IVERSITY,n 

A.N   '-MEG' 


UmB.BS.TY  OF  CAUFORN.A   SA^^ 


3  1822  02584  4069   ^ 


JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 


Honorable  Bertrand  Russell 

Author  of 

Justice  In  War  Time 


-*4J|  .[«>•,  I  


JUSTICE  IN 
WAR-TIME 


BY 

BERTRAND  RUSSELL 

Author  of  "German  Social  Democracy,  " 
' '  The  Principles  of  Mathematics, 
'Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy"  (S'c,  ^'c. 


CHICAGO  LONDON 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 

1916 


Copyright  by 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 

1916 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


PREFACE 

The  following  essays,  of  which  all  except  the  last 
two  have  appeared  in  various  magazines,  were  written 
at  different  times  during  the  course  of  the  war,  and 
are  not  perhaps  wholly  consistent  in  their  expecta- 
tions as  to  the  future,  or  in  their  view  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  the  ordinary  citizen  towards  war.  In  such 
matters,  the  development  of  events  inevitably  some- 
what modifies  first  impressions.  The  view  that  the 
bulk  of  the  population  is  naturally  pacific,  and  is  only 
incited  to  war  by  politicians  and  journalists,  is  widely 
held  among  pacifists,  but  is  vehemently  rejected  by 
the  more  bellicose,  who  point  out  that  men  have  an 
instinct  of  pugnacity,  which  demands  war  from  time 
to  time.  I  think  it  is  true  that  many  men  have  an 
instinct  towards  war,  but  unless  it  is  roused  by  its 
appropriate  stimulus  it  may  well  remain  completely 
latent.  The  instinct,  and  the  machinations  of  war- 
mongers, are  both  needed  to  bring  about  war ;  if  either 
were  coped  with,  the  other  would  be  no  longer  op- 
erative for  evil.  In  the  following  essays  I  have  dealt 
sometimes  with  the  one,  sometimes  with  the  other ;  but 
both  are  essential  factors  in  the  problem,  and  neither 
can  be  neglected  by  any  prudent  friend  of  peace. 

The  first  of  these  essays,  which  was  written  before 
the  Bryce  Report  appeared,  deals  in  part  with  the 
question  of  atrocities.  Nothing  in  that  report  tends 
to  invalidate  the  conclusion  reached  in  the  article, 
namely :  "  No  doubt  both  German  and  Russian  atroci- 
ties have  occurred.    But  it  is  certain  that  they  have 


VI  PREFACE 

been  far  less  numerous,  and  (for  the  most  part)  less 
unnatural,  than  they  are  almost  universally  believed 
to  have  been."  Those  who  can  recall  what  was  be- 
lieved in  England  in  the  early  months  of  the  war  will 
acknowledge  that  the  Bryce  Report,  bad  as  it  is,  tends 
to  show  that  the  atrocities  which  may  be  called  "un- 
natural" have  been  much  fewer  than  most  English 
people  had  supposed.  I  think  it  should  be  added  that 
some  of  the  cases  mentioned  in  the  Bryce  Report  are 
admittedly  based  on  evidence  such  as  would  not  be 
accepted  in  a  criminal  prosecution.  I  have  not  seen 
the  German  Reports  on  supposed  Russian  atrocities, 
but  they,  if  they  are  honest,  presumably  show  exag- 
geration in  what  Germans  believed  about  Russians. 
If  the  atrocities,  however,  were  as  bad  as  was  believed, 
that  can  only  increase  our  horror  of  war.  It  is  war 
that  produces  atrocities,  and  every  fresh  atrocity  is 
a  fresh  argument  for  peace. 

The  last  essay  is  an  attempt  to  show  how  England 
might  have  averted  the  war  by  a  wiser  policy  during 
the  ten  years  preceding  its  outbreak.  To  publish, 
in  war-time,  a  criticism  of  the  policy  of  one's  own 
Government,  is  an  act  which  will  be  thought  by  many 
to  be  unpatriotic.  My  own  deliberate  belief,  however, 
is  that  what  I  have  to  say  is  more  likely  to  benefit 
England  than  to  injure  it,  in  so  far  as  it  produces  any 
effect  at  all.  As  some  readers  might  misunderstand 
my  motives,  I  have  thought  it  well  to  state  them  by 
way  of  introduction. 

I  consider  that  either  a  serious  weakening  of  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Italy,  or  a  serious  strengthening 
of  Germany,  would  be  a  great  misfortune  for  the 


PREFACE  VII 

civilisation  of  the  world.  I  wish  ardently  to  see  the 
Germans  expelled  from  France  and  Belgium,  and  led 
to  feel  that  the  war  has  been  a  misfortune  for  them 
as  well  as  for  the  Allies.  These  things  I  desire  as 
'strongly  as  the  noisiest  of  our  patriots.  But  there 
are  other  things,  forgotten  by  most  men  in  the  excite- 
ment of  battle,  which  seem  to  me  of  even  greater 
importance.  It  is  important  that  peace  should  come 
as  soon  as  possible,  lest  European  civilisation  should 
perish  out  of  the  world.  It  is  important  that,  after 
the  peace,  the  nations  should  feel  that  degree  of 
mutual  respect  which  will  make  co-operation  possible. 
It  is  important  that  England,  the  birthplace  of  liberty 
and  the  home  of  chivalrous  generosity,  should  adopt 
in  the  future  a  policy  worthy  of  itself,  embodying 
its  best,  not  deviously  deceptive  towards  the  hopes  of 
its  more  humane  citizens.  Because  I  prize  civilisation, 
because  I  long  for  the  restoration  of  the  European 
community  of  nations,  but  above  all  because  I  love 
England,  and  because  I  have  hopes  in  regard  to  Eng- 
land which  I  should  feel  Utopian  in  regard  to  Ger- 
many :  because  of  these  fears  and  these  hopes,  I  wish 
to  make  the  English  people  aware  of  the  crimes  that 
have  been  committed  in  its  name,  to  recaU  it  to  the 
temper  in  which  peace  can  be  made  and  preserved, 
and  to  point  the  way  to  a  better  national  pride  than 
that  of  dominion. 

The  British  public,  under  the  influence  of  an  excited 
Press,  believes  that  any  criticism  of  the  past  actions 
of  our  Foreign  Office  tends  to  interfere  with  our 
success  in  the  war.  This,  I  feel  convinced,  is  an  entire 
delusion.     What  has  interfered  with  our  success,  is. 


VIII  PREFACE 

first  and  foremost,  the  supreme  organizing  capacity  of 
the  Germans.  The  faults,  on  our  side,  which  have 
retarded  our  victory,  have  been  lack  of  ability  in 
some  of  the  higher  commands,  lack  of  co-ordination 
in  the  efforts  to  produce  munitions,  jobbery  and  fam- 
ily influence  in  Army  appointments  instead  of  the 
Napoleonic  maxim  of  "la  carriere  ouverte  aux 
talents"  belief,  on  the  part  of  our  politicians,  in 
expedients  and  clever  words  rather  than  a  determined, 
concentrated  vigorous  effort  of  will,  Germans  who 
flatter  themselves  with  hopes  of  England's  decadence 
forget  that  we  have  exhibited  exactly  similar  faults 
in  all  previous  wars,  and  yet  have  been  invariably 
victorious  except  against  our  kith  and  kin  in  America. 
There  has  been  no  failure  of  energy,  courage  and 
self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  nation,  but  there  has 
been  failure  on  the  part  of  its  rulers.  It  is  these 
same  rulers,  not  the  nation,  whose  past  foreign  policy 
I  wish  to  call  in  question.  And  I  do  this  in  the  hope 
that,  after  the  war,  England,  together  with  France 
and  America,  may  lead  the  world  in  a  more  just,  a 
more  humane,  and  a  more  pacific  way  of  dealing  with 
international  problems. 

It  will  be  said  in  England  that  such  criticisms  as 
I  have  made  of  our  Foreign  Office  are  calculated  to 
estrange  the  sympathy  of  Americans.  I  believe  this 
to  be  an  entire  mistake.  Both  England  and  Germany, 
in  presenting  their  case  to  the  American  public,  have 
erred  in  claiming  a  complete  sinlessness  which  is  not 
given  to  mortals,  and  is  not  credible  except  to  the 
eyes  of  self-love.  Both  have  sinned,  and  any  citizen 
of  a  neutral  country  will  take  this  for  granted  before 


PREFACE  IX 

beginning  to  investigate  the  facts.  No  history  of 
events  which  does  not  recognise  this  will  command  his 
assent.  But  though  both  have  sinned,  the  sins  of 
England  sink  into  insignificance  beside  the  German 
treatment  of  Belgium.  And  if  any  Power  is  to  be 
supreme  at  sea,  it  must  be  better  for  international 
freedom  that  that  Power  should  be  England,  whose 
army  is  too  small  to  be  a  danger,  rather  than  Germany, 
which  has  by  far  the  most  powerful  army  in  the 
world.  On  these  broad  grounds,  if  I  belonged  to  a 
neutral  country,  my  sympathies  would  be  against 
Germany.  And  as  an  Englishman,  I  believe  that 
there  is  far  more  hope  of  reform  in  the  foreign  policy 
of  my  own  country  than  in  that  of  Germany.  Most 
of  the  somewhat  discreditable  facts  related  in  the 
following  pages  are  very  little  known  in  England: 
if  they  were  widely  known,  they  would  inspire  wide- 
spread horror  and  determination  of  amendment.  The 
same,  I  believe,  is  true  of  France.  On  this  ground, 
also,  England  and  France  may  claim  the  sympathy 
of  America.  But  the  best  way  of  estranging  the  sym- 
pathy of  neutrals  is  to  make  for  ourselves  pretensions 
which  are  obviously  contrary  to  the  truth,  and  to 
show  that  many  among  us  have  become  blind  to  the 
claims  of  justice.  No  good  cause  is  served  by  the 
suppression  of  truth;  and  those  among  us  who  show 
fear  of  truth  are  doing  a  greater  disservice  to  the 
national  cause  than  can  be  done  by  fearlessly  pro- 
claiming even  the  most  damaging  facts.* 

•I  have  been  greatly  helped  in  the  investigation  of  facts  by 
Miss  Irene  Cooper  Willis,  who,  from  a  consecutive  study  of  "The 
Times"  during  the  critical  periods  of  the  years  concerned,  has 
been  able  to  supply  me  with  most  of  the  references,  all  of  which 
she  has  also  verified. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Preface   v 

An  Appeal  to  the  Intellectuals  of  Europe  ....     1 

The  Ethics  of  War 20 

War  and  Non-Resistance  40 

Why  Nations  Love  War 60 

The  Future  op  Anglo-German  Rivalry 67 

Is  a  Permanent  Peace  Possible  ? 83 

The  Danger  to  Civilization 105 

The  Entente  Policy,  1904-1915.    A  Reply  to  Pro- 
fessor Gilbert  Murray. 

I.  Introduction 128 

II.  MoRROcco 138 

III.  The  Anglo-Russian  Entente 171 

IV.  Persia  180 

V.  What  Our  Policy  Ought  to  Have  Been  .  . .  203 

Appendix  A 216 

Appendix  B  227 

Index    237 


JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

AN  APPEAL  TO  THE  INTELLECTUALS 
OF  EUROPE.* 

Leibniz,  writing  to  a  French  correspondent  at  a  time 
when  France  and  Hanover  were  at  war,  speaks  of 
"this  war,  in  which  philosophy  takes  no  interest." 
[Philosiphische  Werke,  Gerhardt's  edition,  I.,  p.  420.] 
We  have  travelled  far  since  those  days.  In  modern 
times,  philosophers,  professors,  and  intellectuals  gen- 
erally undertake  willingly  to  provide  their  respective 
governments  with  those  ingenious  distortions  and 
those  subtle  untruths  by  which  it  is  made  to  appear 
that  all  good  is  on  one  side  and  all  wickedness  on  the 
other.  Side  by  side,  in  the  pages  of  the  Scientia,  are 
to  be  read  articles  by  learned  men,  all  betraying 
shamelessly  their  national  bias,  all  as  incapable  of  jus- 
tice as  any  cheap  newspaper,  all  as  full  of  special 
pleading  and  garbled  history.  And  all  accept,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  the  inevitability  of  each  other's  bias ; 
disagreeing  with  each  other's  conclusions,  yet  they 
agree  perfectly  with  each  other 's  spirit.  All  agree  that 
the  whole  of  a  writer's  duty  is  to  make  out  a  case 
for  his  own  country. 

•This  article  was  written  in  April,  before  the  Russian  defeats, 
the  participation  of  Italy,  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  and  the 
Bryce  Report.  I  have  not  altered  anything,  though  if  it  were 
written  now  some  alterations  would  be  required.  It  was  to  have 
appeared  in  the  Italian  review,  Scientia,  in  June,  and  was  already 
In  proof,  but  was  withdrawn  in  consequence  of  Italy's  joining 
In  the  war.  It  appeared,  with  some  omissions,  in  Noa.  4  and  5 
of  the  Swiss  International  Review. 


2  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

To  this  attitude  there  have  been  notable  exceptions 
among  literary  men — for  example,  Remain  RoUand 
and  Bernard  Shaw — and  even  among  politicians, 
although  political  extinction  is  now  everywhere  the 
penalty  for  a  sense  of  justice.  Among  men  of  learn- 
ing, there  are  no  doubt  many  who  have  preserved 
justice  in  their  thoughts  and  in  their  private  utter- 
ances. But  these  men,  whether  from  fear  or  from  un- 
willingness to  seem  unpatriotic,  have  almost  kept 
silence.  Among  those  who  have  published  their  opin- 
ions, almost  all  have  shown  a  complete  lack  of  intel- 
lectual detachment.  Such  an  article  as  that  of  V. 
Pareto  in  Scientia  could  hardly  have  been  written  by 
a  professor  in  one  of  the  belligerent  countries.* 

I  cannot  but  think  that  the  men  of  learning,  by 
allowing  partiality  to  colour  their  thoughts  and  words, 
have  missed  the  opportunity  of  performing  a  service 
to  mankind  for  which  their  training  should  have  spe- 
cially fitted  them.  The  truth,  whatever  it  may  be,  is 
the  same  in  England,  France,  and  Germany,  in  Russia 
and  in  Austria.  It  will  not  adapt  itself  to  national 
needs:  it  is  in  its  essence  neutral.  It  stands  outside 
the  clash  of  passions  and  hatreds,  revealing,  to  those 
who  seek  it,  the  tragic  irony  of  strife  with  its  attendant 
world  of  illusions.  Men  of  learning,  who  should  be 
accustomed  to  the  pursuit  of  truth  in  their  daily  work, 
might  have  attempted,  at  this  time,  to  make  themselves 
the  mouthpiece  of  truth,  to  see  what  was  false  on  their 
own  side,  what  was  valid  on  the  side  of  their  enemies. 
They  might   have  used  their  reputation  and  their 

♦Though  the  article  of  N.  Kostyleff  in  the  April  number  of 
Scientia  falls  not  far  short  of  a  completely  just  outlook. 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS  3 

freedom  from  political  entanglements  to  mitigate  the 
abhorrence  with  which  the  nations  have  come  to  re- 
gard each  other,  to  help  towards  mutual  understand- 
ing, to  make  the  peace,  when  it  comes,  not  a  mere 
cessation  due  to  weariness,  but  a  fraternal  reconcili- 
ation, springing  from  realisation  that  the  strife  has 
been  a  folly  of  blindness.  They  have  chosen  to  do 
nothing  of  all  this.  Allegiance  to  country  has  swept 
away  allegiance  to  truth.  Thought  has  become  the 
slave  of  instinct,  not  its  master.  The  guardians  of  the 
temple  of  Truth  have  betrayed  it  to  idolaters,  and  have 
been  the  first  to  promote  the  idolatrous  worship. 

One  of  the  most  surprising  things  in  this  war  is  the 
universal  appeal  to  atavistic  moral  notions  which,  in 
times  of  peace,  civilised  men  would  have  repudiated 
\\dth  contempt.  Germans  speak  of  England's  brutal 
national  egotism,  and  represent  Germany  as  fighting 
to  maintain  a  great  ideal  of  civilisation  against  an 
envious  world.  Englishmen  speak  of  Germany 's  ruth- 
less militarism  and  lust  of  dominion,  and  represent 
themselves  as  fighting  to  uphold  the  sacredness  of 
treaties  and  the  rights  of  small  nations.  In  a  sober 
mood,  many  of  the  men  who  use  such  language  would 
recognise  that  it  is  melodramatic  and  mythical.  All 
nations,  at  all  times,  are  egotistic.  It  may  happen, 
accidentally,  that  in  pursuing  its  own  interest  a  nation 
is  also  spreading  civilisation  or  upholding  the  sacred- 
ness of  treaties ;  but  no  impartial  person  can  believe 
that  for  such  ends  a  nation  will  sacrifice  a  million  lives 
and  a  thousand  millions  of  pounds.  Such  sacrifices 
are  only  made  for  nationally  selfish  ends,  and  until  it 
is  recognised  that  all  the  nations  engaged  in  the  war 


4  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

are  equally  and  wholly  selfish,  no  true  thought  about 
the  issues  involved  is  possible. 

Moral  judgments,  as  applied  to  others  than  oneself, 
are  a  somewhat  subtilised  police  force :  they  make  use 
of  men's  desire  for  approbation  to  bring  self-interest 
into  harmony  with  the  interest  of  one's  neighbours. 
But  when  a  man  is  already  trying  to  Mil  you,  you  will 
not  feel  much  additional  discomfort  in  the  thought 
that  he  has  a  low  opinion  of  your  moral  character. 
For  this  reason,  disapproval  of  our  enemies  in  war- 
time is  useless,  so  far  as  any  possible  effect  upon  them 
is  concerned.  It  has,  however,  a  certain  unconscious 
purpose,  which  is,  to  prevent  humane  feelings  towards 
the  enemy,  and  to  nip  in  the  bud  any  nascent  sym- 
pathy for  his  sufferings.  Under  the  stress  of  danger, 
beliefs  and  emotions  all  become  subservient  to  the  one 
end  of  self-preservation.  Since  it  is  repugnant  to 
civilised  men  to  kill  and  maim  others  just  like  them- 
selves, it  becomes  necessary  to  conquer  repugnance  by 
denying  the  likeness  and  imputing  wickedness  to  those 
whom  we  wish  to  injure.  And  so  it  comes  about  that 
the  harshest  moral  judgments  of  the  enemy  are  formed 
by  the  nations  which  have  the  strongest  impulses  of 
kindliness  to  overcome. 

In  order  to  support  this  belief  in  the  peculiar 
wickedness  of  the  enemy,  a  whole  mythology  of  false- 
hood grows  up,  partly  through  the  deliberate  action 
of  newspapers  and  governments,  but  chiefly  through 
the  inherent  myth-making  tendency  of  strong  collec- 
tive emotions.  Every  powerful  passion  brings  with  it 
an  impulse  to  an  attendant  system  of  false  beliefs.  A 
man  in  love  will  attribute  innumerable  non-existent 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS  5 

perfections  to  the  object  of  his  devotion ;  a  jealous  man 
will  attribute  equally  non-existent  crimes  to  the  object 
of  his  jealousy.  But  in  ordinary  life,  this  tendency  is 
continually  held  in  check  by  intercourse  with  people 
who  do  not  share  our  private  passions,  and  who  there- 
fore are  critical  of  our  irrational  beliefs.  In  national 
questions,  this  corrective  is  absent.  Most  men  meet 
few  foreigners,  especially  in  time  of  war,  and  beliefs 
inspired  by  passion  can  be  communicated  to  others 
without  fear  of  an  unsympathetic  response.  The  sup- 
posed facts  intensify  the  passion  which  they  embody, 
and  are  magnified  still  further  by  those  to  whom  they 
are  told.  Individual  passions,  except  in  lunatics, 
produce  only  the  germs  of  myths,  perpetually  neutral- 
ised by  the  indifference  of  others;  but  collective  pas- 
sions escape  this  corrective,  and  generate  in  time  what 
appears  like  overwhelming  evidence  for  wholly  false 
beliefs. 

Men  of  learning,  who  are  acquainted  with  the  part 
played  by  collective  error  in  the  history  of  religion, 
ought  to  have  been  on  their  guard  against  assaults 
upon  their  credulity.  They  ought  to  have  realised, 
from  the  obvious  falsehood  of  the  correlative  opposite 
beliefs  in  enemy  countries,  that  the  myth-making  im- 
pulse was  unusually  active,  and  could  only  be  repelled 
by  an  unusual  intellectual  vigour.  But  I  do  not  find 
that  they  were  appreciably  less  credulous  than  the 
multitude.  In  the  early  days  of  last  September,  when 
the  Germans  were  carrying  all  before  them  in  France, 
the  need  for  some  source  of  hope  produced  in  England 
an  all  but  universal  belief  that  a  large  Russian  army 
had  travelled  from  Archangel,  through  England,  to 


6  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

Belgium.  The  evidence  was  very  much  better  than 
the  evidence  for  most  facts  of  history :  most  men  knew 
many  eye-'v\dtnesses  of  their  transit,  and  at  last  a  news- 
paper published  a  telegram  from  its  correspondent 
saying  that  he  had  discovered  them  in  Belgium. 
Only  then  was  the  story  officially  denied,  but  for  a 
long  time  many  continued  to  believe  it.  And  the 
intellectuals  were  not  by  any  means  less  ready  to 
believe  it  than  the  rest  of  the  country. 

The  really  harmful  beliefs  are  those  which  produce 
hatred  of  the  enemy.  The  devastation  and  maltreat- 
ment of  Belgium  might  naturally  have  aroused  some 
qualms  among  humane  Germans.  But  the  instinct  of 
self-protection  produced  a  harvest  of  accusations 
against  the  Belgians:  that  they  put  out  the  eyes  of 
wounded  Germans,  or  cut  off  their  hands;  that  they 
behaved  brutally  to  German  women  in  Belgium ;  and, 
generally,  that  they  had  shown  such  depravity  as 
rendered  them  unworthy  of  consideration.  At  the 
very  same  time,  innumerable  German  atrocities  were 
reported  in  England.  It  cannot,  unfortunately,  be 
denied  that  many  very  shocking  atrocities  occurred, 
but  not  nearly  so  many  as  the  English  at  first  believed. 
Many  men  stated  confidently  that  they  knew  people 
in  England  who  had  staying  with  them  Belgian  chil- 
dren whose  hands  had  been  cut  off  by  German  soldiers. 
Some  such  cases  there  were  in  Belgium,  but  I  know 
of  no  evidence  that  any  reached  England.  No  effect 
whatever  was  produced  by  pointing  out  that  if  there 
were  so  many  cases,  at  least  one  with  a  name  and 
address  would  have  been  mentioned  in  the  newspaper. 
Such  arguments  have  no  power  against  a  belief  which 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS  7 

stimulates  ferocity,  and  is  on  that  account  felt  to  be 
useful.  No  doubt  atrocities  have  occurred  on  both 
sides.  But  it  is  certain  that  they  have  been  far  less 
numerous,  and  (for  the  most  part)  less  unnatural, 
than  they  are  almost  universally  believed  to  have  been. 

A  correspondence  in  the  Labour  Leader  for  March 
18  will  illustrate  this  point. 

Rev.  J.  F,  Matthews, 
Glossop  Road  Baptist  Church, 

Sheffield. 
Dear  Sib, 

A  correspondent  informs  us  that  on  Sunday  morning  you 
stated  in  the  course  of  a  sermon  delivered  in  Wash  Lane 
Church,  Latchford,  Warrington,  that  there  is  a  Belgian  girl  in 
Sheffield  with  her  nose  cut  ofT  and  her  stomach  ripped  open 
by  the  Germans,  and  that  she  is  still  living  and  getting  better. 

I  am  anxious  to  investigate  stories  of  German  atrocities,  and 
should  be  grateful   if  you  could   send   particulars   to   me  by 
which  your  statements  could  be  authenticated. 
Faithfully  yours, 

March  5,  1915.  A.  Fenneb  Bbockway. 

Mr.  A.  Fenner  Brockway. 
Deab  Sib, 

Thank  you  for  your  note.  I  have  written  to  our  Belgian 
Consul  here  for  the  name  and  address  of  the  girl  whose  case 
I  quoted  at  Latchford.  If  all  I  hear  is  true  it  is  far  worse 
than  I  stated.  I  am  also  asking  for  another  similar  instance, 
which  I  shall  be  glad  to  transmit  to  you  if,  and  as  soon  as,  I 
can  secure  the  facts. 

I  am,  yours  very  sincerely, 

March  9,  1915.  John  Feancis  Matthews. 

Dear  Mb.  Bbockway, 

I  enclose  our  Consul's  letter,  which  I  have  just  received.  I 
am  writing  a  letter  to  my  old  Church  at  Latchford,  to  be  read 
on  Sunday  next,  contradicting  the  story  which  I  told,  on  what 
seemed  to  be  unimpeachable  authority.  I  am  glad  I  did  not 
give  the  whole  of  the  alleged  facts  as  they  were  given  to  me. 
With  many  thanks  for  your  note  and  inquiry. 
I  am,  yours  sincerely, 

March  12,  1915.  John  Feancis  Matthews. 

Deab  Mb.  Matthews, 

Replying  to  your  letter  of  the  9th  inst.,  enclosing  a  letter 
which  you  have  received  from  the  Labour  Leader,  although  I 
have  heard  of  a  number  of  cases  of  Belgian  girls  being  mal- 


8  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

treated  in  one  way  and  another,  I  have  on  investigation  not 
found  a  particle  of  truth  in  one  of  them,  and  I  know  of  no  girl 
in  Sheffield  who  has  had  her  nose  cut  off  and  her  stomach 
ripped  open. 

I  have  also  investigated  cases  in  other  towns,  but  have  not 
yet  succeeded  in  getting  hold  of  any  tangible  confirmation. 
Yours  very  truly, 

A.  Balfay, 
(Belgian  Consul  at  Sheffield). 
March  11,  1915. 

I  have  not  the  means  of  giving  similar  illustrations 
of  false  beliefs  in  Germany  and  Austria.  But  in  case 
this  book  should  be  read  by  any  German  or  Aus- 
trian, I  would  beg  him  not  to  infer  any  peculiar 
English  credulity,  but  to  realise  that  such  false  stories 
are  an  accident  of  war,  and  that  a  great  deal  of  what 
the  German  or  Austrian  public  believes  on  apparently 
unimpeachable  evidence  is  sure  to  be  untrue.  No  man 
with  any  spark  of  justice  in  his  nature  will  deliber- 
ately wish  to  think  worse  of  his  enemies  than  they 
deserve.  So  long  as  he  is  not  on  his  guard,  his  instinct 
will  play  tricks  with  his  judgment.  We  all  perceive 
quite  easily  that  this  happens  in  enemy  nations ;  what 
I  wish  to  point  out  is  that  it  happens  in  all  the  bellig- 
erent nations.  Those  who  remark  pityingly  that  the 
enemy  are  deluded  with  lies  ought  to  remember  our 
common  human  nature,  and  to  realise  that  their  own 
nation  is  equally  deluded  with  exactly  similar  "lies" 
— though  ' '  lies ' '  is  hardly  the  word,  since  there  is  very 
little  deliberate  deception  involved. 

There  is,  however,  another  class  of  false  beliefs,  in 
which  deliberate  deception  has  played  a  greater  part. 
These  are  false  beliefs  on  political  matters  of  fact.  I 
will  give  two  illustrations,  one  on  each  side. 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS  9 

In  Germany,  the  belief  seems  to  be  almost  universal 
that  England  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
before  Germany  did  so.  This  belief  is  based  partly 
on  the  assertion  that  the  English  sent  troops  to  Bel- 
gium before  the  declaration  of  war,  partly  on  the 
military  conversations  in  Brussels  in  1906  and  1912. 
As  to  the  first  of  these  allegations,  not  only  has  it 
been  denied  by  our  Government,  which  Germans 
could  hardly  be  expected  to  regard  as  evidence;  not 
only  is  its  falsehood  evident  from  the  Belgian  Grey 
Book,  which  Germans  might  regard  as  a  piece  of 
skillful  manipulation;  not  only  are  those  among  us 
who  have  many  acquaintances  in  the  Army,  and  who 
must  have  heard  privately  if  any  troops  were  sent 
abroad,  able  to  assert  with  absolute  certainty  that  no 
such  event  took  place;  but  the  military  events  of 
last  August  are  sufficient  proof,  one  would  have  sup- 
posed, even  to  the  credulity  of  an  enemy.  No  Eng- 
lish prisoners  were  taken  by  the  Germans  in  their 
early  battles  with  Belgians,  and  so  far  as  I  have 
heard  they  do  not  even  allege  that  they  encountered 
any  English  before  they  reached  Mons. 

The  assertion  that  the  military  conversations 
constituted  a  breach  of  neutrality  is  supported  by 
omitting  the  fact  that  all  the  arrangements  were 
conditional  upon  the  Germans  first  invading  Belgium. 
It  was  well  known  that  this  was  likely  to  happen  in 
the  event  of  war,  and  that  England  and  France  would, 
in  that  case,  attempt  the  defence  of  Belgium  if  possi- 
ble. If,  when  the  time  came,  the  Germans  had  respect- 
ed Belgian  neutrality,  they  might  have  pointed  to  the 
conversations  as  proof  of  groundless  suspicion.     But 


10  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

in  view  of  what  has  occurred,  it  is  absurd  to  pretend 
that  England  and  Belgium  had  no  right  to  consider  in 
common  how  they  should  meet  a  threatening  danger 
which  proves  to  have  been  only  too  real.  The  German 
accusation,  like  the  charges  of  atrocities  brought 
against  Belgians,  is  merely  a  symptom  of  a  bad 
conscience,  not  an  outcome  of  any  calm  consideration 
of  the  evidence. 

My  other  illustration  concerns  the  dates  of 
mobilisation.  It  is  usually  asserted  in  England  that 
Austria's  general  mobilisation  preceded  Russia's, 
whereas  the  opposite  seems  almost  certainly  the  truth. 
At  the  time,  the  true  view  was  generally  accepted  in 
England,  just  as  Bethmann-Hollweg  admitted  that  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  was  a  wrong.  But  just  as  this 
admission  was  seen  to  constitute  a  fatal  weakness  in 
Germany's  pose,  so  the  Russian  mobilisation  was  seen 
to  constitute  a  weakness  in  the  Allies'  contention  that 
Germany  deliberately  planned  the  war.  And  so  each 
side  set  to  work  to  explain  away  its  earlier  admissions, 
and  to  produce  a  completely  comfortable  state  of  mind 
by  methods  which  seem  hard  to  acquit  wholly  of 
deliberate  falsification.  But  on  neither  side  have  the 
intellectuals  made  any  appreciable  attempt  to  resist  the 
process  of  self-deception  to  which  their  Governments 
invited  them.  What  little  attempt  at  truth  there  has 
been  has  been  almost  wholly  confined  to  Socialists, 
who  had  none  of  the  educational  advantages  which 
proved  so  unavailing  among  professors. 

The  beliefs  which  the  learned  have  allowed  them- 
selves to  share  with  their  compatriots  are  not  only 
independent  of  fact  in  their  broad  outlines,  but  are 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS         11 

inspired,  even  in  their  niceties,  by  the  instincts 
connected  with  combat.  The  Germans  have  strong 
hope  of  a  separate  peace  with  France,  some  hope  of  a 
separate  peace  with  Russia,  and  no  hope  of  a  separate 
peace  with  England.  It  follows  from  this  that  the 
French  are  not  wicked  at  all,  the  Russians  are  only 
moderately  wicked,  while  the  English  are  a  blot  upon 
the  human  race.  The  English  feel  quite  certain  that 
the  Allies  can  crush  the  Turks,  fairly  confident  that 
they  can  prevent  the  Austrians  from  ever  again 
becoming  a  danger,  but  not  all  sure  that  they  can 
break  the  spirit  of  Germany.  They  deduce  that  the 
Turks  are  brave  misguided,  the  Austrians  the  mere 
tools  of  Prussia,  while  the  Germans  deserve  to  be 
condemned  to  the  lowest  pit  of  hell.  It  is  useless  to 
urge  that  the  Turks  have  been  for  ages  a  by-word  of 
cruelty,  that  the  Austrians  have  prima  facie  more 
responsibility  for  the  war  than  the  Germans,  or  that 
the  Germans  have  contributed  much  of  what  is  most 
valuable  in  the  civilisation  of  the  world.  Such  mere 
facts  carry  no  weight :  moral  reprobation  is  nothing  but 
an  embodiment  of  hatred,  and  hatred  is  a  mechanical 
product  of  biological  instinct.  It  is  unworthy  of  men 
who  pretend  to  freedom  of  thought  to  be  caught  in  the 
toils  of  this  purely  animal  mechanism.  There  is  no 
reason  to  expect  an  unusual  degree  of  humane  feeling 
from  professors;  but  some  pride  of  rationality,  some 
unwillingness  to  let  judgment  be  enslaved  by  brutal 
passions,  we  might  have  hoped  to  find.  But  we  should 
have  hoped  in  vain. 

The  fundamental  irrational  belief,  on  which  all  the 
others  rest,  is  the  belief  that  the  victory  of  one 's  own 


12  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

side  is  of  enormous  and  indubitable  importance,  and 
even  of  such  importance  as  to  outweigh  all  the  evils 
involved  in  prolonging  the  war.  It  is  possible,  in  view 
of  the  uncertainty  of  all  human  affairs,  that  the  victory 
of  one  side  or  the  other  might  bring  great  good  to 
humanity.  But  even  if  this  be  the  case,  the  beliefs  of 
the  combatants  are  none  the  less  irrational,  since  there 
is  no  evidence  such  as  would  convince  an  impartial 
outsider.  The  Allies  are  convinced  that  their  victory 
is  for  the  good  of  mankind,  and  the  Germans  and 
Austrians  are  no  less  convinced  in  the  opposite  sense. 
When  a  large  mass  of  men  hold  one  opinion,  and 
another  large  mass  hold  another,  and  when  in  each 
case  the  opinion  is  in  accordance  with  self-interest,  it 
is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  it  is  based  on  rational 
grounds  either  on  the  one  side  or  on  the  other. 
Meanwhile  the  evils  produced  by  the  war  increase  from 
day  to  day,  and  they,  at  least,  must  be  admitted  by 
both  sides  equally. 

The  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  desirable  issue 
of  the  war  is  not  wholly  due  to  self-interest,  though 
that  is  no  doubt  the  chief  cause.  The  difference  is  due  in 
part  to  divergent  ideals  embodying  divergent  desires. 
Putting  the  matter  crudely,  and  considering  only  the 
Western  war,  we  may  say  that  the  Germans  love  order, 
learning,  and  music,  all  of  which  are  good  things, 
while  the  French  and  English  love  democracy  and 
liberty,  which  are  also  good  things.  In  order  to  force 
their  respective  ideals  upon  nations  which  do  not  value 
them,  the  Germans  are  willing  to  replace  order  in 
Europe  by  the  universal  chaos  of  war,  and  to  send  the 
young  men  who  pursue  learning  or  music  to  be  killed 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS  13 

on  the  battlefield,  while  the  French  and  English  have 
found  it  necessary  to  suppress  democracy  and  liberty 
for  the  present,  without  any  guarantee  that  they  will 
be  restored  when  the  war  is  over.  If  the  war  lasts  long, 
all  that  was  good  in  the  ideals  of  Germany,  France, 
and  England  will  have  perished,  as  the  ideals  of 
Spartans  and  Athenians  perished  in  the  Peloponne- 
sian  War.  All  three  races,  with  all  that  they  have 
added  to  our  civilisation,  will  have  become  exhausted, 
and  victory,  when  it  comes,  will  be  as  barren  and  as 
hopeless  as  defeat. 

Under  the  distorting  influence  of  war,  the  doubtful 
and  microscopic  differences  between  different  Euro- 
pean nations  have  been  exaggerated  when  it  has  be- 
come treason  to  question  their  overwhelming  import- 
ance. Every  educated  man  knew  and  acknowledged 
before  the  war  began,  and  every  educated  man  now 
knows  without  acknowledging,  that  the  likenesses 
among  European  nations  are  immeasurably  greater 
than  their  differences.  Congresses,  conferences,  and 
international  bodies  of  many  kinds  testified  to  the  dif- 
fused consciousness  of  a  common  purpose,  a  common 
task  in  the  life  of  civilisation.  Suddenly,  between 
one  day  and  the  next,  all  this  is  forgotten:  German 
scholars  repudiate  English  honours,  English  scholars 
say  that  Germany  has  done  nothing  of  importance  in 
learning.  In  a  moment,  all  the  great  co-operative 
work  for  which  academic  bodies  exist  is  set  aside  for 
the  pleasure  of  indulging  a  bitter  and  trivial  hatred. 

This  war  is  trivial,  for  all  its  vastness.  No  great 
principle  is  at  stake,  no  great  human  purpose  is  in- 
volved on  either  side.     The  supposed  ideal  ends  for 


14  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

which  it  is  being  fought  are  merely  part  of  the  myth. 
Every  nation  is  fighting  in  self-defence,  every  nation 
is  fighting  to  destroy  the  tyranny  of  armaments, 
every  nation  is  fighting  to  show  that  unprovoked 
aggression  cannot  be  practised  with  impunity. 
Every  nation  pays  homage  to  peace  by  maintaining 
that  its  enemies  began  the  war.  The  fact  that  these 
assertions  carry  equal  conviction  on  both  sides  shows 
that  they  are  not  based  on  reason,  but  are  merely  in- 
spired by  prejudice.  But  besides  these  common  ob- 
jects, there  are  some  in  which  the  two  sides  differ. 
Probably  the  two  Kaisers  would  say,  and  perhaps  be- 
lieve, that  they  are  fighting  to  prove  it  a  crime  to 
assassinate  heirs  to  thrones.  It  can  hardly  be  sup- 
posed that  the  Tsar  would  deny  that  this  is  a  crime, 
but  he  would  say,  as  the  English  do,  that  it  is  a  crime 
for  a  great  nation  to  oppress  a  small  one.  This 
proposition,  however,  is  only  true  in  certain  latitudes ; 
it  does  not  apply  to  Finland  or  Persia.  The  English 
and  French  say  they  are  fighting  in  defence  of  de- 
mocracy, but  they  do  not  wish  their  words  to  be 
heard  in  Petrograd  or  Calcutta.  And,  oddly  enough, 
those  who  most  bitterly  hate  democracy  at  home  are 
the  most  ferocious  in  defending  it  against  Germany. 
This  war  is  not  being  fought  for  any  rational  end : 
it  is  being  fought  because,  at  first,  the  nations  wished 
to  fight,  and  now  they  are  angry  and  determined  to 
win  victory.  Everything  else  is  idle  talk,  artificial 
rationalising  of  instinctive  actions  and  passions.  When 
two  dogs  fight  in  the  street,  no  one  supposes  that 
anything  but  instinct  prompts  them,  or  that  they  are 
inspired  by  high  and  noble  ends.    But  if  they  were 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS         15 

capable  of  what  is  called  thought,  if  they  had  been 
taught  that  Dog  is  a  rational  animal,  we  may  be  sure 
that  a  superstructure  of  belief  would  grow  up  in  them 
during  the  combat.  They  fight  really  because  some- 
thing angers  them  in  each  other's  smell.  But  if  their 
fighting  were  accompanied  by  intellectual  activity,  the 
one  would  say  he  was  fighting  to  promote  the  right 
kind  of  smell  (Kulter),  and  the  other  to  uphold  the 
inherent  canine  right  of  running  on  the  pavement 
(democracy).  Yet  this  would  not  prevent  the  by- 
standers from  seeing  that  their  action  was  foolish, 
and  that  they  ought  to  be  parted  as  soon  as  possible. 
And  what  is  true  of  dogs  in  the  street  is  equally  true 
of  nations  in  the  present  war. 

The  original  impulse  towards  war,  though  by  now 
it  has  spent  its  force,  was  very  strong  in  the  first  days. 
Fighting  and  killing  are  among  the  natural  activities 
of  males,  both  of  human  beings  and  of  the  higher 
animals.  The  spectacle  of  males  killing  each  other  in 
sexual  combat  is  pleasant,  presumably,  to  animal 
females,  and  certainly  to  many  of  those  of  the  species 
homo  sapiens.  Owing  to  the  activities  of  the  police, 
opportunities  for  these  pleasures  are  much  curtailed 
in  civilised  countries.  For  this  reason,  when  war  is 
coming  there  is  a  liberation  of  a  whole  set  of  in- 
stinctive activities  normally  repressed.  This  brings 
with  it  an  exhilaration  comparable  to  that  of  falling 
in  love.  Instead  of  being  oppressed  by  the  prospect 
of  the  horrors  of  war — friends  and  relations  killed 
or  maimed,  countries  ravaged,  civilisation  bleeding  in 
the  mire — most  men,  in  the  first  days,  were  excited 
and  happy,  feeling  an  unusual  freedom,  and  invent- 


16  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

ing,  with  unconscious  hypocrisy,  all  sorts  of  humane 
reasons  to  excuse  their  joy.  In  this  mood  there  is  no 
great  hatred  of  the  enemy:  he  has  his  uses,  since 
without  him  there  could  be  no  fighting.  The  injury 
to  him  is  a  merely  incidental  and  almost  regrettable 
result  of  the  battle.  Primitive  poetry  is  full  of  this 
mood,  and  the  early  days  of  August  showed  that  it 
is  still  possible  to  civilised  men. 

But  when,  as  in  this  war,  neither  side  wins  decisive 
successes,  and  the  utmost  effort  is  required  to  avert 
disaster,  the  honeymoon  intoxication  of  the  first 
moments  is  soon  succeeded  by  a  sterner  mood.  Checks 
cause  fury,  and  injuries  suffered  produce  hatred. 
More  and  more  men 's  thought  become  concentrated  on 
humbling  the  pride  of  their  enemies.  If  the  war  re- 
mains undecided  for  a  long  time,  if  the  new  levies  on 
both  sides  are  exterminated  without  either  victory  or 
defeat,  there  will  be  a  gromng  ferocity,  leading  to 
horrors  such  as  even  this  war  has  not  yet  brought  into 
the  imaginations  of  men.  One  by  one  soldiers  will 
pass  suddenly  from  ferocity  to  apathy:  the  spring 
of  will  will  break,  leaving  millions  of  derelicts  fit  only 
for  the  hospital  or  the  asylum.  This  is  what  the 
German  military  authorities  mean  when  they  say  that 
the  war  will  be  decided  by  nervous  endurance.  They 
hope  that  a  smaller  percentage  of  the  Germans  than 
of  the  Allies  will  be  broken  by  the  strain.  Militarists 
on  both  sides  look  forward  cheerfully  to  the  extinction, 
for  all  purposes  of  national  life,  of  most  of  the  men 
now  between  twenty  and  forty.  And  yet  they  con- 
tinue to  pretend  that  the  victory  of  their  side  is  more 
important  than  an  early  peace.    And  in  this  infamy 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS        17 

their  professorial  parasites  support  them  and  egg 
them  on. 

The  worst  disasters  would  have  been  averted  if 
either  side  had  won  a  rapid  victory,  and  are  even  now 
not  inevitable  if  the  war  comes  to  an  end  during  this 
year.  But  if  peace  is  not  made  soon,  if  no  military 
decision  is  reached,  there  will  have  to  be  an  increasing 
passionate  concentration  of  will  in  all  countries  upon 
the  one  common  purpose  of  mutual  destruction.  As 
the  effort  of  will  required  grows  greater  and  more 
difficult  through  weariness,  the  vital  force  of  the 
nations  will  be  more  and  more  weakened.  When  at 
last  peace  comes,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  no  stimulus 
will  be  adequate  to  rouse  men  to  action.  After  the 
fierce  tension  of  combat,  nothing  will  seem  important ; 
a  weak  and  relaxed  dissipation  will  succeed  the  ter- 
rible unnatural  concentration.  There  is  no  parallel 
in  history  to  the  conflict  in  which  the  world  is  now 
engaged.  Never  before  have  so  large  a  proportion  of 
the  population  been  engaged  in  fighting,  and  never 
before  has  the  fighting  been  so  murderous.  All  that 
science  and  organisation  have  done  to  increase  the 
efficiency  of  labour  has  been  utilised  to  set  free  more 
men  for  the  destructive  work  of  the  battlefield.  Man 's 
greater  command  over  Nature  has  only  magnified  the 
disaster,  because  it  has  not  been  accomplished  by  geater 
command  over  his  own  passions.  And  if  he  does 
not  acquire  command  over  his  own  passions,  what- 
ever destruction  is  not  achieved  now  is  only  postponed 
to  a  later  day. 

The  degradation  of  science  from  its  high  function  in 
ameliorating  the  lot  of  man  is  one  of  the  most  painful 


18  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

aspects  of  this  war.  Savage  man,  like  the  brutes,  lives 
in  bondage  to  matter:  the  task  of  securing  a  bare 
subsistence  absorbs  his  energies,  leaving  no  leisure  for 
art  and  thought  and  the  goods  of  the  mind.  From  this 
bondage  science  has  been  progressively 'liberating  the 
populations  of  civilized  countries.  One  man's  labour 
now  will  produce  a  great  deal  more  than  one  man's 
food.  Out  of  the  time  set  free  in  this  way  have  grown 
literature  and  music,  poetry  and  philosophy,  and  the 
intoxicating  triumphs  of  science  itself.  On  the  basis 
of  the  greater  productivity  of  labour,  education, 
democracy,  and  all  the  political  advances  of  the  modern 
State  have  been  built.  Suddenly,  now,  because  a 
madness  of  destruction  has  swept  over  Europe,  the 
men  of  science  have  abandoned  their  beneficent 
activities :  physicists  invent  swifter  aircraft,  chemists 
devise  more  deadly  explosives,  and  almost  all  who  can, 
devote  themselves  to  the  labour  of  death.  The  place 
of  science  in  human  development,  one  is  compelled  to 
think,  has  never  become  present  to  their  minds,  since 
they  are  willing  to  prostitute  it  to  the  undoing  of  its 
own  work. 

Knowledge  with  elevation  of  mind  is  the  chief 
instrument  of  human  progress;  knowledge  without 
elevation  of  mind  easily  becomes  devilish,  and  increases 
the  wounds  which  man  inflicts  on  man.  Men  of 
learning  should  be  the  guardians  of  one  of  the  sacred 
fires  that  illumine  the  darkness  into  which  the  human 
spirit  is  born:  upon  them  depends  the  ideal  of  just 
thought,  of  disinterested  pursuit  of  truth,  which,  if  it 
had  existed  more  widely,  would  have  sufficed  alone  to 
prevent  the  present  horror.     To  serve  this  ideal,  to 


AN  APPEAL  TO  INTELLECTUALS        19 

keep  alive  a  purpose  remote  from  strife,  is  more  worthy 
of  the  intellectual  leaders  of  Europe  than  to  help 
Governments  in  stimulating  hatred  or  slaughtering 
more  of  the  young  men  upon  whom  the  future  of  the 
world  depends.  It  is  time  to  forget  our  supposed 
separate  duty  toward  Germany,  Austria,  Russia, 
Prance,  or  England,  and  remember  that  higher  duty 
to  mankind  in  which  we  can  still  be  at  one. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR.* 

The  question  whether  war  is  ever  justified,  and  if  so 
under  what  circumstances,  is  one  which  has  been 
forcing  itself  upon  the  attention  of  all  thoughtful  men. 
It  seems  to  me  that  no  single  one  of  the  combatants  is 
justified  in  the  present  war,  and  yet  I  cannot  believe 
that  war  is  under  all  circumstances  a  crime.  Opinions 
on  such  a  subject  as  war  are  the  outcome  of  feeling 
rather  than  of  thought:  given  a  man's  emotional 
temperament,  his  convictions,  both  on  war  in  general 
and  on  any  particular  war  which  may  occur  during  his 
lifetime  can  be  predicted  with  tolerable  certainty. 
The  arguments  used  will  merely  reinforce  what  comes 
out  of  a  man 's  nature.  The  fundamental  facts  in  this 
as  in  all  ethical  questions  are  feelings ;  all  that  thought 
can  do  is  to  clarify  and  harmonise  the  expression  of 
those  feelings,  and  it  is  such  clarifying  and  harmo- 
nising of  my  own  feelings  that  I  wish  to  attempt  in 
the  present  article. 

I. 
The  question  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  a  particular 
war  is  generally  considered  from  a  juridical  or  quasi- 
juridical  standpoint:  A  certain  country  broke  a 
certain  treaty,  crossed  a  certain  frontier,  committed 
certain  technically  unfriendly  acts,  and,  therefore,  by 
the  rules,  it  is  permissible  to  kill  as  many  of  the 
soldiers  of  that  country  as  modern  armaments  render 

•Reprinted  from  the  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  January, 
1915. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  21 

possible.  There  is  a  certain  unreality,  a  certain  lack 
of  imaginative  grasp  about  this  way  of  viewing 
matters.  It  has  the  advantage,  always  dearly  prized 
by  lazy  men,  of  substituting  a  formula,  at  once  am- 
biguous and  easily  applied,  for  the  vital  realisation 
of  the  consequences  of  acts.  The  judicial  point  of 
view  is  properly  applicable  to  the  relations  of  indi- 
viduals within  a  State,  but  not,  as  yet,  to  the  relations 
between  States.  Within  a  State,  private  war  is  for- 
bidden, and  the  disputes  of  private  citizens  are  settled, 
not  by  their  own  force,  but  by  the  force  of  the  police, 
which,  being  overwhelming,  very  seldom  needs  to  be 
explicity  displayed.  There  have  to  be  rules  according 
to  which  the  police  decide,  who  is  to  be  considered 
in  the  right  in  a  private  dispute,  and  these  rules  con- 
stitute law.  The  chief  gain  derived  from  the  law  and 
the  police  is  the  abolition  of  private  wars,  and  this 
gain  is  secured  even  if  the  law  as  it  stands  is  not  the 
best  possible.  It  is  therefore  in  the  public  interest 
that  the  man  who  goes  against  the  law  should  be 
considered  in  the  wrong,  not  because  of  the  excellence 
of  the  law,  but  because  of  the  importance  of  pre- 
venting individuals  within  the  State  from  resorting 
to  force. 

In  the  interrelations  of  States  nothing  of  the  same 
sort  exists.  There  is,  it  is  true,  a  body  of  conventions 
called  "international  law,"  and  there  are  innumerable 
treaties  between  High  Contracting  Powers.  But  the 
conventions  and  the  treaties  differ  from  anything  that 
could  properly  be  called  law  by  the  absence  of  sanc- 
tion: there  is  no  police  force  able  or  willing  to  en- 
force their  observance.     It  follows  from  this  that 


22  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

every  nation  concludes  multitudes  of  divergent  and 
incompatible  treaties,  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  high 
language  one  sometimes  hears,  the  main  purpose  of 
the  treaties  is  in  actual  fact  to  afford  the  sort  of  pre- 
text which  is  considered  respectable  for  engaging  in 
war  with  another  Power.  A  Great  Power  is  consid- 
ered unscrupulous  when  it  goes  to  war  without 
previously  providing  itself  with  such  a  pretext — 
unless,  indeed,  its  opponent  is  a  smaU  country,  in 
which  case  it  is  only  to  be  blamed  if  that  small  country 
happens  to  be  under  the  protection  of  some  other 
Great  Power.  England  and  Russia  may  partition 
Persia  immediately  after  guaranteeing  its  integrity 
and  independence,  because  no  other  Great  Power  has 
a  recognised  interest  in  Persia,  and  Persia  is  one  of 
those  small  States  in  regard  to  which  treaty  obliga- 
tions are  not  considered  binding.  Prance  and  Spain, 
under  a  similar  guarantee  to  Morocco,  must  not 
partition  it  without  first  compensating  Germany, 
because  it  is  recognised  that,  until  such  compensation 
has  been  offered  and  accepted,  Germany,  though  not 
Morocco,  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  the  preserva- 
tion of  that  country.  All  Great  Powers  having 
guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  England  has  a 
recognised  right  to  resent  its  violation — a  right  which 
is  exercised  when  it  is  believed  to  be  to  England's 
interest,  and  waived  when  England's  interest  is  not 
thought  to  be  involved.  A  treaty  is  therefore  not  to 
be  regarded  as  a  contract  having  the  same  kind  of 
binding  force  as  belongs  to  private  contracts ;  it  is  to 
be  regarded  only  as  a  means  of  giving  notice  to  rival 
Powers  that  certain  acts  may,  if  the  national  inter- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  23 

est  so  demand,  form  one  of  those  reasons  for  war 
which  are  recognised  as  legitimate.  If  the  faithful 
observance  of  treaties  were  a  frequent  occurrence, 
like  the  observance  of  contracts,  the  breach  of  a  treaty 
might  be  a  real  and  not  merely  a  formal  ground  for 
war,  since  it  would  tend  to  weaken  the  practice  of 
deciding  disputes  by  agreement  rather  than  by  armed 
force.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  practice,  however, 
appeal  to  treaties  is  only  to  be  regarded  as  part  of 
the  diplomatic  machinery.  A  nation  whose  diplom- 
acy has  been  skilfully  conducted  will  always  be  able 
to  find  some  treaty  or  agreement  bringing  its  inter- 
vention within  the  rules  of  the  diplomatic  game  when 
it  believes  that  its  interests  demand  war.  But  so 
long  as  treaties  are  only  observed  when  it  is  conven- 
ient to  do  so,  the  rules  of  the  diplomatic  game  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  question  whether  embarking  or 
participating  in  a  war  will  or  will  not  be  for  the  good 
of  mankind,  and  it  is  this  question  which  has  to  be 
decided  in  considering  whether  a  war  is  justified  or  not. 

11. 
It  is  necessary,  in  regard  to  any  war,  to  consider 
not  its  paper  justification  in  past  agreements,  but  its 
real  justification  in  the  balance  of  good  which  it  is 
to  bring  to  mankind.  At  the  beginning  of  a  war 
each  nation,  under  the  influence  of  what  is  called 
patriotism,  believes  that  its  own  victory  is  both  cer- 
tain and  of  great  importance  to  mankind.  The  praise- 
worthiness  of  this  belief  has  become  an  accepted 
maxim:  even  when  war  is  actually  in  progress  it  is 
held  to  be  natural  and  right  that  a  citizen  of  an  enemy 
country  should   regard   the   victory   of   his   side   as 


24  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

assured  and  highly  desirable.  By  concentrating  at- 
tention upon  the  supposed  advantages  of  the  victory 
of  our  own  side,  we  become  more  or  less  blind  to  the 
evils  inseparable  from  war  and  equally  certain  which- 
ever side  may  ultimately  prove  victorious.  Yet  so 
long  as  these  are  not  fully  realised,  it  is  impossible  to 
judge  justly  whether  a  war  is  or  is  not  likely  to  be 
beneficial  to  the  human  race.  Although  the  theme  is 
trite,  it  is  necessary  briefly  to  remind  ourselves  what 
the  evils  of  war  really  are.. 

To  begin  with  the  most  obvious  evil :  large  numbers 
of  young  men,  the  most  courageous  and  the  most 
physically  fit  in  their  respective  nations,  are  killed, 
bringing  great  sorrow  to  their  friends,  loss  to  the 
community,  and  gain  only  to  themselves,  since  they 
escape  the  horror  of  existence  in  this  world  of  strife. 
Many  others  are  maimed  for  life,  some  go  mad,  and 
others  become  nervous  wrecks,  mere  useless  and  help- 
less derelicts.  Of  those  who  survive  many  will  be 
brutalised  and  morally  degraded  by  the  fierce  busi- 
ness of  killing,  which,  however  much  it  may  be  the 
soldier's  duty,  must  shock  and  often  destroy  the  most 
humane  instincts.  As  every  truthful  record  of  war 
shows,  fear  and  hate  let  loose  the  wild  beast  in  a 
certain  proportion  of  combatants,  leading  to  strange 
cruelties,  which  must  be  faced,  but  not  dwelt  upon  if 
sanity  is  to  be  preserved. 

Of  the  evils  of  war  to  the  non-combatant  popula- 
tion in  the  regions  where  fighting  occurs,  the  recent 
misfortunes  of  Belgium  have  afforded  an  example 
upon  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  enlarge.  It  is  neces- 
sary, however,  to  combat  the  common  belief  of  Eng- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  25 

lish  people  that  the  misfortunes  of  Belgium  afford  a 
reason  in  favour  of  war.  By  a  tragic  delusion,  hatred 
perpetuates  the  evils  from  which  it  springs.  The 
sufferings  of  Belgium  are  attributed  to  the  Ger- 
mans, not  to  war,  and  thus  the  very  horrors  of 
the  war  are  used  to  make  men  desire  to  increase  their 
area  and  intensity.  Even  assuming  the  utmost  pos- 
sible humanity  in  the  conduct  of  military  operations, 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  if  the  troops  of  the  Allies 
penetrate  into  the  industrial  regions  of  Germany,  the 
German  population  will  have  to  suffer  a  great  part 
of  the  misfortunes  which  Germany  has  inflicted  upon 
Belgium.  To  men  under  the  influence  of  hate  this 
thought  is  a  cause  of  rejoicing,  but  to  men  in  whom 
humane  feeling  is  not  extinct  it  shows  that  our 
sympathy  with  Belgium  should  make  us  hate  war 
rather  than  Germany. 

The  evils  which  war  produces  outside  the  area  of 
military  operations  are  perhaps  even  more  serious, 
for,  though  less  intense,  they  are  far  more  widespread. 
Passing  by  the  anxiety  and  sorrow  of  those  whose  sons 
or  husbands  or  brothers  are  at  the  front,  the  extent 
and  consequences  of  the  economic  injury  inflicted  by 
war  are  much  greater  than  is  usually  realised.  It  is 
common  to  speak  of  economic  evils  as  merely  material, 
and  of  desire  for  economic  progress  as  grovelling  and 
uninspired.  This  view  is  perhaps  natural  in  well-to-do 
people,  to  whom  economic  progress  means  setting  up 
a  motor  car  or  taking  holidays  abroad  instead  of  at  the 
seaside.  But  with  regard  to  the  poorer  classes  of 
society,  economic  progress  is  the  first  condition  of 
many  spiritual  goods,  and  even  often  of  life  itself.    An 


26  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

overcrowded  family,  living  in  a  slum  in  conditions  of 
filth  and  immorality,  where  half  the  children  die  from 
ignorance  of  hygiene  and  bad  sanitation,  and  the 
remainder  grow  up  stunted  and  ignorant — such  a 
family  can  hardly  make  progress  mentally  or 
spiritually,  except  through  an  improvement  in  its 
economic  condition.  And  without  going  to  the  very 
bottom  of  the  social  scale,  economic  progress  is  neces- 
sary for  a  good  education,  for  a  tolerable  existence  for 
women,  and  for  that  breadth  and  freedom  of  outlook 
upon  which  any  solid  and  national  advance  must  be 
based.  It  is  not  the  most  oppressed  or  the  most  ill-used 
who  make  an  effective  plea  for  social  justice,  for  some 
reorganization  of  society  which  shall  give  less  to  the 
idler  and  more  to  the  common  man.  Throughout  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  while  the  landowners  of  England 
continually  increased  their  rent-rolls,  the  mass  of  the 
wage-earning  population  sank  into  greater  and  greater 
destitution.  It  was  only  afterwards,  during  the  long 
peace,  that  a  less  unjust  distribution  began  to  be 
possible.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  rich  to  distract  men's  minds  from  the 
claims  of  social  justice  has  been  more  or  less  un- 
consciously one  of  the  motives  leading  to  war  in 
modern  Europe.  Everywhere  the  well-to-do,  and  the 
political  parties  which  represent  their  interests,  have 
been  the  chief  agents  in  stirring  up  international 
hatred  and  in  persuading  the  working  man  that  his 
real  enemy  is  the  foreigner.  Thus  war,  and  the  fear 
of  war,  has  a  double  effect  in  retarding  social  progress : 
it  diminishes  the  resources  available  for  improving 
the  condition  of  the  wage-earning  classes,  and  it  dis- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  27 

tracts  men's  minds  from  the  need  and  possibility  of 
general  improvement  by  persuading  them  that  the 
way  to  better  themselves  is  to  injure  their  comrades 
in  some  other  country.  It  is  as  a  protest  against  this 
delusion  that  international  Socialism  has  arisen;  and 
whatever  may  be  the  thought  of  Socialism  as  an 
economic  doctrine,  its  internationalism  makes  it  the 
sanest  force  in  modern  politics,  and  the  only  large 
body  which  has  preserved  some  degrees  of  judgment 
and  humanity  in  the  present  chaos. 

But  of  all  the  evils  of  war  the  greatest  is  the  purely 
spiritual  evil:  the  hatred,  the  injustice,  the  repudia- 
tion of  truth,  the  artificial  conflict,  where,  if  the  na- 
tions could  once  overcome  the  blindness  of  inherited 
instincts  and  the  sinister  influence  of  anti-social  in- 
terests, such  as  those  of  armaments  with  their  sub- 
servient press,  it  would  be  seen  that  there  is  a  real 
consonance  of  interest  and  essential  identity  of  hu- 
man nature,  and  every  reason  to  replace  hatred  by 
love.  Mr.  Norman  Angell  has  well  shown  how  un- 
real, as  applied  to  the  conflicts  of  civilised  States,  is 
the  whole  vocabulary  of  international  conflict,  how 
illusory  are  the  gains  supposed  to  be  obtained  by 
victory,  and  how  fallacious  are  the  injuries  which  na- 
tions, in  times  of  peace,  are  supposed  to  inflict  upon 
each  other  in  economic  competition.  The  importance 
of  this  thesis  lies  not  so  much  in  its  direct  economic 
application  as  in  the  hope  which  it  affords  for  the 
liberation  of  better  spiritual  impulses  in  the  rela- 
tions of  different  communities.  To  love  our  enemies, 
however  desirable,  is  not  easy,  and  therefore,  it  is 
well  to  realise  that  the  enmity  springs  only  from 


28  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

blindness,  not  from  any  inexorable  physical  necessity. 

III. 

Are  there  any  wars  which  achieve  so  much  for  the 
good  of  mankind  as  to  outweigh  all  the  evils  we  have 
been  considering  ?  I  think  there  have  been  such  wars 
in  the  past,  but  they  are  not  wars  of  the  sort  with 
which  our  diplomatists  are  concerned,  for  which  our 
armies  and  navies  have  been  prepared,  and  which  are 
exemplified  by  the  present  conflict.  For  purposes  of 
classification  we  may  roughly  distinguish  four  kinds 
of  wars,  though,  of  course,  in  any  given  case  a  war  is 
not  likely  to  be  quite  clearly  of  any  one  of  the  four 
kinds.  With  this  proviso  we  may  distinguish:  (1) 
Wars  of  Colonisation;  (2)  Wars  of  Principle;  (3) 
Wars  of  Self-defence;  (4)  Wars  of  Prestige.  Of 
these  four  kinds  I  should  say  that  the  first  and  sec- 
ond are  fairly  often  justified;  the  third  seldom,  ex- 
cept as  against  an  adversary  of  inferior  civilisation; 
and  the  fourth,  which  is  the  sort  to  which  the  present 
war  belongs,  never.  Let  us  consider  these  four  kinds 
of  war  in  succession. 

By  a  "war  of  colonisation"  I  mean  a  war  whose 
purpose  is  to  drive  out  the  whole  population  of  some 
territory  and  replace  it  by  an  invading  population  of 
a  different  race.  Ancient  wars  were  very  largely  of 
this  kind,  of  which  we  have  a  good  example  in  the 
Book  of  Joshua.  In  modern  times  the  conflicts  of 
Europeans  with  American-Indians,  Maories,  and 
other  aborigines  in  temperate  regions,  have  been  of 
this  kind.  Such  wars  are  totally  devoid  of  technical 
justification,  and  are  apt  to  be  more  ruthless  than  any 
other  war.     Nevertheless,  if  we  are  to  judge  by  re- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  29 

suits,  we  cannot  regret  that  such  wars  have  taken 
place.  They  have  the  merit,  often  quite  fallaciously- 
claimed  for  all  wars,  of  leading  in  the  main  to  the 
survival  of  the  fittest,  and  it  is  chiefly  through  such 
wars  that  the  civilised  portion  of  the  world  has  been 
extended  from  the  neighbourhood  of  the  IMediterran- 
ean  to  the  greater  part  of  the  earth's  surface.  The 
eighteenth  century,  which  liked  to  praise  the  virtues 
of  the  savage  and  contrast  them  with  the  gilded  cor- 
ruption of  courts,  nevertheless  had  no  scruple  in 
thrusting  the  noble  savage  out  from  his  North- Ameri- 
can hunting  grounds.  And  we  cannot  at  this  date 
bring  ourselves  to  condemn  the  process  by  which  the 
American  continent  has  been  acquired  for  European 
civilisation.  In  order  that  such  wars  may  be  justified, 
it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  very  great  and 
undeniable  difference  between  the  civilisation  of  the 
colonisers  and  that  of  the  dispossessed  natives.  It  is 
necessary,  also,  that  the  climate  should  be  one  in  which 
the  invading  race  can  flourish.  When  these  conditions 
are  satisfied  the  conquest  becomes  justified,  though 
actual  fighting  against  the  dispossessed  inhabitants 
ought,  of  course,  to  be  avoided  as  far  as  is  compatible 
with  colonising.  Many  humane  people  will  object  in 
theory  to  the  justification  of  this  form  of  robbery,  but 
I  do  not  think  that  any  practical  or  effective  objection 
is  likely  to  be  made. 

Such  wars,  however,  belong  now  to  the  past.  The 
regions  where  the  white  man  live  are  all  allotted, 
either  to  white  races  or  to  yellow  races  to  whom  the 
white  man  is  not  clearly  superior,  and  whom,  in  any 
case,  he  is  not  strong  enough  to  expel.     Apart  from 


30  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

small  punitive  expeditions,  wars  of  colonisation,  in  the 
true  sense,  are  no  longer  possible.  What  are  nowa- 
days called  colonial  wars  do  not  aim  at  the  complete 
occupation  of  a  country  by  a  conquering  race;  they 
aim  only  at  securing  certain  governmental  and  trad- 
ing advantages.  They  belong,  in  fact,  rather  with 
what  I  call  wars  of  prestige  than  with  wars  of  coloni- 
sation in  the  old  sense.  There  are,  it  is  true,  a  few 
rare  exceptions.  The  Greeks  in  the  second  Balkan 
war  conducted  a  war  of  colonisation  against  the  Bul- 
garians; throughout  a  certain  territory  which  they 
intended  to  occupy  they  killed  all  the  men,  and  car- 
ried off  all  the  women.  But  in  such  cases  the  only 
possible  justification  fails,  since  there  is  no  evidence 
of  superior  civilisation  on  the  side  of  the  conquerors. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  wars  of  colonisation  belong 
to  the  past,  men's  feelings  and  beliefs  about  war 
are  still  those  appropriate  to  the  extinct  conditions 
which  rendered  such  wars  possible.  When  the  pres- 
ent war  began,  many  people  in  England  imagined  that 
if  the  Allies  were  victorious  Germany  would  cease  to 
exist:  Germany  was  to  be  "destroyed"  or  ''smashed," 
and  since  these  phrases  sounded  vigorous  and  cheer- 
ing, people  failed  to  see  that  they  wer-e  totally  devoid 
of  meaning.  There  are  some  seventy  million  Ger- 
mans ;  with  great  good  fortune  we  might,  in  a  success- 
ful war,  succeed  in  killing  two  millions  of  them.  There 
would  then  still  be  sixty-eight  million  Germans,  and 
in  a  few  years  the  loss  of  the  population  due  to  the 
war  would  be  made  good.  Germany  is  not  merely  a 
State,  but  a  nation,  bound  together  by  a  common  lan- 
guage, common  traditions,  and  common  ideals.  What- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAE  31 

ever  the  outcome  of  the  war,  this  nation  will  still  exist 
at  the  end  of  it,  and  its  strength  cannot  be  perma- 
nently impaired.  But  imagination  in  what  pertains  to 
war  is  still  dominated  by  Homer  and  the  Old  Testa- 
ment; men  who  cannot  see  that  circumstances  have 
changed  since  those  works  were  composed  are  called 
"practical"  men,  and  are  said  to  be  free  from  illu- 
sions, while  those  who  have  some  understanding  of 
the  modern  world,  and  some  capacity  for  freeing  their 
minds  from  the  influence  of  phrases,  are  called  dreamy 
idealists,  Utopians,  traitors,  and  friends  of  every 
country  but  their  own.  If  the  facts  were  understood, 
wars  amongst  civilised  nations  would  cease  owing  to 
their  inherent  absurdity.  Men's  passions  always  lag 
behind  their  political  organisation,  and  facts  which 
leave  no  outlet  for  passions  are  not  readily  admitted. 
In  order  that  hatred,  pride,  and  violence  may  find  an 
outlet,  men  unconsciously  blind  themselves  to  the 
plainest  facts  of  politics  and  economics,  and  modern 
war  continues  to  be  waged  with  the  phrases  and 
theories  invented  by  simpler  men  in  a  simpler  age. 

IV. 
The  second  type  of  war  which  may  sometimes  be 
justified  is  what  may  be  called  "the  war  of  principle. " 
To  this  kind  belong  the  wars  of  Protestant  and  Catho- 
lic, and  the  English  and  American  civil  wars.  In 
such  cases,  each  side,  or  at  least  one  side,  is  honestly 
convinced  that  the  progress  of  mankind  depends  upon 
the  adoption  of  certain  beliefs  or  institutions,  which, 
through  blindness  or  natural  depravity,  the  other  side 
will  not  regard  as  reasonable,  except  when  presented 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.     Such  wars  may  be  justi- 


32  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

fied;  for  example,  a  nation  practising  religious  toler- 
ation may  be  justified  in  resisting  a  persecuting  nation 
holding  a  different  creed.  On  this  ground  we  might 
justify  the  resistance  of  the  Dutch  to  the  English  and 
French  combined  in  the  time  of  Charles  II.  But  wars 
of  principle  are  much  less  often  justified  than  is  be- 
lieved by  those  in  whose  age  they  occur.  It  is  very 
seldom  that  a  principle  of  genuine  value  to  mankind 
can  only  be  propagated  by  military  force:  as  a  rule, 
it  is  the  bad  part  of  men's  principles,  not  the  good 
part,  which  makes  it  necessary  to  fight  for  their  de- 
fence. And  for  this  reason  the  bad  part  rather  than 
the  good  rises  to  prominence  during  the  progress  of 
the  war  of  principle.  A  nation  undertaking  a  war  in 
defence  of  religious  toleration  would  be  almost  certain 
to  persecute  those  of  its  citizens  who  did  not  believe  in 
religious  toleration.  A  war  on  bcLalf  of  democracy, 
if  it  is  long  and  fierce,  is  sure  to  end  in  the  exclusion 
from  all  share  of  power  of  those  who  do  not  support 
the  war.  Mr,  George  Trevelyan  in  an  eloquent  passage 
describes  the  defeat  which,  as  the  ultimate  outcome 
of  our  civil  war,  overtook  alike  the  ideals  of  the  Round- 
heads and  the  ideals  of  the  Cavaliers.  "And  this  was 
the  curse  of  the  victors,  not  to  die,  but  to  live,  and 
almost  to  lose  their  awful  faith  in  God,  when  they  saw 
the  Restoration,  not  of  the  old  gaiety  that  was  too 
gay  for  them,  and  the  old  loyalty  that  was  too  loyal 
for  them,  but  of  corruption  and  selfishness  that  had 
neither  country  nor  king.  The  sound  of  the  Round- 
head cannon  has  long  ago  died  away,  but  still  the 
silence  of  the  garden  is  heavy  with  unalterable  fate, 
brooding  over  besiegers  and  besieged,  in  such  haste  to 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  33 

destroy  each  other  and  permit  only  the  vile  to  sur- 
vive."* This  common  doom  of  opposite  ideals  is  the 
usual,  though  not  the  invariable,  penalty  of  support- 
ing ideals  by  force.  While  it  may  therefore  be  con- 
ceded that  such  wars  are  not  invariably  to  be  con- 
demned, we  must,  nevertheless,  scrutinise  very  scep- 
tically the  claim  of  any  particular  war  to  be  justified 
on  the  ground  of  the  victory  which  it  brings  to  some 
important  principle. 

There  are  some  who  maintain  that  the  present  war 
is  a  war  in  defence  of  democracy.  I  do  not  know 
whether  this  view  is  adopted  by  the  Tsar,  and  for  the 
sake  of  the  stability  of  the  Alliance  I  sincerely  hope 
that  it  is  not.  I  do  not,  however,  desire  to  dispute  the 
proposition  that  democracy  in  the  western  nations 
would  suffer  from  the  victory  of  Germany.  What  I  do 
wish  to  dispute  is  the  belief  not  infrequently  enter- 
tained in  England  that  if  the  Allies  are  victorious 
democracy  can  be  forced  upon  a  reluctant  Germany  as 
part  of  the  conditions  of  peace.  Men  who  think  thus 
have  lost  sight  of  the  spirit  of  democracy  in  worship 
of  the  letter.  The  Germans  have  the  form  of  govern- 
ment which  they  desire,  and  any  other  form,  imposed 
by  alien  victors,  would  be  less  in  harmony  with  the 
spirit  of  democracy,  however  much  it  might  conform 
to  the  letter.  Men  do  right  to  desire  strongly  the  vic- 
tory of  ideals  which  they  believe  to  be  important,  but 
it  is  almost  always  a  sign  of  yielding  to  undue  im- 
patience when  they  believe  that  what  is  valuable  in 
their  ideals  can  be  furthered  by  substituting  force  for 

•George  M.  Trevelyan,  Clio,  A  Muse,  and  other  Essays,  literary 
and  pedestrian,  London,  1913,  pages  26-27. 


34  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

peaceful  persuasion.  To  advocate  democracy  by  war 
is  only  to  repeat,  on  a  vaster  scale  and  with  far  more 
tragic  results,  the  error  of  those  who  have  sought  it 
hitherto  by  the  assassin's  knife  and  the  bomb  of  the 
anarchist. 

V. 
The  next  kind  of  war  to  be  considered  is  the  war  of 
self-defence.  This  kind  of  war  is  almost  universally 
admitted  to  be  justifiable,  and  is  condemned  only  by 
Christ  and  Tolstoy.  The  justification  of  wars  of  self- 
defence  is  very  convenient,  since  so  far  as  I  know  there 
has  never  yet  been  a  war  which  was  not  one  of  self- 
defence.  Every  strategist  assures  us  that  the  true 
defence  is  offence ;  every  great  nation  believes  that  its 
own  overwhelming  strength  is  the  only  possible 
guarantee  of  the  world's  peace  and  can  only  be  se- 
cured by  the  defeat  of  other  nations.  In  the  present 
war,  Servia  is  defending  itself  against  the  brutal 
aggression  of  Austria-Hungary;  Austria- Hungary  is 
defending  itself  against  the  disruptive  revolutionary 
agitation  which  Servia  is  believed  to  have  fomented; 
Russia  is  defending  Slavdom  against  the  menace  of 
Teutonic  aggression ;  Germany  is  defending  Teutonic 
civilisation  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Slav; 
France  is  defending  itself  against  a  repetition  of 
1870;  and  England,  which  sought  only  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  status  quo,  is  defending  itself  against  a 
prospective  menace  to  its  maritime  supremacy.  The 
claim  on  each  side  to  be  fighting  in  self-defence  ap- 
pears to  the  other  side  mere  wanton  hypocrisy,  be- 
cause in  each  case  the  other  side  aims  at  conquest  as 
the  only  means  of  self-defence.    So  long  as  the  prin- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  35 

ciple  of  self-defence  is  recognised  as  affording  always 
a  sufficient  justification  for  war,  this  tragic  conflict 
of  irresistible  claims  remains  unavoidable.  In  cer- 
tain cases,  where  there  is  a  clash  of  differing  civilisa- 
tions, a  war  of  self-defence  may  be  justified  on  the 
same  grounds  as  a  war  of  principle.  But  I  think  that, 
even  as  a  matter  of  practical  politics,  the  principle  of 
non-resistance  contains  an  immense  measure  of  wis- 
dom, if  only  men  would  have  the  courage  to  carry  it 
out.  The  evils  suffered  during  a  hostile  invasion  are 
suffered  because  resistance  is  offered:  the  Duchy  of 
Luxenburg,  which  was  not  in  a  position  to  offer  re- 
sistance, has  escaped  the  fate  of  the  other  regions 
occupied  by  hostile  troops.  What  one  civilised  nation 
can  achieve  against  another  by  means  of  conquest 
is  very  much  less  than  is  commonly  supposed.  It 
is  said,  both  here  and  in  Germany,  that  each  side  is 
fighting  for  its  existence;  but  this  phrase  covers  a 
great  deal  of  confusion  of  thought  induced  by  un- 
reasoning panic.  We  cannot  destroy  Germany  even 
by  a  complete  military  victory,  nor  could  Germany 
destroy  England  even  if  our  navy  were  sunk  and 
London  occupied  by  the  Prussians.  English  civilisa- 
tion, the  English  language,  English  manufactures 
would  still  exist,  and  as  a  matter  of  practical  politics 
it  would  be  totally  impossible  for  Germany  to  establish 
a  tyranny  in  this  country.  If  Germans,  instead  of 
being  resisted  by  force  of  arms,  had  been  passively 
permitted  to  establish  themselves  wherever  they 
pleased,  the  halo  of  glory  and  courage  surrounding 
the  brutality  of  military  success  would  have  been 
absent,  and  public  opinion  in  Germany  itself  would 


36  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

have  rendered  any  oppression  impossible.  The  his- 
tory of  our  own  dealings  with  our  colonies  afforda 
abundant  examples  to  show  that  under  such  circum- 
stances the  refusal  of  self-government  is  not  possible. 
In  a  word,  it  is  the  means  of  repelling  hostile  aggres- 
sion which  make  hostile  aggression  disastrous  and 
which  generate  the  fear  by  which  hostile  nations  come 
to  think  aggression  justified.  As  between  civilised  na- 
tions, nonresistance  would  seem  not  only  a  distant 
religious  ideal,  but  the  course  of  practical  wisdom. 
Only  pride  and  fear  stand  in  the  way  of  its  adoption. 
But  the  pride  of  military  glory  might  be  overcome 
by  a  nobler  pride,  and  the  fear  might  be  overcome  by 
a  clearer  realisation  of  the  solidity  and  indestructi- 
bility of  a  modern  civilised  nation. 

VI. 
The  last  kind  of  war  we  have  to  consider  is  what  I 
have  called  * '  the  war  of  prestige. ' '  Prestige  is  seldom 
more  than  one  element  in  the  causes  of  a  war,  but  it 
is  often  a  very  important  element.  In  the  present 
war,  until  the  war  had  actually  broken  out,  it  was 
almost  the  only  thing  involved,  although  as  soon  as 
the  war  began  other  and  much  more  important  mat- 
ters came  to  be  at  stake.  The  initial  question  between 
Austria  and  Russia  was  almost  wholly  one  of  prestige. 
The  lives  of  Balkan  peasants  could  not  have  been 
much  affected  for  good  or  evil  by  the  participation 
or  non-participation  of  Austrian  officials  in  the  trial 
of  supposed  Servian  accomplices  in  the  Sarajevo 
murders.  This  important  question,  which  is  the  one 
on  which  the  war  is  being  fought,  concerns  what  is 
called  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkans,  and  this  is  en- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  37 

tirely  a  question  of  prestige.  Men  desire  the  sense  of 
triumph,  and  fear  the  sense  of  humiliation  which  they 
would  have  in  yielding  to  the  demands  of  another 
nation.  Rather  than  forego  the  triumph,  rather  than 
endure  the  humiliation,  they  are  willing  to  inflict  upon 
the  world  all  those  disasters  which  it  is  now  suffering 
and  all  that  exhaustion  and  impoverishment  which  it 
must  long  continue  to  suffer.  The  willingness  to  in- 
flict and  endure  such  evils  is  almost  universally 
praised:  it  is  called  high-spirited,  worthy  of  a  great 
nation,  showing  fidelity  to  ancestral  traditions.  The 
slightest  sign  of  reasonableness  is  attributed  to  fear, 
and  received  with  shame  on  the  one  side  and  with 
derision  on  the  other.  In  private  life  exactly  the  same 
state  of  opinion  existed  so  long  as  duelling  was 
practised,  and  existed  still  in  those  countries  in  which 
this  custom  still  survives.  It  is  now  recognised,  at 
any  rate  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world,  that  the  so-called 
' '  honour '  *  which  made  duelling  appear  inevitable  was 
a  folly  and  a  delusion.  It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to 
hope  that  the  day  may  come  when  the  honour  of 
nations,  like  that  of  individuals,  will  be  no  longer 
measured  by  their  willingness  to  inflict  slaughter.  It 
can  hardly  be  hoped,  however,  that  such  a  change  will 
be  brought  about  while  the  affairs  of  nations  are  left 
in  the  keeping  of  diplomats,  whose  status  is  bound  up 
with  the  diplomatic  or  military  triumph  of  the  coun- 
tries from  which  they  come,  and  whose  manner  of  life 
renders  them  unusually  ignorant  of  all  political  and 
economic  facts  of  real  importance  and  of  all  the 
changes  of  opinion  and  organisation  which  make  the 


38  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

present  world  different  from  that  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  If  any  real  progress  is  to  be  made  in  intro- 
ducing sanity  into  international  relations,  these  rela- 
tions must  henceforth  be  in  the  hands  of  men  less  aloof 
and  less  aristocratic,  more  in  touch  with  common  life, 
and  more  emancipated  from  the  prejudices  of  a  by- 
gone age.  And  popular  education,  instead  of  inflam- 
ing the  hatred  of  foreigners  and  representing  even  the 
tiniest  triumph  as  worthy  of  even  the  greatest  sacri- 
fices, must  learn  to  aim  rather  at  producing  some  sense 
of  the  solidarity  of  mankind  and  of  the  paltryness  of 
those  objects  to  which  diplomatists,  often  secretly, 
think  fit  to  pledge  the  manhood  and  heroism  of  nations. 
The  objects  for  which  men  have  fought  in  the  past, 
whether  just  or  unjust,  are  no  longer  to  be  achieved 
by  wars  amongst  civilised  nations.  A  great  weight  of 
tradition,  of  financial  interests,  of  political  insincerity, 
is  bound  up  with  the  anachronism  of  war.  But  it  is 
perhaps  not  chimerical  to  hope  that  the  present  war, 
which  has  shocked  the  conscience  of  mankind  more 
than  any  war  in  previous  history,  may  produce  a  re- 
vulsion against  antiquated  methods,  and  may  lead  the 
exhausted  nations  to  insist  upon  that  brotherhood  and 
co-operation  which  their  rulers  have  hitherto  denied 
them.  There  is  no  reason  whatever  against  the  settle- 
ment of  all  disputes  by  a  Council  of  the  Powers  de- 
liberating in  public.  Nothing  stands  in  its  way  except 
the  pride  of  rulers  who  wish  to  remain  uncontrolled  by 
anything  higher  than  their  own  will.  When  this  great 
tragedy  has  worked  itself  out  to  its  disastrous  conclu- 
sion, when  the  passions  of  hate  and  self-assertion  have 


THE  ETHICS  OF  WAR  39 

given  place  to  compassion  with  the  universal  misery, 
the  nations  will  perhaps  realise  that  they  have  fought 
in  blindness  and  delusion,  and  that  the  way  of  mercy 
is  the  way  of  happiness  for  all. 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE* 

The  principle  that  it  is  always  wrong  to  employ  force 
against  another  human  being  has  been  held  in  its 
extreme  form  by  Quakers  and  by  Tolstoy,  but  has 
always  been  rejected  by  the  great  majority  of  mankind 
as  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  civilised  society. 
In  this,  no  doubt,  the  majority  of  mankind  are  in  the 
right.  But  I  think  that  the  occasions  where  forcible 
resistance  is  the  best  course  are  much  fewer  than  is 
generally  believed,  and  that  some  very  great  and  im- 
portant advances  in  civilisation  might  be  made  if  this 
were  more  widely  recognised.  The  so-called  "right 
of  self-defence,"  in  particular,  seems  to  have  only  a 
very  limited  sphere  of  application,  and  to  be  often  sup- 
ported by  arguments  involving  both  mistakes  as  to 
political  questions  and  a  wrong  conception  of  the  best 
type  of  character.* 

No  one  who  holds  that  human  conduct  ought  to  be 
such  as  to  promote  certain  ends — no  matter  what  ends 
may  be  selected — will  expect  any  absolute  hard-and- 
fast  rules  of  conduct  to  which  no  possible  exception 
can  be  found.  Not  to  lie,  not  to  steal,  not  to  murder, 
are  very  good  precepts  for  ordinary  cases :  it  may  be, 
in  view  of  the  likelihood  of  biassed  judgments,  that 
most  men  will  act  better  if  they  always  follow  these 

•Reprinted  from  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  August,  1915. 
I  touched  upon  this  subject  in  a  former  article,  in  the  Inter- 
national Journal  of  Ethics  (January,  1915),  but  as  my  discus- 
sion was  very  brief,  it  was  misunderstood,  and  seems  In  need  of 
expansion.  The  present  article  is  a  partial  reply  to  Professor 
Perry  in  the  April  Number  of  that  Journal,  but  I  have  thought 
it  better  to  make  the  reply  explanatory  rather  than  controversial. 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  41 

precepts  unquestioningly  than  if  they  consider  each 
ease  on  its  merits.  Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that 
there  are  cases  where  lying  and  stealing  are  justifiable, 
and  the  same  must  be  said  of  murder  by  those  who 
hold  that  some  wars  are  righteous.  Tolstoy  does  not 
judge  conduct  by  its  consequences:  he  considers 
actions  inherently  right  or  wrong.  This  makes  it  pos- 
sible for  him  to  say  that  no  use  of  force  is  ever  right. 
But  if  we  judge  conduct,  as  I  think  we  ought,  by  its 
power  of  promoting  what  we  consider  a  good  life  or  a 
good  society,  we  cannot  expect  such  simplicity  in  our 
moral  precepts,  and  we  must  expect  all  of  them  to  be 
subject  to  exceptions.  Whatever  we  may  have  to  say 
must  be  regarded  as  in  the  nature  of  practical  maxims, 
to  be  applied  with  common  sense,  not  as  logically 
universal  rules  to  be  tested  by  extreme  cases.* 

Broadly  speaking,  I  think  the  use  of  force  is 
justifiable  when  it  is  ordered  in  accordance  with  law 
by  a  neutral  authority,  in  the  general  interest  and  not 
primarily  in  the  interest  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
quarrel.  On  this  ground,  the  use  of  force  by  the  police 
is  justifiable,  provided  (as  is  no  doubt  sometimes  the 
case)  the  authorities  are  employing  the  police  in  the 
general  interest  and  not  merely  in  the  interest  of  the 
holders  of  power.  In  international  affairs,  if  there 
were  a  Council  of  the  Powers,  strong  enough  to  re- 
strain any  aggressive  nation  without  great  diflSeulty, 
any  army  or  navy  employed  in  obedience  to  its  orders 
might  be  regarded  as  a  police  force,  and  justified  on 

•Professor  Perry  (page  311)  confronts  me  with  an  extreme 
case.  But  I  had  provided  for  such  cases  by  admitting  that  a 
war  of  self-defence  is  sometimes  a  war  of  principle,  and  justifi- 
able on  that  ground. 


42  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

the  same  grounds  on  which  the  police  are  justified.  I 
think  there  is  more  hope  of  ultimately  achieving 
universal  peace  by  this  method  than  by  the  adoption 
of  non-resistance.  But  this  has  no  bearing  upon  the 
question  whether  non-resistance  would  be  a  good 
policy,  if  any  nation  could  be  induced  to  adopt  it.  So 
long  as  no  Council  of  the  Powers  exists,  there  is  no 
neutral  authority  to  order  resistance,  and  we  have  to 
consider  the  justification  of  repelling  an  attack  when 
the  nation  attacked  is  the  judge  in  its  own  cause. 

The  justification  of  non-resistance  is  more  easily 
seen  in  the  case  of  quarrels  between  individuals.  If 
I  encountered  the  traditional  highwayman,  and  he 
demanded  my  money  or  my  life,  I  should  unhesitat- 
ingly give  him  my  money,  even  if  it  were  in  my  power 
to  shoot  him  before  he  shot  me.  I  should  do  this,  not 
from  cowardice  or  lack  of  spirit,  but  because  I  would 
rather  part  with  money  than  have  a  man's  blood  on 
my  conscience.  And  for  the  same  reason,  if  I  were 
compelled  to  engage  in  a  duel,  I  would  rather  let  my 
adversary  shoot  me  than  shoot  him.  In  this  I  believe 
all  humane  people  would  agree.  At  the  same  time, 
if  he  were  a  worthless  fellow,  and  I  had  just  made  an 
important  mathematical  discovery  which  I  had  not 
yet  had  time  to  record,  it  might  be  right  to  preserve 
my  life  at  his  expense.  Arguments  of  this  sort  would 
justify  civilised  communities  in  defending  themselves 
against  savages.  But  conflicts  between  civilised 
nations  are  more  like  conflicts  between  rival  meta- 
physicians, each  of  whom  considers  his  own  system 
admirable  and  the  other  man's  abominable,  while  to 
outsiders  it  is  obvious  that  both  are  equally  fantastic. 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  43 

In  private  Kfe,  most  situations  can  be  met  by  the 
double  principle  of  neither  employing  force  nor  obey- 
ing it.  It  is  a  familiar  Platonic  thesis  that  the  man 
who  inflicts  injustice  is  more  to  be  pitied  than  the  man 
who  suffers  it.  But  such  statements  are  read  with  a 
smile,  as  charming  literary  paradoxes,  and  are  not 
taken  as  practical  wisdom  for  the  guidance  of  life.  Yet 
the  use  of  force  to  coerce  another  man's  will,  even  in 
those  rare  cases  in  which  it  is  justifiable,  produces  a 
brutal  and  tyrannous  state  of  mind,  and  is  more  de- 
structive of  inward  peace  than  any  misfortune  that  can 
be  inflicted  from  without.  The  greatest  good  that  can 
be  achieved  in  this  life  is  to  have  will  and  desire  di- 
rected to  universal  ends,  purged  of  the  self-assertion 
which  belongs  to  instinctive  will.  A  man  who  has  once 
known  this  good  will  not  consider  any  private  end 
important  enough  to  be  fought  for :  he  may  be  willing 
to  enter  upon  a  contest  of  force,  but  if  so,  it  will  be 
for  some  end  outside  his  own  life,  since  what  is  best 
in  his  own  life  cannot  be  taken  from  him  by  another. 
But  although  he  will  not  dictate  to  others  for  his  own 
ends,  he  will  also  not  be  turned  aside  from  universal 
ends  by  others:  he  will  be  no  more  willing  to  obey 
than  to  command.  He  will  preserve  his  own  liberty 
as  scrupulously  as  he  respects  the  liberty  of  others. 

Exactly  similar  considerations  apply  to  the  conduct 
of  nations,  but  they  are  obscured  by  traditional 
phrases  about  "honour,"  "patriotism,"  "  sacred  tra- 
ditions," or  "the  protection  of  women  and  children." 
It  is  assumed  that  a  nation  which  does  not  oppose  force 
with  force  must  be  actuated  by  cowardice,  and  must 
lose  whatever  is  valuable  in  its  civilisation.    Both 


44  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

these  are  illusions.  To  oppose  force  by  passive  non- 
obedience  would  require  more  courage,  and  would  be 
far  more  likely  to  preserve  the  best  elements  of  the 
national  life.  It  would  also  do  far  more  to  discourage 
the  use  of  force.  This  would  be  the  way  of  practical 
wisdom,  if  men  could  be  brought  to  believe  it.  But 
I  fear  men  are  too  much  wedded  to  the  belief  that 
patriotism  is  a  virtue,  and  too  fond  of  proving  their 
superiority  to  others  in  a  contest  of  force.  People  who 
object  to  the  doctrine  that  might  is  right  always  con- 
tend that  it  will  be  disproved  by  showing  that  might 
is  on  their  own  side.  Yet  that  would  only  be  a  dis- 
proof if  their  side  were  in  the  wrong,  and  their  argu- 
ment shows  that  they  really  believe  the  doctrine  they 
are  pretending  to  combat.  Those  who  genuinely 
disbelieve  the  doctrine  will  not  attempt  to  disprove  it 
by  getting  might  on  their  side. 

Let  us  imagine  that  England  were  to  disband  its 
army  and  navy,  after  a  generation  of  instruction  in 
the  principles  of  passive  resistance  as  a  better  defence 
than  war.  Let  us  suppose  that  England  at  the  same 
time  publicly  announced  that  no  armed  opposition 
would  be  offered  to  an  invader,  that  all  might  come 
freely,  but  that  no  obedience  would  be  yielded  to  any 
commands  that  a  foreign  authority  might  issue.  What 
would  happen  in  this  case  ? 

Suppose,  to  continue  the  argument,  that  the  German 
Government  wished  to  take  advantage  of  England's 
defenceless  condition.  It  would  be  faced,  at  the  out- 
set, by  the  opposition  of  whatever  was  not  utterly 
brutal  in  Germany,  since  no  possible  cloak  could  be 
found   to   hide   the   nakedness   of   aggression.     All 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  45 

civilised  countries,  when  they  engage  in  war,  find  some 
decent  excuse:  they  fight,  almost  always,  either  in 
self-defence  or  in  defence  of  the  weak.  No  such 
excuse  could  be  found  in  this  case.  It  could  no  longer 
be  said,  as  the  Germans  now  say,  that  England's 
naval  preponderance  keeps  other  nations  in  bondage, 
and  threatens  the  very  existence  of  any  nation  which 
depends  upon  imported  food.  It  could  no  longer  be 
said  that  we  were  oppressing  India,  since  India  would 
be  able  to  separate  from  the  British  Empire  whenever 
.it  wished  to  do  so.  All  the  usual  pretexts  by  which 
aggression  is  justified  would  be  lacking.  When 
America  attacked  Spain,  it  was  to  liberate  the  Cubans, 
against  whom  Spain  was  carrying  on  a  war.  When 
England  attacked  the  Transvaal,  the  Poet  Laureate, 
the  Times,  Messrs.  Werner,  Beit  and  Co.,  and  the 
other  imperialist  magnates  who  represented  the 
ancient  traditions  of  the  British  race,  solemnly  assured 
us  that  our  intervention  was  necessary  for  the  safety 
of  English  women  in  Johannesburg,  and  for  the  libera- 
tion of  the  natives  from  virtual  slavery  to  the  Boers. 
These  pleas  deceived  many  people  who,  though  no 
doubt  not  unwilling  to  be  deceived,  would  yet  have 
shrunk  from  an  aggression  which  could  not  be  in  any 
way  disguised.  And  it  was  said  that  the  Boers  aimed 
at  the  conquest  of  the  whole  of  South  Africa :  we  were 
told  that,  if  ever  England  found  itself  entangled  in  a 
European  war,  Cape  Colony  would  be  overrun,  and  its 
English  colonists  would  be  subjected  to  a  tyranny.  In 
any  civilised  country,  arguments  of  this  kind  are 
always  used  in  justifying  even  the  most  aggressive 
war. 


46  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

If  England  had  no  army  and  no  navy,  the  Germans 
would  be  hard  put  to  it  to  find  a  pretext  for  invasion. 
All  the  Liberal  elements  in  Germany  would  oppose 
any  such  enterprise ;  so  would  all  other  nations,  unless 
Germany  offered  them  a  share  of  the  plunder.  But 
let  us  suppose  all  home  opposition  overcome,  and  a 
force  despatched  to  England  to  take  possession  of  the 
country.  Such  a  force,  since  it  would  meet  with  no 
military  opposition,  would  not  need  to  be  large,  and 
would  not  be  in  the  state  of  mingled  fear  and  ferocity 
which  characterises  an  invading  army  among  a  hostile 
population.  There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  preserving 
military  discipline,  and  no  opportunity  for  the  rape 
and  rapine  which  have  always  been  displayed  by 
troops  after  victory  in  battle.  There  would  be  no  glory 
to  be  won,  not  even  enough  to  earn  one  iron  cross.  The 
Germans  could  not  congratulate  themselves  upon  their 
military  prowess,  or  imagine  that  they  were  displaying 
the  stern  self-abnegation  believed  to  be  shown  by 
willingness  to  die  in  the  fight.  To  the  soldierly  mind, 
the  whole  expedition  would  be  ridiculous,  causing  a 
feeling  of  disgust  instead  of  pride.  Perhaps  a  few 
impudent  street-boys  might  have  to  have  their  ears 
boxed,  but  otherwise  there  would  be  nothing  to  lend 
dignity  to  the  expedition. 

However,  we  will  suppose  the  invading  army 
arrived  in  London,  where  they  would  evict  the  King 
from  Buckingham  Palace  and  the  Members  from  the 
House  of  Commons.  A  few  able  bureaucrats  would 
be  brought  over  from  Berlin  to  consult  with  the  Civil 
Servants  in  Whitehall  as  to  the  new  laws  by  which  the 
reign  of  Kultur  was  to  be  inaugurated.    No  difficulty 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  47 

would  be  expected  in  managing  so  tame  a  nation,  and 
at  first  almost  all  the  existing  officials  would  be  con- 
firmed in  their  offices.  For  the  government  of  a  large 
modern  State  is  a  complicated  matter,  and  it  would  be 
thought  well  to  facilitate  the  transition  by  the  help  of 
men  familiar  with  the  existing  machinery. 

But  at  this  point,  if  the  nation  showed  as  much 
courage  as  it  has  always  shown  in  fighting,  difficulties 
would  begin.  All  the  existing  officials  would  refuse 
to  co-operate  with  the  Germans.  Some  of  the  more 
prominent  would  be  imprisoned,  perhaps  even  shot,  in 
order  to  encourage  the  others.  But  if  the  others  held 
firm,  if  they  refused  to  recognise  or  transmit  any  order 
given  by  Germans,  if  they  continued  to  carry  out  the 
decrees  previously  made  by  the  English  Parliament 
and  the  English  Government,  the  Germans  would  have 
to  dismiss  them  all,  even  to  the  humblest  postman, 
and  call  in  German  talent  to  fill  the  breach. 

The  dismissed  officials  could  not  all  be  imprisoned 
or  shot:  since  no  fighting  would  have  occurred,  such 
wholesale  brutality  would  be  out  of  the  question.  And 
it  would  be  very  difficult  for  the  Germans  suddenly, 
out  of  nothing,  to  create  an  administrative  machine. 
Whatever  edicts  they  might  issue  would  be  quietly 
ignored  by  the  population.  If  they  ordered  that 
German  should  be  the  language  taught  in  schools,  the 
schoolmasters  would  go  on  as  if  no  such  order  had  been 
issued;  if  the  schoolmasters  were  dismissed,  the 
parents  would  no  longer  send  the  children  to  school. 
If  they  ordered  that  English  young  men  should  under- 
go military  service,  the  young  men  would  simply  re- 
fuse ;  after  shooting  a  few,  the  Germans  would  have  to 


48  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

give  up  the  attempt  in  despair.  If  they  tried  to  raise 
revenue  by  customs  duties  at  the  ports,  they  v;ould 
have  to  have  German  customs  officers ;  this  would  lead 
to  a  strike  of  all  the  dock  labourers,  so  that  this  way 
of  raising  revenue  would  become  impossible.  If  they 
tried  to  take  over  the  railways,  there  would  be  a  strike 
of  the  railway  servants.  Whatever  they  touched 
would  instantly  become  paralysed,  and  it  would  soon 
be  evident,  even  to  them,  that  nothing  was  to  be  made 
out  of  England  unless  the  population  could  be  con- 
ciliated. 

Such  a  method  of  dealing  with  invasion  would,  of 
course,  require  fortitude  and  discipline.  But  fortitude 
and  discipline  are  required  in  war.  For  ages  past, 
education  has  been  largely  directed  to  producing  these 
qualities  for  the  sake  of  war.  They  now  exist  so 
widely  that  in  every  civilised  country  almost  every 
man  is  willing  to  die  on  the  battlefield  whenever  his 
Government  thinks  the  moment  suitable.  The  same 
courage  and  idealism  which  are  now  put  into  war 
could  quite  easily  be  directed  by  education  into  the 
channel  of  passive  resistance.  I  do  not  know  what 
losses  England  may  suffer  before  the  present  war  is 
ended,  but  if  they  amount  to  a  million  no  one  will  be 
surprised.  An  immensely  smaller  number  of  losses, 
incurred  in  passive  resistance,  would  prove  to  any 
invading  army  that  the  task  of  subjecting  England  to 
alien  domination  was  an  impossible  one.  And  this 
proof  would  be  made  once  for  all,  without  dependence 
upon  the  doubtful  accidents  of  war. 

In  internal  politics,  in  all  democratic  countries,  the 
very  method  we  have  been  considering  is  constantly 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  49 

practised,  with  continually  increasing  success.  Even 
in  Russia,  it  was  the  general  strike  which  secured  the 
Constitution  of  1905.  For  a  generation,  terrorists  had 
uselessly  copied  the  methods  of  militarists  by  bomb- 
thro\^dng  and  assassination;  they  had  achieved 
nothing  except  to  afford  the  authorities  an  excuse  for 
ruthless  repression — an  excuse  not  only  to  the  public, 
but  also  to  their  own  consciences,  since  they  appeared 
to  themselves,  as  soldiers  do,  to  be  brave  men  facing 
death  in  the  public  service.  After  all  the  years  of 
fruitless  violence,  it  was  the  method  of  passive  non- 
obedience  which  secured  the  momentary  victory,  after- 
wards lost  through  disunion  and  a  return  to  violence. 
And  in  all  the  dealings  of  democratic  Governments 
with  labour  troubles  or  with  irreconciliable  minorities, 
it  is  this  same  power  of  passive  resistance  that  comes 
into  play.  In  a  civilised,  highly  organised,  highly 
political  State,  government  is  impossible  without  the 
consent  of  the  governed.  Any  object  for  which  a  con- 
siderable body  of  men  are  prepared  to  starve  and  die 
can  be  achieved  by  political  means,  without  the  need 
of  any  resort  to  force.  And  if  this  is  true  of  objects 
only  desired  by  a  minority,  it  is  a  thousand  times  more 
true  of  objects  desired  unanimously  by  the  whole 
nation. 

But  it  may  be  said  that,  even  if  the  Germans  could 
not  actually  take  over  the  government  of  England,  or 
rob  us  of  internal  self-government,  they  could  do  two 
things  which  would  injure  us  vitally :  they  could  take 
away  our  Empire,  and  they  could  levy  a  tribute  by 
the  threat  of  depriving  us  of  food  supplies. 

The  Germans  could  not  take  away  the  self-governing 


50  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

parts  of  our  Empire,  since  they  would  encounter  there 
the  same  difficulties  as  would  prevent  them  from 
governing  England.  They  could  take  away  those 
parts  of  our  Empire  which  we  hold  by  force,  and  this 
would  be  a  blow  to  our  pride :  the  oppression  of  subject 
races  is  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  patriotic  satisfac- 
tion, and  one  of  the  chief  things  for  which  Germany 
envies  us.  But  it  is  not  a  source  of  pride  to  any 
rational  or  humane  man.  European  rule  over  un- 
civilised races  is,  in  fact,  a  very  sordid  affair.  The 
best  of  the  men  whom  it  employs  are  those  engaged  in 
the  attempt  at  government,  who  live  in  exile  and 
usually  die  of  fever;  the  rest  grow  rich  selling  rum 
to  natives  or  making  them  work  in  mines.  Meanwhile 
the  natives  degenerate:  some  die  of  drink,  some  of 
diseases  caught  from  white  men,  some  of  consumption 
in  the  mines;  those  who  survive  contract  the  vices  of 
civilisation  without  losing  the  vices  of  barbarism.  It 
can  only  be  a  blessing  to  any  nation  to  be  deprived  of 
this  source  of  pride,  which  is  a  canker  of  corruption 
and  immorality  in  the  life  of  democratic  communities. 
That  the  Germans  could  levy  a  tribute  on  England 
by  threatening  our  food  supplies  is  obviously  true. 
The  ethics  of  such  a  demand  would  be  exactly  the 
same  as  that  of  the  highwayman  who  demands  "your 
money  or  your  life. ' '  The  same  reasons  which  would 
lead  a  reasonable  man  to  give  his  money  rather  than 
shoot  or  be  shot  would  also  lead  a  reasonable  nation 
to  give  a  tribute  rather  than  resist  by  force  of  arms. 
The  greatest  sum  that  foreigners  could  theoretically 
exact  would  be  the  total  economic  rent  of  the  land  and 
natural  resources  of  England.    In  fact,  economic  rent 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  51 

may  be  defined  as  what  can  be,  and  historically  has 
been,  extorted  by  such  means.  The  rent  now  paid  to 
landowners  in  England  is  the  outcome  of  the  exactions 
made  by  William  the  Conquerer  and  his  barons.  The 
law-courts  are  the  outcome  of  those  set  up  at  that 
time,  and  the  law  which  they  administer,  so  far  as 
land  is  concerned,  represents  simply  the  power  of  the 
sword.  From  inertia  and  lack  of  imagination,  the 
English  at  the  present  day  continue  to  pay  to  the  land- 
owners a  vast  sum  to  which  they  have  no  right  but 
that  of  conquest.  The  working  classes,  the  shop- 
keepers, manufacturers,  and  merchants,  the  literary 
men,  and  the  men  of  science  — all  the  people  who  make 
England  of  any  account  in  the  world — have  at  most  an 
infinitesimal  and  accidental  share  in  the  rental  of 
England.  The  men  who  have  a  share  use  their  rents 
in  luxury,  political  corruption,  taking  the  lives  of 
birds,  and  depopulating  and  enslaving  the  rural  dis- 
tricts. This  way  of  life  is  that  which  almost  all  Eng- 
lish men  and  women  consider  the  most  admirable: 
those  who  are  anywhere  near  achieving  it  struggle  to 
attain  it  completely,  and  those  who  are  more  remote 
read  serial  stories  about  it  as  their  ancestors  would 
have  read  of  the  joys  of  Paradise. 

It  is  this  life  of  the  idle  rich  which  would  be  cur- 
tailed if  the  Germans  exacted  a  tribute  from  England. 
Everything  in  England  that  is  not  positively  harmful 
would  be  untouched :  wages  and  other  earned  incomes 
could  not  be  diminished  without  diminishing  the  pro- 
ductivity of  English  labour,  and  so  lessening  Eng- 
land's capacity  for  paying  tribute.  Our  snobbish  in- 
stincts, if  the  idle  rich  were  abolished,  might  be  driven, 


52  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

by  want  of  other  outlet,  into  the  admiration  of  real 
merit.  And  if  the  Germans  could  effect  this  for  us, 
they  would  well  deserve  their  tribute. 

It  is  very  doubtful,  indeed,  whether  the  Germans 
would  exact  from  us  a  larger  tribute  than  we  exact 
from  ourselves  in  resisting  them.  There  is  no  know- 
ing what  this  war  will  have  cost  England  when  it  ends, 
but  we  shall  probably  not  exaggerate  if  we  place  the 
cost  at  a  thousand  million  pounds.*  This  represents 
an  annual  payment  of  forty  million  pounds.  All  this, 
together  with  the  annual  expenditure  on  our  Army 
and  Navy,  we  might  have  paid  to  the  Germans  without 
being  any  poorer  than  we  shall  be  when  the  war  ends. 
This  represents  an  incredibly  larger  tribute  than  we 
derive  from  India;  yet  the  Germans  assure  us  that 
we  are  full  of  commercial  cunning,  and  that  we  govern 
India  solely  for  our  own  profit.  If  they  believe  this, 
it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  the  receipt  of  such  a 
tribute  would  fail  to  satisfy  them.  Meanwhile  we 
should  have  avoided  the  death  of  our  young  men,  the 
moral  degradation  of  almost  our  whole  population, 
and  the  lowering  of  the  standard  of  civilisation  slowly 
achieved  through  centuries  which  were  peaceful  in 
comparison  with  our  present  condition. 

But,  of  course,  all  that  I  have  been  saying  is  fan- 
tastic, degrading,  and  out  of  touch  with  reality.  I 
have  been  assuming  that  men  are  to  some  extent 
guided  by  reason,  that  their  actions  are  directed  to 
ends  such  as  "life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness."    This  is  not  the  case.     Death,  slavery,  and 

•It  is  now  (September,  1915)  evident  that  this  is  an  under- 
estimate. 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  53 

unhappiness  (for  others)  are  the  chief  ends  pursued 
by  States  in  their  external  relations.  It  is  the  prefer- 
ence of  such  ends  to  one's  own  happiness  that  consti- 
tutes patriotism,  that  shows  a  man  to  be  free  from 
materialism,  and  that  raises  him  above  the  commercial, 
money-grubbing  level  of  the  mere  shopkeeper.  The 
Prussian  feels  himself  noble  because  he  is  willing  to 
be  killed  provided  men  of  other  nations  are  killed  at 
the  same  time.  His  nobility  and  his  freedom  from 
commercialism  consists  in  the  fact  that  he  desires  the 
misery  of  others  more  than  his  own  happiness.  And 
there  is  a  Prussian  lurking  in  each  of  us,  ready  to 
make  us  reject  any  national  advantage  which  is  not 
purchased  by  injury  to  some  other  nation.  It  is  this 
lurking  Prussian  in  our  instincts  who  assures  us  that  a 
policy  of  non-resistance  would  be  tame  and  cowardly, 
unworthy  of  a  great  and  proud  nation,  a  failure  to  per- 
form our  duty  of  chastising  an  exactly  similar  pride 
in  other  nations. 

Pride  has  its  place  among  virtues,  in  the  lives  of 
individuals  as  well  as  in  the  lives  of  nations.  Pride, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  a  virtue,  is  a  determination  not  to  be 
turned  aside  from  the  ends  which  a  man  thinks  good, 
no  matter  what  outside  pressure  may  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  him.  There  is  pride  in  Condorcet,  sen- 
tenced to  the  guillotine,  spending  his  last  days  in 
writing  a  book  on  human  progress.  There  is  pride  in 
those  who  refuse  to  recant  their  religious  convictions 
under  persecution.  Such  pride  is  the  noblest  form  of 
courage :  it  shows  that  self-determination  of  the  will 
which  is  the  essence  of  spiritual  freedom.  But  such 
pride  should  have  as  its  complement  a  just  conception 


54  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

of  what  constitutes  human  welfare,  and  as  it  correla- 
tive a  respect  for  the  freedom  of  others  as  absolute  as 
the  determination  to  preserve  freedom  for  ourselves. 
Exactly  the  same  kind  of  pride  is  good  in  the  life  of  a 
nation.  If  we  think  ill  of  war,  while  some  other  nation 
thinks  well  of  it,  let  us  show  our  national  pride  by- 
living  without  war,  whatever  temptations  the  other 
nation  may  put  in  our  way  to  live  according  to  their 
ideals  rather  than  according  to  our  own.  The  Ger- 
mans, we  are  given  to  understand,  hate  us  with  a 
"bitter  hatred,  and  long  to  believe  that  we  feel  towards 
them  as  they  feel  towards  us;  for  unrequited  hatred 
is  as  bitter  as  unrequited  love.  They  have  made  it 
increasingly  difficult  not  to  gratify  their  desire;  but 
in  so  far  as  we  can  keep  our  resistance  free  from  bitter- 
ness we  win  a  spiritual  victory  over  what  deserves  to 
be  combated  in  the  enemy,  which  is  far  more  impor- 
tant than  any  victory  to  be  won  by  guns  and  bayonets. 
But  this  kind  of  pride  is  not  the  kind  which  patriots 
exhort  us  to  display.  The  pride  that  they  admire  is 
the  kind  which  aims  at  thwarting  others ;  it  is  the  pride 
of  power.  Having  suspected  that  the  Germans  desired 
Morocco  and  Mesopotamia,  we  were  proud  of  the  fact 
that  we  prevented  them  from  acquiring  either. 
Having  found  that  the  Boers  desired  independence, 
we  were  proud  of  the  fact  that  we  made  them  submit 
to  our  rule.  This  kind  of  pride  consists  merely  in  love 
of  dominion.  Dominion  and  power  can  only  be  con- 
clusively shown  by  compelling  others  to  forego  what 
they  desire.  By  a  natural  consequence,  those  in  whom 
the  love  of  power  is  strong  are  led  to  inflict  pain  and 
to  use  force  against  the  perfectly  legitimate  desires  of 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  55 

those  whom  they  wish  to  subdue.  In  nations,  this 
nation 's  history  are  not  those  who  have  benefited  man- 
kind, but  those  who  have  injured  other  nations.  If 
we  prided  ourselves  upon  the  good  and  not  the  harm 
that  we  have  done,  we  should  have  put  Shakespeare 
in  the  Nelson  Monument,  and  given  Apsley  House  to 
Darwin.  But  the  citizens  whom  every  nation  honours 
most  are  those  who  have  killed  the  greatest  number 
of  foreigners. 

It  is  this  pride  of  power  which  makes  us  unwilling  to 
yield  to  others  in  matters  of  no  intrinsic  importance. 
The  Germans  cherish  a  desire  to  own  African  swamps, 
of  which  we  have  a  superfluity.  No  one  in  England 
benefits  by  the  possession  of  them,  except  a  few  finan- 
cial magnates,  mostly  of  foreign  origin.  If  we  were 
reasonable,  we  should  regard  the  German  desire  as  a 
curious  whim,  which  we  might  gratify  without  any 
real  national  loss.  Instead  of  that,  we  regard  the  Ger- 
man desire  as  a  crime,  and  our  resistance  to  it  as  a 
virtue.  We  teach  school  children  to  rejoice  because  so 
much  of  the  map  is  painted  red.  In  order  that  as  much 
as  possible  may  be  painted  red,  we  are  willing  to  sacri- 
fice those  ideals  of  freedom  which  we  have  led 
mankind,  and,  if  necessary,  to  adopt  all  the  worst 
features  of  the  Prussian  spirit.  This  is  because  we 
fear  the  external  enemy,  who  kills  the  body,  more  than 
the  internal  enemy,  who  Mils  the  soul.  The  soul  of  a 
nation,  if  it  is  a  free  soul,  without  slavishness  and  with- 
out tyranny,  cannot  be  killed  by  any  outward  enemy. 
And  if  men  would  realize  this,  the  panic  fear  which 
the  nations  feel  one  toward  another  would  be  expelled 


56  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

by  a  better  pride  than  that  of  diplomatists  and  war- 
lords. 

The  armies  and  navies  of  the  world  are  kept  up  by 
three  causes:  cowardice,  love  of  dominion,  and  lust 
for  blood. 

It  is  cowardice  that  makes  it  difficult  to  meet 
invasion  by  the  method  of  passive  resistance.  More 
courage  and  discipline  is  needed  for  the  successful 
practice  of  this  method  than  for  facing  death  in  the 
heat  of  battle.  But  I  am  persuaded  that  there  is 
in  England  enough  courage  and  enough  capacity  for 
discipline  to  make  success  in  passive  resistance  possi- 
ble, if  education  and  moral  teaching  is  directed  to 
that  end  instead  of  to  warlike  prowess.  It  is  cowardice 
also  that  makes  men  prefer  the  old  method  of  trying 
to  be  stronger  than  your  adversary  (in  which  only  one 
party  can  succeed),  rather  than  a  new  method  requir- 
ing imagination  and  a  readjustment  of  traditional 
standards.  Yet,  if  men  could  think  outside  the  well- 
worn  grooves,  there  are  many  plain  facts  which  show 
the  folly  of  conventional  statesmanship.  Why  has 
Germany  invaded  France  ?  Because  the  French  have 
an  army.  Why  has  England  attacked  Germany?  Be- 
cause the  Germans  have  a  navy.  Yet  people  persist  in 
thinking  that  the  French  army  and  the  German  navy 
contribute  to  national  safety.  Nothing  could  be  more 
obvious  than  the  facts ;  nothing  could  be  more  univer- 
sal than  men's  blindness  to  them. 

The  second  reason  for  keeping  up  the  armies  and 
navies  of  the  world  is  love  of  dominion.  The  Germans, 
in  the  Morocco  controversy,  announced  that  nothing 
of  importance  was  to  happen  anywhere  without  their 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  57 

being  consulted.  We  regarded  this  as  monstrous 
arrogance ;  but  for  two  centuries  we  had  advanced  the 
same  claim  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  matters  about 
which  diplomatists  raise  a  pother  are  usually  of  only 
microscopic  importance  to  the  welfare  of  ordinary 
citizens:  they  are  matters  involving  national 
"  prestige,"  that  is  to  say,  the  power  of  the  State  to 
prevent  other  States  from  doing  as  they  wish.  This 
power  is  sometimes  partly  based  on  money,  but  in  the 
main  it  rests  on  armies  and  navies.  If  our  navy  had 
been  smaller,  we  should  not  have  been  able  to  defeat 
the  German  desire  for  an  Atlantic  port  in  Morocco.  It 
would  have  done  us  no  harm  if  the  Germans  had 
acquired  Casablanca,  but  we  enjoyed  the  thought  that 
our  fiat  kept  them  out.  The  procuring  of  such  pleas- 
ures is  the  second  purpose  served  by  armies  and  navies. 
The  third  purpose  of  armaments — ^indeed  their 
primary  and  original  purpose,  from  which  all  others 
are  derivative — is  to  satisfy  the  lust  for  blood.  Fight- 
ing is  an  instinctive  activity  of  males,  both  animal  and 
human.  Human  males,  being  gregarious,  naturally 
fight  in  packs.  It  has  been  found  that  the  pack  tends 
to  be  more  successful  against  other  packs  when  fighting 
within  the  pack  is  as  far  as  possible  prevented.  For 
this  purpose,  the  law  and  the  police  have  been  insti- 
tuted. But  the  shedding  of  human  blood  is  still  con- 
sidered the  most  glorious  thing  a  man  can  do,  provided 
he  does  it  in  company  with  the  rest  of  his  pack.  War, 
like  marriage,  is  the  legally  permitted  outlet  for  a 
certain  instinct.  But  the  instinct  which  leads  to  war, 
unlike  the  instinct  which  leads  to  marriage,  so  far  from 
being  necessary  to  the  human  race,  is  wholly  harmful 


58  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

among  civilised  men.  It  is  an  instinct  which  easily 
becomes  atrophied  in  a  settled  community :  many  men 
have  hardly  a  trace  of  it.  Unfortunately,  as  men  grow 
older,  their  affections  and  their  powers  of  thought  de- 
cay. For  this  reason,  and  also  because  power  stimu- 
lates the  love  of  power,  the  men  who  have  most  influ- 
ence in  government  are  usually  men  whose  passions 
and  impulses  are  less  civilised  than  those  of  the  aver- 
age citizen.  These  men — the  great  financiers,  the 
Ministers,  and  some  editors  of  daily  papers — use  their 
position,  their  knowledge,  and  their  power  of  dissem- 
inating misinformation,  to  arouse  and  stimulate  the 
latent  instinct  for  bloodshed.  When  they  have  suc- 
ceeded, they  say  that  they  are  reluctantly  forced  into 
war  by  the  pressure  of  public  opinion.  Their  activities 
are  exactly  analogous  to  those  of  men  who  distribute 
indecent  pictures  or  produce  lascivious  plays.  They 
ought  to  be  viewed  in  the  same  light;  but  because  of 
the  notion  that  a  wish  to  kill  foreigners  is  patriotic 
and  virtuous,  they  are  honoured  as  men  who  have  de- 
served well  of  their  country.  They  provide  an  outlet 
for  the  impulse  to  homicide.  To  gratify  this  impulse 
is  the  third  and  ultimate  purpose  of  armies  and  navies. 
All  these  three  motives  for  armaments — cowardice, 
love  of  dominion,  and  lust  for  blood — are  no  longer  in- 
eradicable in  civilised  human  nature.  All  are  dimin- 
ishing under  the  influence  of  modern  social  organisa- 
tion. All  might  be  reduced  to  a  degree  which  could 
make  them  almost  inocuous,  if  early  education  and 
current  moral  standards  were  directed  to  that  end. 
Passive  resistance,  if  it  were  adopted  deliberately  by 
the  will  of  a  whole  nation,  with  the  same  measure  of 


WAR  AND  NON-RESISTANCE  59 

courage  and  discipline  which  is  now  displayed  in  war, 
might  achieve  a  far  more  perfect  protection  for  what 
is  good  in  national  life  than  armies  and  navies  can  ever 
achieve,  without  demanding  the  courage  and  waste 
and  welter  of  brutality  involved  in  modern  war. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  prog- 
ress will  come  in  this  way,  because  the  imaginative 
effort  required  is  too  great.  It  is  much  more  likely 
that  it  will  come  as  the  reign  of  law  within  the  State 
has  come,  by  the  establishment  of  a  central  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  able  and  willing  to  secure  obedience 
by  force,  because  the  great  majority  of  men  will  recog- 
nise that  obedience  is  better  than  the  present  inter- 
national anarchy.  A  central  government  of  this  kind 
will  command  assent,  not  as  a  partisan,  but  as  the 
representative  of  the  interests  of  the  whole.  Very 
soon,  resistance  to  it  would  be  seen  to  be  hopeless,  and 
wars  would  cease.  Force  directed  by  a  neutral  author- 
ity is  not  open  to  the  same  abuse,  or  likely  to  cause  the 
same  long-drawn  conflicts,  as  force  exercised  by  quar- 
relling nations  each  of  which  is  the  judge  of  its  own 
cause.  Although  I  firmly  believe  that  the  adoption  of 
passive  instead  of  active  resistance  would  be  good  if  a 
nation  could  be  convinced  of  its  goodness,  yet  it  is 
rather  to  the  ultimate  creation  of  a  strong  central 
authority  that  I  should  look  for  the  ending  of  war. 
But  war  will  only  end  after  a  great  labour  has  been 
performed  in  altering  men's  moral  ideals,  directing 
them  to  the  good  of  all  mankind,  and  not  only  of  the 
separate  nations  into  which  men  happen  to  have  been 
born. 


WHY  NATIONS  LOVE  WAR* 

When  the  war  broke  out,  many  normally  pacific  peo- 
ple, headed  by  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells,  proclaimed  their  belief 
that  "this  is  a  war  which  will  end  war."  Yet  they 
were  unintentionally  illustrating,  by  their  state  of 
mind,  the  chief  reason  for  doubting  whether  this  war 
will  end  war  and  the  chief  obstacle  which  pacifists  will 
have  to  overcome  if  their  efforts  are  ever  to  be  crowned 
with  success.  It  was  obvious  that  those  who  pro- 
claimed their  belief  that  there  would  never  be  another 
great  war  were  actually  enjoying  the  present  war  and 
that,  in  spite  of  a  conventional  recognition  that 
war  is  a  misfortune,  they  were  happier,  more  alive, 
suffering  less  from  what  Mr.  Graham  Wallas  calls 
"  balked  disposition,"  than  in  times  of  peace.  Their 
belief  that  this  war  will  end  war  was  obviously  not 
based  on  reason,  but  on  an  unconscious  effort  to 
reconcile  their  present  enjoyment  with  their  sincere 
but  not  deeply  felt  belief  that  war  is  an  evil.  My 
object  is  to  analyse  and  try  to  understand  this  wide- 
spread enjoyment  of  war — a  phenomenon,  as  I  think, 
of  the  very  greatest  importance,  which,  from  homage 
to  humanitarian  ideals,  men  in  this  country  have  not 
sufficiently  emphasised  or  allowed  for,  either  in  their 
expectations  or  in  their  views  as  to  what  has  occurred 
throughout  Europe. 

In  the  days  of  crisis  preceding  the  war  every  nation 
in  Europe  (if  one  can  judge  by  the  newspapers,  inter- 

•Reprinted  from  War  and  Peace,  November,  1914. 


WHY  NATIONS  LOVE  WAR  61 

preted  in  the  light  of  what  was  occurring  in  England) 
went  through  a  certain  instinctive  development  as 
definite  as  falling  in  love,  though  much  more  complex. 
It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  populations 
which  must  suffer  by  war  would  have  urged  upon  their 
Governments  the  importance  of  attempting  to  find  a 
diplomatic  solution.  But  in  fact  what  occurred  was 
exactly  the  opposite:  every  Government  became  in- 
creasingly popular  as  war  drew  nearer,  the  advantages 
of  peace  were  forgotten  or  recalled  coldly  without 
conviction,  and  the  desire  to  have  done  with  negotia- 
tions was  everywhere  loudly  expressed  by  enthusiastic 
crowds.  If  a  diplomatic  solution  had  been  found  at 
the  last  moment,  there  would  have  been  almost  univer- 
sal disappointment,  and  every  Government  would 
have  had  to  face  fierce  attacks  for  its  weakness  in 
yielding  to  the  arrogance  and  unscrupulousness  of  the 
enemy. 

This  whole  collective  state  of  mind  illustrated  an 
instinctive  disposition  of  human  nature,  stronger,  no 
doubt,  in  some  nations,  such  as  the  Germans,  than 
in  others,  but  present,  to  some  degree,  wherever  vigour 
and  vital  energy  are  to  be  found. 

The  basis  of  the  whole  state  of  mind  is  the  instinct 
of  every  gregarious  animal  to  co-operate  with  mem- 
bers of  its  own  herd  and  to  oppose  members  of  other 
herds.  There  is  in  the  natural  man  an  instinctive  dis- 
like and  distrust  of  men  whose  ways  are  different,  who 
are  felt  as  foreign ;  and  round  this  instinctive  dislike 
a  whole  set  of  appropriate  beliefs  tend  to  congregate — 
that  the  foreigner  is  wicked,  that  he  has  hostile  de- 
signs, and  that  his  customs  are  impious.     With  the 


62  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

instinctive  dislike  and  distrust  goes  an  impulse  to  co- 
operate, for  defence  or  attack,  with  those  who  are 
recognised  as  not  foreigners.  It  is  this  double  dispo- 
sition to  co-operation  and  hostility  which  forms  the 
motive  power  in  patriotism,  though  it  is  perhaps  sur- 
prising that  so  primitive  a  feeling  can  attach  itself  to 
somewhat  artificial  aggregations  such  as  modern  States 
or  even  alliances  of  States. 

Round  this  entirely  primitive  feeling  a  number  of 
others  are  grouped  in  the  civilised  man's  desire  for 
war.  There  is  first  of  all  the  desire  for  excitement — 
that  is  to  say,  for  the  exercise,  actually  or  in  imagina- 
tion, of  instinctive  activities  normally  kept  in  check  by 
the  restraints  of  civilised  life.  Love  of  excitement  is 
not  a  primitive  impulse :  it  is  a  desire  for  the  letting 
loose  of  some  instinct,  no  matter  what,  as  a  relief  from 
a  life  unduly  full  of  inhibitions.  In  modern  urban 
populations  this  is  no  doubt  one  of  the  most  powerful 
incentives  to  war;  but  it  could  not  operate  without 
the  other  more  direct  and  more  primitive  impulse  as 
its  foundation. 

Strong  incentives,  to  many  men,  are  derived  from 
the  desires  for  triumph,  for  honour,  and  for  power. 
Under  the  influence  of  national  self-esteem,  every  great 
country  believes  itself  superior  to  all  others  in  fighting 
capacity  and  in  courage.  Englishmen  in  times  of 
peace  chafe  at  the  thought  that  their  Navy,  the  great- 
est in  the  world,  has  no  opportunity  of  showing  its 
merits;  Germans,  similarly,  have  longed  to  show  the 
excellence  of  their  Army.  Every  man  believes  that  the 
fighting  forces  of  his  own  country  will  prove,  on  the 
battlefield,  to  be  far  better  than  the  enemy  has  sup- 


WHY  NATIONS  LOVE  WAR  63 

posed,  and  will  win  honour  at  the  expense  of  the 
enemy.  This  is  a  widespread  popular  feeling,  proh- 
ably  more  operative  among  ordinary  citizens  than 
among  those  who  direct  policy  or  have  a  close  knowl- 
edge of  public  affairs.  On  the  other  hand  the  pleasure 
in  the  contemplation  of  the  power  which  victory  will 
bring  operates  most  among  those  who  have  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  modern  history  or  current  politics :  the 
pleasure  of  redrawing  (in  imagination)  the  map  of 
Europe  has  blinded  many  of  the  educated  classes  both 
here  and  in  Germany  to  the  ravages  and  inhumanity 
of  war.  All  these  pleasures,  which,  if  they  stood 
alone,  would  be  recognised  as  somewhat  base,  are  lib- 
erated and  excused  by  the  fear  of  what  the  enemy 
would  do  if  he  were  not  defeated. 

War  is  felt  to  be  the  ultimate  test  of  a  nation's 
manhood,  the  ultimate  proof  of  its  vigour  and  of  its 
right  to  exist.  In  war  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
both  sides  are  in  earnest;  to  force  one's  will  on  the 
enemy  in  so  terrific  a  contest  is  regarded  as  unanswer- 
able evidence  of  superiority  in  those  qualities  of 
courage  and  determination  which  most  men  honour 
above  all  others  and  above  all  others  vnsh  to  be  known 
to  possess.  For  this  reason  the  victorious  side  always 
tries  to  persuade  itself  that  its  victory  has  not  been 
due  to  superior  numbers ;  and  for  this  reason  victory 
with  the  bayonet  gives  more  pleasure  than  victory 
by  a  more  skilful  use  of  artillery. 

With  this  desire  to  prove  the  nation 's  manhood  goes 
the  feeling  which  makes  it  so  difficult  to  give  way  in 
negotiations,  the  fear  of  seeming  craven  or  mean- 
spirited.    Even  if  reason  clearly  shows  the  desirability 


64  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

of  giving  way,  even  if  the  point  is  one  which  would 
be  readily  conceded  if  not  demanded  with  overt  or 
covert  threats,  it  becomes  impossible  to  give  way  as 
soon  as  fear  may  be  supposed  to  be  the  motive.  The 
feeling  of  shame  that  would  accompany  yielding  under 
such  circumstances  is  one  of  the  strongest  reasons  for 
the  popular  clamour  in  favour  of  war  which  arises  as 
soon  as  a  crisis  becomes  acute. 

Besides  all  these  motives  there  is  another,  more 
idealistic,  almost  religious:  a  passionate  devotion  to 
the  Nation,  conceived  as  an  entity  with  a  life  of  its 
own,  surviving  the  lives  of  the  present  citizens,  and 
passing  on  to  their  children,  the  better  or  the  worse  for 
what  is  done  now.  With  this  passionate  devotion  goes 
a  desire  for  self-sacrifice,  for  immolation  to  further 
an  end  greater  than  anything  in  any  individual  life. 
This  impulse  of  heroism  for  the  welfare  of  the  nation 
is  more  widespread  than  any  other  kind  of  subordi- 
nation to  something  outside  Self,  with  the  sole 
exception  of  parental  affection.  It  is  by  far  the 
noblest  of  the  motives  that  make  for  war,  and  it  ought 
not  to  be  combated  by  merely  material  considerations 
such  as  the  economic  exhaustion  produced  by  war. 

Being  itself  in  essence  religious,  like  the  impulses 
that  lead  to  martyrdom,  it  can  only  be  adequately  com- 
bated by  a  wider  religion,  extending  the  boundaries  of 
one 's  country  to  all  mankind.  But  by  this  extension  it 
loses  the  support  and  reinforcement  of  the  primitive 
gregarious  instinct  underlying  patriotism,  and  thus 
becomes,  except  in  a  few  men  gifted  with  an  excep- 
tional power  of  love,  a  very  pale  and  thin  feeling  com- 
pared to  the  devotion  that  leads  a  man  to  face  death 


WHY  NATIONS  LOVE  WAR  65 

willingly  on  the  battlefield.  It  is  this  fact,  more  per- 
haps than  any  other,  which  causes  the  difficulties  of 
pacifism. 

I  do  not  wish,  however,  to  suggest  any  pessimism 
as  to  the  possibility  of  leading  civilised  nations  to 
abandon  the  practice  of  war.  The  primitive  instinct 
of  collective  hostility  to  strangers,  which  is  at  the  basis 
of  popular  love  of  war,  depends,  like  other  instincts, 
upon  its  appropriate  stimulus.  No  hostility  is  more 
instinctive  than  that  of  cat  and  dog,  yet  a  cat  and  a 
dog  brought  up  together  will  become  good  friends.  In 
like  manner,  familiarity  with  foreigners,  absence  of 
journalistic  incitements  to  fear  and  suspicion,  realisa- 
tion that  their  likeness  to  ourselves  is  much  greater 
than  their  unlikeness,  will  entirely  prevent  the  growth 
of  the  impulse  to  go  to  war.  The  desires  for  triumph 
and  power  can  be  satisfied  by  the  ordinary  contests  of 
football  and  politics,  unless  the  nation's  pride  is 
embodied  in  large  and  efficient  armaments.  The 
feeling  that  war  is  the  ultimate  test  of  a  nation 's  man- 
hood depends  upon  a  rather  barbarous  standard  of 
values,  a  belief  that  superiority  in  physical  force  is 
the  most  desirable  form  of  superiority.  This  belief  has 
largely  died  out  as  between  individuals  in  a  civilised 
country,  and  it  seems  not  Utopian  to  hope  that  it  may 
die  out  as  between  nations.  The  day  may  come  when 
we  shall  be  as  proud  of  Shakespeare  as  of  Nelson. 

The  same  change  in  a  nation's  standard  of  values 
will  alter  the  direction  of  the  quasi-religious  devotion 
to  one's  native  country.  If  victory  in  a  contest  of 
material  force  ceases  to  be  considered  the  supreme 
good  for  a  nation,  the  desire  to  be  of  service  will  find 


66  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

other  channels  than  war  and  will  no  longer  be  bound 
up  with  injury  to  other  nations.  Patriotism  in  its 
present  form  is  essentially  an  ideal  involving  strife 
and  therefore  partial  and  inadequate;  with  a  better 
conception  of  what  constitutes  a  nation's  good  the 
element  of  strife  would  disappear. 

It  is  important,  in  any  case,  to  arrive  at  a  true 
diagnosis  of  the  impulses  which  lead  nations  to  war. 
There  are  times — especially  the  time  immediately 
after  a  war — when  nations  are  in  a  pacific  mood  and 
anxious  to  find  ways  of  preventing  future  conflicts. 
It  may  be  hoped  that  Europe  as  a  whole  will  be  in  a 
pacific  mood  for  some  time  after  the  end  of  the  present 
war;  and  if  the  utmost  permanent  good  is  to  result 
from  the  hopes  of  such  a  period,  it  is  before  all  things 
necessary  that  the  cause  of  war  should  be  thoroughly 
understood.  I  do  not  believe  this  is  to  be  found 
merely  in  the  sins  of  statesmen,  but  rather  in  the 
standards  and  desires  which  civilised  nations  have 
inherited  from  a  barbarous  past.  If  this  is  the  case, 
a  stable  peace  can  only  be  attained  by  a  process  of 
popular  education  and  by  a  gradual  change  in  the 
standards  of  value  accepted  by  men  who  are  con- 
sidered to  be  civilised. 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY 

If  the  Germans  are  to  be  believed,  their  only  im- 
placable and  unappeasable  enmity  in  the  war  is 
against  England. 

Toward  France  they  express  a  kind  of  brutal,  con- 
temptuous liking.  As  providing  opportunities  for 
military  glory  in  1870  and  again  last  August,  France 
has  deserved  well  of  the  Fatherland.  Toward  Russia 
they  have  the  tolerance  of  merely  momentary  hostility, 
with  the  consciousness  that  the  grounds  of  quarrel  are 
finite  and  capable  of  adjustment.  But  toward 
England  they  express  a  hatred  which  nothing  can 
satisfy  except  the  utter  destruction  of  England's 
power.  Portugal,  Spain,  Holland,  were  once  great 
maritime  and  colonial  empires,  but  they  are  fallen 
from  their  high  estate;  so  England  is  to  fall,  if 
Germany  in  its  present  mood  is  to  have  its  way. 

This  attitude  is  not  confined  to  journalists  or  the 
thoughtless  multitude ;  it  is  to  be  found  equally  in  the 
deliberate  writings  of  learned  men.  Very  instructive 
from  this  point  of  view  is  an  article  by  the  historian 
Eduard  Meyer,  in  the  Italian  periodical  Scientia, 
on  England's  war  against  Germany  and  the  problems 
of  the  future.*  The  erudite  professor,  following 
Mommsen,  considers  Germany  as  the  analogue  of 
Rome  and  England  as  the  analogue  of  Carthage.  He 
hardly  hopes  for  a  decisive  victory  now,  but  looks 

♦Reprinted  from  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  July,  1915. 
•"Engrlands  Krieg   ^egen   Deutschland  und   die   Problems   der 
Zukunff  ;  March,  1915,  pp.  286-300. 


68  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

forward  to  a  succession  of  conflicts  like  the  Punic 
Wars,  ending,  we  are  to  suppose,  in  an  equally  final 
triumph.  "Especially  in  America,"  he  says,  "but 
also  in  Europe,  above  all  in  the  neutral  countries, 
there  are  not  a  few  well-meaning  people  who  believe 
that  this  tremendous  war  will  be  the  last  for  a  long 
time  to  come,  that  a  new  era  of  peaceful  development 
and  of  harmonious  international  peace  will  follow.  I 
regard  these  views  as  a  Utopian  dream.  Their  realis- 
ation could  be  hoped  for  only  in  case  we  should 
succeed  in  really  casting  England  to  the  ground, 
breaking  her  maritime  dominion,  and  thereby  con- 
quering the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  at  the  same  time 
in  so  controlling  our  other  enemies  that  they  would 
lose  for  ever  the  desire  to  attack  us  again.  But  so 
high  our  hopes  can  hardly  rise;  it  seems  far  more 
probable  that  we  shall  have  to  be  content  with  much 
less,  even  if  we  remain  victorious  to  the  end.  But 
then,  so  far  as  one  can  foresee,  this  peace  will  only 
be  a  short  truce;  England  will  use  the  first  oppor- 
tunity of  beginning  the  fight  again,  better  prepared, 
.at  the  head  of  a  new  coalition  if  not  of  the  old  one, 
and  a  long  series  of  difficult  and  bloody  wars  will 
follow,  until  at  last  the  definite  decision  is  obtained. ' ' 
He  adds  that  modern  civilisation,  from  now  on,  is  to 
decline,  as  ancient  civilisation  declined;  that  the  era 
of  attempts  at  international  friendship  is  definitely 
past,  and  that  "the  characteristic  of  the  next  century 
will  be  unconquerable  opposition  and  embittered  hate 
between  England  and  Germany." 

Very  similar  sentiments  are  expressed  by  English 
professors,  except  that  their  military  hopes  are  less 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  69 

modest,  and  they  expect  to  achieve  in  this  war  that 
crushing  victory  which,  like  Eduard  Meyer,  they 
regard  as  the  only  possible  road  to  a  permanent  peace. 
They  hope,  at  any  rate,  to  crush  German  militarism, 
and  Professor  Meyer  assures  us  that ' '  whoever  intends 
to  destroy  German  militarism  must  destroy  the 
German  nation."* 

Are  the  professors  of  England  and  Germany  in  the 
right?  Is  it  certain  that  these  two  nations  will  con- 
tinue to  fight  and  hate  each  other  until  one  of  them 
is  utterly  broken?  Fortunately,  no  country  consists 
wholly  of  professors,  not  even  Germany;  and  it  may 
be  hoped  that  more  sanity  is  to  be  found  among  those 
who  have  not  been  made  mad  by  much  learning.  For 
the  moment,  both  countries  are  wholly  blind  to  their 
own  faults,  and  utterly  fantastic  in  the  crimes  which 
they  attribute  to  the  enemy.  A  vast  but  shadowy 
economic  conflict  has  been  invented  to  rationalise  their 
hostility,  which  in  fact  is  as  irrational  and  instinctive 
as  that  of  dogs  who  snarl  and  fly  at  each  other  in  the 
street.  The  cynic  who  said,  "Speech  has  been  given 
us  to  conceal  our  thoughts,"  might  well  have  added, 
"Thought  has  been  given  us  to  conceal  our  passions 
from  ourselves. ' '  At  least  I  am  sure  that  this  is  true 
of  thought  in  war-time. 

In  this  article,  I  wish  to  examine,  in  a  neutral  spirit, 
the  causes  and  supposed  justifications  of  Anglo- 
German  enmity,  and  to  suggest  ways  by  which  it  may 
be  possible  hereafter  to  avoid  the  appalling  conse- 
quences contemplated  by  Professor  Meyer. 

♦English  professors  now  (September,  1915)  have  come  into 
almost  exact  agreement  with  Eduard  Meyer. 


70  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

The  first  thing  that  must  strike  any  impartial 
observer  of  England  and  Germany  in  war-time  is  their 
amazing  similarity  in  myth  and  melodrama.  France 
and  Russia  each  has  its  myth,  for  without  myth  no 
great  national  upheaval  is  possible.  But  their  myths 
are  different  from  ours,  whereas  the  myths  of  England 
and  Germany  are  all  but  identical.  Each  believes 
itself  a  great  peace-loving  nation,  powerful,  but 
always  using  its  power  to  further  worthy  ends.  Each 
believes  that  the  other,  with  an  incredible  perfidy 
inspired  by  the  basest  jealousy,  suddenly  stirred  up 
the  war,  after  many  years  of  careful  preparation, 
military  in  the  one  case,  diplomatic  in  the  other. 
Each  believes  that  only  the  utter  humiliation  of  the 
other  can  secure  the  peace  of  the  world  and  the 
ordered  progress  of  civilisation.  In  each,  a  pacifist 
minority  urges  moderation  in  the  use  of  victory,  while 
yielding  to  none  in  the  conviction  that  victory  is  the 
indispensable  preliminary  to  any  future  reconstruc- 
tion. Each  is  absolutely  confident  of  victory,  and 
prepared  for  any  sacrifice,  however  great,  in  order  to 
secure  victory.  Each  is  quite  unable  to  believe  that 
the  other  is  sincere  in  the  opinion  which  it  professes : 
its  own  innocence  and  the  other's  guilt  are  as  clear  as 
noonday,  and  can  be  denied  only  by  the  most  abject 
hypocrisy. 

Both  cannot  be  right  in  these  opinions,  and  a  priori 
it  is  not  likely  that  either  is  right.  No  nation  was 
ever  so  virtuous  as  each  believes  itself,  and  none  was 
ever  so  wicked  as  each  believes  the  other.  If  these 
beliefs  survive  the  war,  no  real  peace  will  be  possible. 
Both   nations   have    concentrated   their    energies    so 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  71 

wholly  on  making  war  that  they  have  rendered  it 
almost  impossible  to  make  peace.  In  normal  times 
civilised  and  humane  people  find  a  difficulty  in  be- 
lieving that  they  do  well  to  butcher  each  other.  In 
order  to  overcome  this  feeling,  journalists  have  filled 
the  minds  of  their  readers  with  such  appalling 
accounts  of  the  enemy's  crimes  that  hatred  has  come 
to  seem  a  noble  indignation,  and  it  has  grown  difficult 
to  believe  that  any  of  our  opponents  deserve  to  live. 
Yet  peace,  if  it  is  to  be  real,  must  be  accompanied  by 
respect,  and  must  bring  with  it  some  sense  of  justice 
toward  rival  claims.  "What  these  claims  are,  and  what 
justice  demands  if  they  are  to  be  reconciled,  must  be 
realised  in  some  degree  before  the  peace,  if  the  peace 
is  to  heal  the  wounds  which  the  war  is  inflicting. 

Apart  from  accusations  of  crime  connected  with  the 
war,  what  have  been  the  grounds  of  England's  oppo- 
sition to  Germany  in  recent  years  ? 

Far  the  most  important  ground  has  been  fear  of  the 
German  navy,  not  as  it  has  hitherto  been,  but  as  it 
may  become.  It  is  said  on  the  Continent — not  only 
by  Germans — that  jealousy  of  Germany's  economic 
development  was  an  equal  cause  of  hostility;  but  I 
believe  this  to  be  an  entire  mistake.  America's  eco- 
nomic development  has  been  quite  as  remarkable  as 
that  of  Germany,  but  it  has  not  produced  the  slightest 
ripple  of  political  hostility.  The  government  in 
power,  as  free  traders,*  do  not  believe  that  the  pros- 
perity of  one  country  is  economically  injurious  to  that 
of  another,  and  in  this  opinion  a  majority  of  the 

♦This  was  written  before  the  Coalition  Government  was 
formed. 


72  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

nation  agree  with  them.  Most  Germans  think  of  trade 
in  nationalist  terms,  but  in  England  this  habit  is  not 
very  common.  And  whatever  may  be  thought  abroad, 
it  is  contrary  to  British  political  instincts  to  allow 
trade  rivalry  to  cause  diplomatic  opposition — largely, 
no  doubt,  because  we  realise  that  a  nation's  trade  is 
not  necessarily  injured  by  defeat  in  war. 

But  whoever  threatens  our  naval  supremacy  touches 
a  sensitive  nerve,  awakening  an  instinctive  movement 
of  self-protection  in  all  classes,  even  the  most  unedu- 
cated and  the  least  conscious  of  international  compli- 
cations. When  the  Germans,  with  their  usual  incau- 
tious explicitness,  made  the  announcement,  "Our 
future  is  on  the  sea,"  most  Englishmen  felt,  almost 
without  conscious  thought,  that  the  Germans  might  as 
well  have  announced  that  their  future  lay  through  the 
death  of  England's  greatness  and  the  starvation  of 
our  population.  In  vain  the  Germans  protested  that 
their  navy  was  purely  defensive,  and  was  not  intended 
to  be  as  strong  as  ours.  As  we  watched  the  carrying 
out  of  their  Navy  Law,  as  we  realised  how  the  era  of 
dreadnoughts  had  diminished  our  superiority,  some- 
thing not  far  removed  from  apprehension  began  to  be 
felt;  and  in  a  proud  nation  apprehension  inevitably 
shows  itself  in  hostility.  Because  the  apprehension 
was  real  and  deep-seated,  the  hostility  was  rather 
blind  and  instinctive ;  although,  in  the  region  of  con- 
scious thought,  the  hopes  of  an  understanding  were 
not  abandoned,  yet  in  that  deeper  region  out  of  which 
effective  action  springs,  the  belief  in  a  future  conflict 
had  taken  root  and  could  no  longer  be  dislodged. 

At  the  same  time  Germany's  growing  friendship 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  73 

with  Turkey  produced  uneasiness  in  our  governing 
classes,  with  whom  the  consciousness  of  Indian  prob- 
lems has  become  almost  as  much  part  of  the  texture  of 
everyday  thought  as  the  need  of  naval  supremacy. 
Our  traditional  policy  of  protecting  the  Turk,  while  it 
had  caused  untold  misery  in  the  Balkans,  had  been 
maintained  chiefly  on  account  of  the  Mohammedan 
population  of  India.  "When  the  Kaiser  supplanted  us 
at  Constantinople,  and  announced  himself  the  pro- 
tector of  all  Mohammedans,  we  dreaded  the  effect  on 
the  most  warlike  races  of  India;  and  our  dread  was 
not  diminished  by  the  Bagdad  Railway,  with  the  pros- 
pect which  it  opened  of  German  colonisation  in  Meso- 
potamia and  a  German  naval  base  on  the  Persian  Gulf. 
But  this  motive,  although  it  affected  our  government 
and  that  small  section  of  the  population  which  is  alive 
to  Indian  problems,  did  not,  like  the  challenge  to  our 
sea-power,  affect  all  classes  or  attain  the  status  of  a 
question  to  be  discussed  at  general  elections.  More- 
over, this  whole  problem  was  in  its  nature  capable  of 
diplomatic  adjustment  by  mutual  concessions ;  indeed, 
we  are  told  that  an  agreement  had  almost  been  con- 
eluded  when  the  war  broke  out. 

Let  us  now  try  to  see  the  history  of  the  past  fifteen 
years  from  the  German  point  of  view.  Before  speak- 
ing of  their  supposed  grievances,  I  wish  to  say  that  I 
regard  the  whole  theory  out  of  which  they  spring  as 
wholly  mistaken :  I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  of  any  real 
importance  to  a  nation  to  possess  colonies  or  to  develop 
either  its  military  or  its  naval  forces  beyond  the  point 
which  is  necessary  to  prevent  invasion.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  official  English  view;  and  the  official 


74  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

German  view  seems,  apart  from  questions  of  method, 
merely  an  echo  of  the  principles  by  which  English 
policy  has  been  governed  for  centuries.  It  is  only  this 
similarity — not  absolute  validity — that  I  wish  to 
exhibit  in  stating  the  German  ease. 

The  Germans  are  commonly  regarded  as  an  excep-. 
tionally  aggressive  nation.  This  is  no  doubt  true  of 
their  spirit,  but  when  we  come  to  inquire  into  their 
actual  acquisitions,  we  find  that  in  recent  years  their 
gains  of  territory  have  been  insignificant  in  compari- 
son with  those  of  England  and  Russia,  and  approxi- 
mately equal  to  those  of  France.  Since  1900,  we  have 
gained  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  we 
have  consolidated  our  position  in  Egypt,  and  we 
have  secured  a  protectorate  over  Southern  Persia  and 
its  oil  wells.  The  French,  meanwhile,  have  gained 
about  four-fifths  of  Morocco,  and  the  Russians,  though 
they  have  lost  a  small  portion  of  Manchuria,  have 
gained  more  than  half  of  Persia.  The  Germans,  in 
the  same  period,  have  gained  only  a  not  very  valuable 
colony  in  West  Africa.*  Their  designs  in  Morocco 
and  Mesopotamia  have  been  thwarted,  largely  by 
England's  efforts.    Yet  they  feel  that  their  economic 

•The  following  figures  are  not  without  interest: — 
Total  area  of  colonies. 

Great  Britain 11,429,078  square  miles 

France    4,512,543 

Germany     1,027,820 

Increase  in  area  of  colonies  since  1900. 

Great  Britain 324,500  square  miles 

Germany    100,820 

France    92,180 

The  British  increase  consists  almost  wholly  of  the  Transvaal, 
tion  of  the  Congo  ceded  to  Germany  in  1911;  and  the  German 
French  increase  consists  almost  wholly  of  Morocco,  less  the  por- 
the  Orange  Free  State,  and  the  British  sphere  in  Persia.  The 
increase  consists  wholly  of  this  portion  of  the  Congo,  less  a 
small  area  in  the  Cameroons,  ceded  to  France  in  1911.  The  Rus- 
sian sphere  in  Persia  contains  305,000  square  miles  and  6,400,000 
inhabitants. 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GEEMAN  EIVALRY  75 

progress  and  their  growing  population  make  the  need 
of  colonies  far  greater  for  them  than  for  the  French. 

I  am  not  for  a  moment  denying  that  we  had  weighty 
reasons  for  our  opposition  to  German  expansion, 
though  perhaps  weightier  reasons  could  have  been 
found  for  not  opposing  it.  I  am  only  concerned,  for 
the  moment,  with  the  way  in  which  our  actions  im- 
pressed the  Germans,  not  mth  the  justification  of  our 
actions.  The  Germans,  in  spite  of  their  progress, 
their  energy,  and  their  population,  are  very  inferior 
in  colonial  possessions,  not  only  to  England  and  Rus- 
sia, but  also  to  France.  This  seems  to  them  unjust; 
but  wherever  they  turn  to  try  to  acquire  new  colonies, 
England  and  England's  navy  block  the  way,  because 
of  our  friendship  with  France,  or  our  sensitiveness 
about  India,  or  some  other  interest  in  the  complicated 
web  of  our  foreign  policy. 

German  aggressiveness,  real  and  obnoxious  as  it  has 
become,  is  the  result  of  experience.  Germany  cannot, 
as  we  do,  acquire  colonies  absent-mindedly,  without 
intention,  and  almost  without  effort.  When  colonies 
were  easier  to  acquire  than  they  are  now,  Germany 
had  not  yet  entered  into  the  competition;  and  since 
Germany  became  a  great  Power,  it  has  been  handi- 
capped by  naval  inferiority  and  by  the  necessity  of 
defending  two  frontiers.  It  is  these  accidents  of  his- 
tory and  geography,  rather  than  innate  wickedness, 
which  have  produced  German  aggressiveness.  The 
aims  of  German  policy  are  closely  similar  to  those 
which  we  have  always  pursued,  but  its  methods  cannot 
be  the  unobtrusive  methods  which  we  have  usually 


76  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

adopted,  because  such  methods,  in  the  circumstances, 
would  achieve  nothing. 

Colonial  ambitions  are  no  doubt  one  reason  why 
Germany  has  developed  a  navy ;  but  another  and  still 
more  imperative  reason  is  the  necessity  of  safe- 
guarding foreign  trade. 

In  the  time  of  Bismarck,  Germany  had  not  yet 
become  a  great  industrial  nation :  it  was  independent 
of  foreign  food,  and  its  exports  of  manufactures  were 
insignificant.  Its  industrial  expansion  dates  from  the 
introduction  of  the  Bessemer  process  in  1879,  by  which 
its  supplies  of  iron  became  possible  to  work  at  a  profit. 
From  that  time  onward,  German  industrial  progress 
has  been  extraordinarily  rapid;  more  and  more,  Ger- 
many has  tended  to  become  dependent,  like  England, 
upon  the  possibility  of  importing  food  and  exporting 
manufactures.  In  this  war,  as  we  see,  Germany  is 
just  able,  by  very  painful  economy,  to  subsist  upon  the 
stock  of  food  in  the  country ;  but  another  ten  years  of 
such  development  as  was  taking  place  before  the  war 
would  have  made  this  impossible.  High  agrarian  pro- 
tection, which  alone  could  have  retarded  the  process, 
was  naturally  disliked  by  the  manufacturers  and  the 
working  classes,  and  could  not  be  carried  beyond  a 
certain  point  for  fear  of  leading  to  a  triumph  of 
Socialism. 

It  thus  became  obvious  that,  in  a  few  years'  time, 
Germany  would  be  liable  to  defeat  by  starvation  in 
any  war  with  a  superior  naval  power.  In  1900,  when 
the  Germans  decided  to  build  a  great  navy,  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  weaker  than  France  and  Russia  on  the 
sea.     The  wish  not  to  be  inferior  to  France  and  Russia 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GER]\IAN  RIVALRY  77 

is  enough  to  account  for  the  beginnings  of  the  German 
navy;  the  rivalry  with  us  may  perhaps  have  been  no 
part  of  the  original  intention,  but  merely  a  result  of 
the  suspicions  produced  in  England  by  the  German 
programme.  However  that  may  be,  it  ought  to  have 
been  obvious  to  the  Germans  that  a  strong  navy  was 
sure  to  make  us  hostile,  and  would  therefore  not  serve 
the  purposes  for  which  it  was  intended  unless  it  was 
stronger  than  our  navy.  But  it  could  not  be  supposed 
that  we  should  submit  to  the  existence  of  a  navy 
stronger  than  our  own,  unless  we  had  first  been  utterly 
and  hopelessly  defeated;  and  there  was  no  way  of 
defeating  us  except  by  first  having  a  navy  stronger 
than  ours.  For  these  reasons,  the  German  policy  was 
inherently  incapable  of  success.  And  yet,  without 
success,  all  industrial  progress  and  all  colonial  expan- 
sion remain  perpetually  at  England's  mercy.  If  we 
ask  ourselves  how  we  should  feel  if  we  were  similarly 
at  the  mercy  of  Germany,  we  shall  perhaps  begin  to 
understand  why  the  Germans  hate  us.  And  yet  we 
can  hardly  feel  any  sense  of  guilt,  because  a  supreme 
navy  is  for  us  a  matter  of  life  and  death. 

This  dilemma  must  be  faced,  if  we  are  to  understand 
the  conflict  of  England  and  Germany,  and  not  regard 
it  as  merely  due  to  wickedness  on  one  side  or  on  the 
other.  After  the  war,  sooner  or  later,  exactly  the 
same  problem  will  have  to  be  faced  again.  The  native 
energy  of  the  Germans  cannot  be  permanently  checked 
by  defeat :  after  a  longer  or  shorter  period  of  recuper- 
ation, they  will  again  feel  that  commercial  safety  and 
colonial  expansion  demand  a  strong  navy,  if  they  are 
not  to  be  content  to  live  on  sufferance  and  to  be  com- 


78  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

pelled  to  bow  to  England's  will  on  all  occasions  of 
serious  dispute.  The  problem  is  a  new  one,  since 
hitherto  England  has  been  the  only  nation  dependent 
for  subsistence  on  food  imported  by  sea,  and  England 
has  had  unquestioned  naval  supremacy.  But  if  we 
are  to  avoid  the  century  of  internecine  warfare  con- 
templated by  Eduard  Meyer,  we  must  find  some  solu- 
tion of  the  problem,  and  not  be  content  merely  to 
hope  that,  whenever  war  comes,  we  shall  be  victorious. 
Germany's  industrial  ambitions,  at  least,  are  entirely 
legitimate;  and  they  alone  make  some  security  for 
German  trade  an  imperative  necessity.  It  is  not  only 
justice  that  makes  it  necessary  to  find  a  solution,  but 
also  self-preservation.  It  is  impossible  to  know  how 
submarines  may  develop;  perhaps,  in  future,  no 
degree  of  naval  power  will  be  sufficient  to  protect  sea- 
borne trade.  Even  now,  our  position  might  be  preca- 
rious if  all  the  men  and  money  which  Germany  has 
devoted  to  useless  dreadnoughts  had  been  devoted  to 
the  multiplication  of  submarines.  After  the  war,  our 
own  future  safety,  as  well  as  the  peace  of  the  world, 
will  demand  some  new  and  statesmanlike  development 
in  our  naval  policy. 

No  solution  will  be  possible  until  it  grows  clear  to 
the  Germans  that  they  cannot  reasonably  hope  to 
become  superior  to  us  at  sea.  So  long  as  that  hope 
remains  with  them,  they  will  go  on  struggling  to 
acquire  that  complete  world-dominion  which  they 
believe  would  result  from  possession  of  both  the 
strongest  navy  and  the  strongest  army  in  the  world. 
It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  present  war  will  persuade 
them  of  the  futility  of  their  hopes.     They  speak  to 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GER]\IAN  RIVALRY  79 

neutrals  of  their  wish  to  secure  for  all  nations  "the 
freedom  of  the  sea,"  but  the  neutrals  remain  deaf  to 
all  their  blandishments.  The  neutrals  do  not  see  how 
there  would  be  more  freedom  under  German  suprem- 
acy than  under  that  of  England,  and  they  do  see 
that,  so  long  as  any  nation  has  naval  supremacy,  it  is 
better  that  it  should  be  a  nation  without  a  strong  army 
or  the  means  of  invasion.  This  will  enable  us  to  avoid 
hostile  coalitions,  and  to  make  a  German  victory  over 
us  at  some  future  date  exceedingly  unlikely.  But  it 
will  not,  by  itself,  prevent  Germany  from  hating  us, 
or  from  seeking  every  possible  means  of  injuring  us. 
And  if  Germany's  industrial  development  continues, 
it  will  leave  Germany  increasingly  dependent  upon 
us  for  its  means  of  subsistence  in  any  war  in  which 
Russia  is  on  our  side. 

Such  a  situation  will  be  full  of  danger  to  the  peace 
of  Europe  and  of  possible  harm  to  ourselves  as  well  as 
to  Germany.  For  the  sake  of  the  progress  of  civilisa- 
tion, and  also  for  the  sake  of  our  security  as  well  as 
Germany's,  both  nations,  if  they  have  any  statesman- 
ship, will  be  driven  to  seek  some  means  by  which  food- 
supply  can  be  secured  from  the  menace  of  attack  by 
a  hostile  Power. 

Before  this  war,  many  would  have  thought  that  abo- 
lition of  the  right  of  capture  at  sea  would  achieve  this 
object.  But  it  is  now  evident  that  no  reliance  can  be 
placed  upon  paper  guarantees  which  are  not  backed 
by  force.  If  it  could  be  expected  that  a  nation  which 
resorted  to  capture  at  sea  would  have  to  face  a  coali- 
tion of  neutrals,  the  practice  of  capture  might  be 
effectively  abolished.     But  so  long  as  neutrals  do  not 


80  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

intervene  by  force  of  arms  to  protect  international 
law,  it  cannot  be  expected  that  its  provisions  will  be 
observed;  nor  would  they  be  observed  if  neutrals 
should  intervene,  unless  they  were  sufficiently  power- 
ful to  turn  the  scale.  If  Germany's  submarine 
blockade  could  have  been  made  effective,  all  the  neu- 
trals in  the  world  would  have  been  powerless  to 
prevent  it. 

In  this  matter,  as  also  in  regard  to  armies,  the 
future  of  civilisation  depends  on  the  discovery  of 
means  which  will  make  nations  strong  for  defence  but 
weak  for  attack.  The  naval  problem  is  particularly 
urgent,  because,  if  submarines  develop  as  may  be 
expected,  navies  will  become  strong  for  attack  and 
weak  for  defence,  "attack"  being  understood  as  in- 
cluding the  capture  or  destruction  of  merchant  ships. 

There  is  one  obvious  solution,  which  would  be 
adopted  if  any  large  section  of  mankind  were  actuat«}d 
by  humanity  or  reason  or  even  self-interest.  If  this 
were  the  case,  national  armies  and  navies  would  be 
abolished,  and  only  an  international  army  and  navy 
would  be  retained,  for  police  purposes.  But  among 
all  the  great  Powers,  pride  is  stronger  than  self- 
interest;  men  prefer  the  risk  of  death  for  themselves 
and  their  sons,  the  certainty  of  impoverishment  and 
the  possibility  of  national  disaster,  to  loss  of  the  oppor- 
tunity for  bullying  which  is  afforded  by  an  army  and 
a  navy.  Under  these  circumstances,  there  is  probably 
no  chance  of  a  theoretically  complete  solution  of  the 
problem.  The  best  hope  is  that  through  the  expe- 
rience of  the  present  war  men  will  acquire  a  more  firm 
resolve  to  preserve  the  peace,  and  neutrals  will  realise 


FUTURE  OF  ANGLO-GERMAN  RIVALRY  81 

that  war  is  a  disaster  even  to  those  who  do  not  take 
part  in  it.  It  may  be  that,  in  time,  the  powers  not 
directly  interested  in  a  quarrel  will  insist  upon  its 
being  always  submitted  to  an  international  tribunal, 
and  will  make  their  insistence  effective  by  threatening 
war  if  it  is  disregarded.  In  that  case,  any  Power 
could  secure  safety  by  merely  abstaining  from  aggres- 
sion. At  present,  no  great  Power  wishes  to  make 
aggression  impossible.  But  experience  of  war,  the 
progress  of  democracy,  and  the  growing  economic 
interdependence  of  different  countries,  are  causing 
rapid  changes  in  public  opinion.  It  is  at  least  as 
rational  to  expect  that  the  next  hundred  years  will 
see  the  growth  and  victory  of  an  international  council 
for  the  settlement  of  all  disputes  between  nations,  as 
it  is  to  expect,  with  Eduard  JNIeyer,  that  they  will  see 
civilisation  engulfed  in  a  futile  contest  for  supremacy 
between  England  and  Germany. 

The  learned  historian,  I  am  confident,  does  injus- 
tice to  his  compatriots ;  I  know  that  he  does  injustice 
to  the  English.  Without  hope,  nothing  will  be 
achieved;  but  with  hope,  no  limits  can  be  set  to 
what  may  be  achieved  toward  realising  the  ideal  of 
international  co-operation.  Is  the  victory  of  either 
side  in  this  war  likely  to  bring  a  stable  peace  ?  Both 
in  England  and  in  Germany,  men  who  have  pro- 
fessed a  horror  of  war,  but  who  do  not  wish  it  thought 
that  they  oppose  this  war,  have  argued  that  their  own 
country  is  notorious  for  its  love  of  peace,  of  which  it 
has  given  repeated  proofs,  laying  it  open  to  the 
charge  of  weakness ;  but  that  it  has  been  attacked  by 
unscrupulous  enemies,  and  must  quell  their  ruthless 


82  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

pride  before  the  world  can  be  relieved  from  the  dread 
of  war.  This  language  is  not  insincere,  but  is  the 
result  of  a  very  superficial  analysis  of  the  events  and 
passions  which  led  up  to  the  conflict.  Such  an  analy- 
sis, if  allowed  to  pass  unchallenged,  is  dangerous, 
since  it  leaves  untouched  all  the  misjudgment,  suspi- 
cion, and  pride  out  of  which  future  wars,  equally  dev- 
astating, may  be  expected  to  grow  in  the  course  of 
the  years.  Something  more  than  the  mere  victory 
of  one  party  is  necessary  for  a  secure  peace,  and 
something  deeper  than  a  belief  in  the  enemy's  wicked- 
ness is  necessary  if  the  nations  are  to  move  towards 
that  goal.  I  shall  attempt  first  an  analysis  of  the 
causes  of  modern  war,  and  then  a  discussion  of  means 
of  preventing  future  wars  between  civilised  States. 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE  ?* 

I. 

The  present  war  springs  from  the  rivalry  of  States. 
And  the  rivalry  of  States  springs  from  certain  erron- 
eous beliefs,  inspired  and  encouraged  by  pride  and 
fear,  and  embodied  in  a  political  machinery  intended 
to  make  the  power  of  a  State  quick,  effective,  and 
terrible.  If  wars  between  civilised  States  are  to 
cease,  these  beliefs  must  be  seen  to  be  mistaken,  pride 
must  take  a  different  form,  fear  must  become  ground- 
less, and  the  machinery  of  international  relations  must 
no  longer  be  designed  solely  for  rivalry. 

In  surveying  the  larger  causes  of  the  war,  the 
diplomacy  of  the  last  fortnight  may  be  left  altogether 
out  of  account.  Ever  since  the  conclusion  of  the 
Anglo-French  entente  in  1904  the  war  had  been  on 
the  point  of  breaking  out,  and  could  only  have  been 
avoided  by  some  radical  change  in  the  temper  of 
nations  and  Governments,  The  annexation  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  had  produced  a  profound  estrangement  be- 
tween France  and  Germany.  Russia  and  Germany 
became  enemies  through  the  Pan-Slavist  agitation, 
which  threatened  the  Austrian  influence  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  even  the  very  existence  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  State.  Finally  the  German  determination  to 
build  a  powerful  Navy  drove  England  into  the  arms 
of  Russia  and  France.  Our  long-standing  differences 
with  those  two  countries  were  suddenly  discovered 

♦Reprinted  from  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  March,  1915. 


84  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

to  be  unimportant,  and  were  amicably  arranged  with- 
out any  difficulty.  By  a  treaty  whose  important  arti- 
cles were  kept  secret,  the  French  withdrew  their  oppo- 
sition to  our  occupation  of  Egypt,  and  we  undertook 
to  support  them  in  acquiring  Morocco — a  bargain 
which,  from  our  own  point  of  view,  had  the  advantage 
of  reviving  the  hostility  between  France  and  Germany 
at  a  time  when  there  seemed  a  chance  of  its  passing 
away.  As  regards  Russia,  our  deep-rooted  suspicions 
of  its  Asiatic  designs  were  declared  groundless,  and 
we  agreed  to  the  independence  of  Tibet  and  the  parti- 
tion of  Persia  in  return  for  an  acknowledgment  of 
our  suzerainty  in  Afghanistan.  Both  these  arrange- 
ments show  that,  if  good  wiU  and  reason  presided  over 
international  affairs,  an  adjustment  of  differences 
might  have  been  made  at  any  time;  as  it  is,  nothing 
but  fear  of  Germany  sufficed  to  persuade  us  of  the 
uselessness  of  our  previous  hostility  to  France  and 
Russia. 

No  sooner  had  this  grouping  of  the  European 
Powers  been  brought  about  than  the  Entente  and  the 
Alliance  began  a  diplomatic  game  of  watchful  ma- 
noeuvring against  each  other.  Russia  suffered  a  blow 
to  her  pride  in  the  Austrian  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina;  Germany  felt  humiliated  by  hav- 
ing to  acknowledge,  though  with  compensation,  the 
French  occupation  of  Morocco.  The  first  Balkan  war 
was  a  gain  to  Russia,  the  second  afforded  some  con- 
solation to  Austria.  And  so  the  game  went  on,  with 
recurring  crises  and  alternate  diplomatic  victories 
first  for  one  side,  then  for  the  other. 

In  all  this  struggle,  no  one  on  either  side  thought 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    85 

for  a  moment  of  the  welfare  of  the  smaller  nations 
which  were  the  pawns  in  the  struggle.  The  fact  that 
Morocco  appealed  to  Germany  for  protection  against 
French  aggression  was  not  held  to  put  England  and 
France  in  the  wrong.  The  fact  that  the  Persians — 
the  intellectual  aristocracy  of  the  IMoslem  world — had 
freed  themselves  from  the  corrupt  Government  of  the 
Shah  and  were  becoming  Liberal  and  Parliamentary 
was  not  regarded  as  any  reason  why  their  northern 
provinces  should  not  be  devastated  by  Cossacks  and 
their  southern  regions  occupied  by  the  British.  The 
fact  that  the  Turks  had  for  ages  displayed  a  suprem- 
acy in  cruelty  and  barbarism  by  torturing  and 
degrading  the  Christians  under  their  rule  was  no 
reason  why  Germany  should  not,  like  England  in  for- 
mer times,  support  their  tottering  despotism  by 
military  and  financial  assistance.  All  considerations 
of  humanity  and  liberty  were  subordinated  to  the 
great  game :  first  one  side  threatened  war,  then  the 
other ;  at  last  both  threatened  at  once,  and  the  patient 
populations,  incited  cynically  by  lies  and  clap-trap, 
were  driven  on  to  the  blind  work  of  butchery. 

A  world  where  such  cruel  absurdities  are  possible 
is  not  to  be  put  right  by  a  mere  treaty  of  peace.  War 
between  civilised  States  is  both  wicked  and  foolish, 
and  it  will  not  cease  until  either  the  wickedness  or 
the  folly  is  understood  by  those  who  direct  the  policy 
of  nations.  Most  men  do  not  mind  being  wicked,  and 
the  few  who  do  have  learnt  ways  of  persuading  them- 
selves that  they  are  virtuous.  But,  except  in  moments 
of  passion,  men  do  mind  being  foolish.  There  is  more 
hope  of  preventing  war  in  future  by  persuading  men 


86  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

of  its  folly  than  by  urging  its  wickedness.  To  a 
dispassionate  observation  its  folly  is  evident,  but  most 
observation  is  not  dispassionate :  unconsciously  men 
tend  to  adopt  the  opinions  which  will  justify  them  in 
indulging  their  passions.  Just  as  a  libertine,  in  order 
to  excuse  himself,  comes  to  think  that  women  have 
no  deep  feelings,  so  a  militant  patriot  comes  to  think 
that  the  interests  of  his  country  are  vitally  opposed 
to  those  of  some  other  country,  in  order  that  he  may 
have  an  opportunity  to  indulge  pride,  the  desire  for 
triumph,  and  the  lust  of  dominion.  What  the  pacifist 
has  to  contend  against  is  a  system  of  false  beliefs, 
inspired  by  unrecognised  evil  passions  which  are 
thought  to  be  justified  by  the  beliefs.  If  the  beliefs 
are  seen  to  be  false,  there  is  some  hope  that  the 
passions  may  be  recognised  as  evil.  And  the  falsehood 
of  the  belief  in  the  essential  conflict  of  interests  be- 
tween nations  is  easily  recognised  by  any  candid  mind. 
Among  men,  as  among  all  gregarious  animals,  there 
are  two  kinds  of  economic  relation:  co-operation  and 
competition.  There  is  co-operation  when  the  activities 
which  the  one  undertakes  in  his  own  interests  tend 
to  benefit  the  other;  there  is  competition  when  they 
tend  to  injure  the  other.  Neither  co-operation  nor 
competition  need  be  conscious ;  it  is  not  even  necessary 
that  either  should  be  aware  of  the  existence  of  the 
other.  But  in  so  far  as  they  are  conscious  they  bring 
into  play  quite  different  sets  of  feelings.  On  the  one 
side  we  have  affection,  loyalty,  gratitude ;  on  the  other 
fear,  hatred,  triumph.  The  emotions  out  of  which  war 
springs  result  from  a  combination  of  the  two  sets :  they 
are  the  emotions  appropriate  to  co-operation  against 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    87 

a  common  competitor.  In  the  modem  world,  where 
men  are  grouped  by  States,  these  emotions  are  summed 
up  in  patriotism.  Co-operation  and  competition  have 
governed  the  lives  of  our  ancestors  since  the  days 
before  they  were  human,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
struggle  for  existence  our  emotional  nature  has  de- 
veloped so  as  to  respond  deeply  and  instinctively  to 
these  ancient  stimuli.  There  is  in  all  men  a  disposi- 
tion to  seek  out  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  instinctive 
feelings,  and  it  is  this  disposition,  rather  than  any 
inexorable  economic  or  physical  fact,  which  is  at  the 
bottom  of  enmities  between  nations.  The  conflicts  of 
interest  are  invented  to  afford  an  excuse  for  feelings 
of  hostility ;  but  as  the  invention  is  unconscious,  it  is 
supposed  that  the  hostility  is  caused  by  some  real 
conflict  of  interests. 

The  cause  of  this  absence  of  harmony  between  our 
instincts  and  our  real  needs  is  the  modern  develop- 
ment of  industry  and  commerce.  In  a  savage  com- 
munity, where  each  family  lives  by  its  own  labour, 
there  is  no  occasion  for  peaceful  co-operation  in  any 
group  larger  than  the  family.  But  there  is  often 
occasion  for  ivar-like  co-operation :  if  all  the  members 
of  some  other  tribe  can  be  killed,  it  is  possible  to  appro- 
priate their  hunting  grounds  and  their  pastures.  In 
such  a  state  of  things,  war  is  profitable  to  the  victors, 
and  the  vanquished  leave  no  descendants.  The  human 
race  is  descended  from  a  long  line  of  victors  in  war; 
for,  although  there  have  been  just  as  many  van- 
quished, they  failed  in  early  days  to  leave  any  pos- 
terity. The  feelings  which  men  now  have  on  the 
subject  of  war  and  international  relations  are  feelings 


88  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

which  were  in  agreement  with  facts,  so  far  as  the 
victors  were  concerned,  in  those  primitive  internecine 
combats  of  savage  tribes.  But  in  the  modern  world 
our  economic  organisation  is  more  civilised  than  our 
emotions,  and  the  conflicts  in  which  we  indulge  do  not 
really  offer  that  prospect  of  gain  which  lets  loose 
the  brute  within  us.  The  brute  within  us  refuses  to 
face  this  disappointing  fact,  and  turns  upon  those 
who  bring  it  forward  with  savage  accusations  of  un- 
manliness  or  lack  of  patriotism.  But  it  remains  a 
fact  none  the  less. 

The  international  character  of  our  economic  organi- 
sation is  due  to  division  of  labour,  taking  partly  the 
form  of  exchange,  partly  the  form  of  multiplying 
stages  in  production.  Consider  some  quite  simple 
example :  say  a  loaf  of  bread  baked  in  Holland  from 
Argentine  wheat  grown  by  the  help  of  English  agri- 
cultural machinery  made  from  Spanish  ore.  Holland, 
Argentina,  England,  and  Spain  all,  through  this  loaf 
of  bread,  have  an  interest  in  each  other's  welfare; 
any  misfortune  to  any  one  of  the  four  is  likely  to 
cause  some  injury  to  the  other  three.  And  so  it  hap- 
pens that  times  of  good  trade  and  times  of  bad  trade 
are  both  world-wide.  Yet  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  when 
Germany  is  prosperous  England  is  prosperous,  and 
when  Germany  has  hard  times  England  has  hard 
times,  men  persist,  both  in  England  and  in  Germany, 
in  concentrating  attention  on  the  comparatively  small 
amount  of  economic  competition,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  very  much  greater  amount  of  economic  co-opera- 
tion. It  is  thought  that  if  Germany  were  ruined 
England  would  be  enriched,  and  vice  versa.       Yet 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    89 

every  tradesman  knows  that  the  ruin  of  his  customers 
is  an  injury  to  him,  which  cannot  be  compensated  by 
the  ruin  of  his  competitors.  Instinct  makes  us  want 
a  nation  to  hate,  and  diplomatists  have  decided  that, 
for  the  last  ten  years,  that  nation  should  be  Germany ; 
and  since  we  hate  Germany,  we  imagine  its  interests 
opposed  to  ours.  But  one  moment's  thought  without 
hatred  shows  that  the  whole  opposition  is  merely 
imaginary. 

The  diplomatic  conflict  is  even  more  unreal  and 
disproportionate  to  any  possibility  of  gain  than  the 
economic  conflict.  Apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  a 
somewhat  childish  pride,  what  does  it  matter  to  either 
France  or  Germany  which  of  them  owns  Morocco? 
Neglecting  the  fact  that  France  had  to  promise  the 
open  door  in  order  to  win  Germany's  acquiescence, 
the  extreme  limit  of  possible  advantage  would  be  the 
capture  of  the  whole  foreign  trade  of  Morocco.  This 
is  a  limit  which  cannot,  in  practice,  be  reached,  since, 
even  with  the  most  restrictive  tariff,  there  will  be  some 
commodities  which  will  have  to  be  imported  from 
elsewhere.  But  even  if  it  could  be  reached,  it  is  a 
mere  fallacy  to  suppose  that  the  necessary  restrictions 
would  be  advantageous  to  France.  England,  after 
much  experience,  has  abandoned  the  attempt  to  impose 
any  restrictions  on  foreign  trade  in  its  Crown  Colonies, 
because  they  hamper  the  development  of  colonies, 
diminish  their  purchasing  power,  and  in  the  long  run 
injure  English  trade  more  than  they  beneflt  it.  With 
every  desire  to  profit  by  injury  to  others,  experience 
has  taught  us  that  our  own  profit  is  best  secured  by 
allowing  equal  opportunities  to  other  nations,  and  that 


90  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

injury  to  others,  however  delightful  in  itself,  has  to  be 
paid  for  by  a  corresponding  injury  to  ourselves.  But 
even  if  we  adopt,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  the  view 
that  a  nation  owning  a  colony  can  profit  by  securing 
the  whole  trade  of  that  colony  to  itself,  what  propor- 
tion is  there  between  the  gain  and  the  cost  ? 

In  order  that  the  French  might  acquire  Morocco, 
England  and  France,  in  1905  and  again  in  1911,  were 
brought  to  the  verge  of  war  with  Germany,  causing 
huge  increases  in  the  French  Army  and  the  English 
Navy,  embittering  the  relations  of  both  with  Germany, 
and  producing  a  state  of  public  feeling  which  made 
the  present  war  possible.  A  solemn  international  con- 
ference deliberated  at  Algeciras,  and  arrived  at  deci- 
sions which  England  and  France  regarded  as  ' '  scraps 
of  paper."  Finally  Germany,  as  the  price  of  aban- 
doning its  claims,  acquired  a  bit  of  African  territory, 
at  the  expense  of  a  similar  increase  of  armaments,  a 
similar  exacerbation  of  public  feeling,  and  an  exhibi- 
tion of  bullying  methods  which  prepared  the  whole 
world  to  view  all  Germany's  proceedings  with  suspi- 
cion. And  as  everybody  knows,  the  loss  due  to  mere 
uncertainty,  produced  in  industry  and  finance  by  a 
"Vigorous"  policy,  was  so  great  that  the  German 
business  world  at  last  compelled  the  Government  to 
give  way.  And  all  this  turmoil  was  on  the  question 
whether  France  should  have  the  empty  right  to  ca,ll 
Morocco  "French"! 

Viewed  as  a  means  of  obtaining  any  tangible  gain, 
a  diplomatic  contest  such  as  that  which  was  waged 
over  Morocco  is  a  childish  absurdity.  The  diplo- 
matists  who    conduct    it,    and    the    journalists   who 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    91 

applaud  their  ridiculous  activities,  are  ignorant  men 
— ignorant,  I  mean,  in  all  that  is  really  important  to 
the  welfare  of  nations.  Their  only  training  is  in  the 
kind  of  skill  by  which  a  horse-dealer  palms  off  a  bad 
bargain  upon  a  foolish  customer,  and  in  the  knowledge 
of  personalities  which  is  required  in  all  games  of 
intrigue.  But  such  training,  though  it  had  its  impor- 
tance in  simpler  times,  grows  less  and  less  useful  as 
the  organisation  of  society  becomes  more  complex  and 
as  the  interdependence  of  men  in  widely  severed  parts 
of  the  world  increases.  More  and  more  the  important 
facts  are  dry,  statistical,  impersonal ;  less  and  less  are 
they  of  the  sort  that  lends  itself  to  expression  in 
traditional  literary  form.  Men's  imaginations  are 
governed  to  an  extraordinary  extent  by  literary  tradi- 
tion :  the  fact  that  the  really  important  knowledge  can 
only  be  acquired  by  industrious  investigation  makes  it 
"vulgar"  and  not  such  as  any  aristocratic  diplo- 
matist would  condescend  to  know. 

The  economic  absurdity  of  ouri  diplomatic  and 
military  conflicts  is  not  denied  by  well-informed  advo- 
cates of  international  strife.  They  will  admit  that, 
in  a  war  between  civilised  States,  even  the  victor 
can  no  longer  hope  to  gain  in  wealth.  But  they  reply 
that  such  considerations  are  sordid,  and  that  they,  the 
war-like  party,  have  nobler  ideals  than  mere  money- 
grubbing.  This  is  an  even  more  preposterous  absurd- 
ity than  the  pretence  of  trading  advantages  to  be 
obtained  by  victory.  Let  us  admit  at  once  that  the 
interest  which  most  people  felt  in  the  jMoroccan  ques- 
tion  was   not,    except    in   a   very   small   degree,    an 


92  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

economic  interest.    But  was  it  something  higher  than 
an  economic  interest? 

The  main  thing  involved  in  all  such  contests,  and 
the  thing  that  makes  the  average  man  tolerate  them, 
is  national  pride.  The  Germans  felt  that  France  had 
failed  to  treat  them  with  proper  respect  by  not 
informing  them  officially  of  the  Anglo-French  agree- 
ment ;  the  English  and  French  felt  the  sending  of  the 
Panther  to  Agadir  an  act  of  aggression  which  must 
be  resented ;  the  Germans  felt  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  high 
language  at  the  Mansion  House  in  1911  a  threat  to 
which  no  great  Power  could  yield  with  dignity.  This 
is  the  nobler  stuff  with  which  the  idealists  of  war 
confront  the  money-grubbing  economists!  Compared 
with  this  schoolboy  desire  for  cheap  triumphs,  money- 
grubbing  is  humane,  enlightened,  and  noble.  The  man 
who  builds  up  an  industry  confers  benefits  upon 
countless  others  in  the  course  of  pursuing  his  own 
advantage :  he  becomes  rich  because  he  is  doing  some- 
thing of  real  use  to  the  community.  But  the  pride 
that  wishes  to  humiliate,  and  the  pride  that  can  be 
humiliated  by  yielding  trivial  diplomatic  advantages 
rather  than  risk  war,  are  alike  childish  and  barbarous, 
springing  from  low  ambitions,  and  enviously  regard- 
ing one  man's  gain  as  consisting  in  another's  loss. 
Diplomatic  victory  rests  with  the  side  most  willing 
to  risk  war :  so  long  as  men  feel  proud  of  their  country 
on  account  of  its  victories,  and  not  on  account  of  its 
contributions  to  civilisaton  and  the  welfare  of  man- 
kind, so  long  they  will  feel  humiliated  when  their 
country  is  reasonable,  and  elated  when  it  is  brutal, 
overbearing,  ready  to  plunge  the  world  into  the  chaos 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    93 

of  armed  conflict.  As  against  this  state  of  mind,  the 
man  who  urges  the  economic  loss  involved,  nowadays, 
even  in  successful  war,  is  a  humane  advocate  of  sane 
co-operation,  not  a  man  blinded  by  sordid  consider- 
ations to  the  supposed  splendours  of  what  is  really 
the  most  degraded  form  of  "patriotism." 

The  disease  from  which  the  civilised  world  is 
suffering  is  a  complex  one,  derived  from  the  failure 
of  men 's  instincts  to  keep  pace  with  changing  material 
conditions.  Among  savages,  where  there  is  no  trade 
and  little  division  of  labour,  the  only  economic  rela- 
tion between  different  tribes  is  that  of  competition 
for  the  food  supply.  The  tribe  which  attacks  with 
most  cunning  and  ferocity  exterminates  the  greatest 
number  of  others,  and  leaves  the  largest  posterity. 
Disposition  to  ferocity  and  cunning  is,  at  this  stage, 
a  biological  advantage ;  and  the  instincts  of  civilised 
men  are  those  developed  during  this  early  stage.  But 
through  the  growth  of  commerce  and  manufactures  it 
has  come  about  that  nine-tenths  of  the  interests  of  one 
civilised  nation  coincide  with  nine-tenths  of  the 
interests  of  any  other.  So  long  as  the  disposition  to 
primitive  ferocity  is  not  excited,  men  are  able  to  see 
their  community  of  interest,  as,  for  example,  most 
men  do  in  America.  But  there  remains  in  the  back- 
ground a  readiness  to  enmity  and  suspicion,  a  capacity 
for  all  the  emotions  of  the  savage  on  the  war-path, 
which  can  be  roused  by  any  skillful  manipulator ;  and 
there  remain  many  men  who,  from  a  brutal  nature  or 
from  some  underground  effect  of  self-interest,  are 
unable  to  see  that  friendship  between  nations  is  pos- 
sible and  that  hostility  has  lost  whatever  raison  d'etre 


94  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

it  once  possessed.  And  so  the  old  rivalries,  now 
become  an  unmeaning  and  murderous  futility,  go  on 
unchecked,  and  all  the  splendid  heroism  of  war  is 
wasted  on  a  tragic  absurdity. 

II. 

The  old  methods  have  brought  us  to  the  present 
disaster,  and  new  and  better  methods  must  be  found. 
So  much  is  agreed  on  all  hands. 

But  as  soon  as  we  attempt  to  specify  better  methods, 
disagreement  breaks  out — partly  from  disagreement  as 
to  the  facts  which  have  brought  about  the  present 
situation,  partly  from  desire  to  find  an  heroic  solution 
which  shall  once  for  all  make  war  impossible  by  some 
mechanical  arrangement. 

The  steps  to  be  taken  for  securing  a  lasting  peace 
fall  into  three  parts:  (1)  the  conditions  of  peace;  (2) 
the  subsequent  machinery  for  adjusting  international 
disputes;  (3)  measures  for  producing,  throughout 
Europe,  a  more  sane,  well-informed,  and  pacific  public 
opinion. 

(1)  Nine  men  out  of  ten,  in  the  combatant  nations, 
consider,  or  at  least  considered  when  the  war  broke 
out,  that  the  conditions  of  peace  are  the  only  question 
of  importance.  Nine  out  of  ten  Englishmen  believe, 
or  believed,  that  England,  France,  and  Russia  are 
essentially  peace-loving  countries;  that  they  made 
every  conceivable  effort  for  the  preservation  of  peace ; 
and  that  the  one  thing  necessary  to  secure  the  per- 
manent peace  of  the  world  is  that  they  should  smash 
the  military  power  of  Germany  and  Austria.  Nine  out 
of  ten  Germans  believe,  or  believed,  that  Germany  and 
Austria  are  essentially  peace-loving  countries;  that 


IS   A  PERMANENT   PEACE    POSSIBLE    95 

while  they  were  struggling  to  preserve  the  peace, 
Russia,  secretly  encouraged  by  England  treach- 
erously mobilised  under  cover  of  negotiations  between 
the  Tsar  and  the  Kaiser;  and  that  the  one  thing 
necessary  to  secure  the  permanent  peace  of  the  world 
is  that  Germany  and  Austria  should  smash  the  mili- 
tary power  of  the  Allies.  These  opposing  views  are 
merely  melodramatic :  no  nation  is  quite  black,  and 
none  is  quite  white,  but  all  are  of  varying  shades  of 
grey.  Like  every  one  else  in  Europe,  I  think  my  own 
nation  of  the  lightest  shade  of  grey;  but  no  member 
of  the  game  of  Alliance  and  Entente,  which  statesmen 
have  played  for  the  last  ten  years,  ought  to  flatter 
itself  that  it  is  wholly  unspotted.  And  in  any  case, 
as  a  solution,  the  complete  destruction  of  the  enemy 
has  the  defect  of  being  impossible.  England  and 
Germany  will  both  exist  after  the  war :  if  they  fought 
each  other  for  five  centuries,  like  England  and  France, 
they  would  still  both  exist.  This  fact  is  beginning  to 
be  realised  on  both  sides,  and  to  compel  even  the  most 
bellicose  to  seek  for  some  way  by  which  they  can  learn 
to  endure  each  other's  existence  with  equanimity. 
"What  is  wanted  is  a  change  of  heart,  leading  to  a 
change  of  political  methods;  and  victory  or  defeat 
must  be  considered  in  the  light  of  their  power  of 
producing  a  change  of  heart. 

From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  important  that  no 
nation  should  make  such  great  gains  as  to  feel  that  it 
was  worth  while  going  to  war,  and  that  none  should 
suffer  such  humiliating  losses  as  to  be  impelled  to 
revenge.  The  result  of  1870  was  the  worst  possible 
from  the  point  of  view  of  mankind.     The  Germans 


96  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

were  encouraged  in  militarism  by  success,  the  French 
were  goaded  into  militarism  by  the  intolerable  shame 
of  defeat  and  dismemberment.  Whatever  happens  at 
the  peace,  there  should  be  no  new  Alsace-Lorraines : 
any  transfer  of  territory  should  be  such  as  can  be 
recommended  to  neutral  opinion  on  the  ground  of  the 
wishes  of  the  inhabitants.  So  far  as  the  West  is  con- 
cerned, it  may  be  reasonably  hoped  that  this  condition 
will  be  carried  out ;  but  in  the  East  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  none  of  the  combatants  will  respect  it.  No  one 
supposes  that  any  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire  will  be 
allowed  any  voice  in  deciding  its  fate ;  but  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  Turks,  throughout  all  the  centuries 
since  their  rise,  have  done  as  little  to  deserve  consider- 
ation as  any  nation  on  earth. 

(2)  But  changes  of  territory  are  the  least  important 
part  of  what  may  be  hoped  from  the  peace.  In  all 
nations,  every  sane  man  and  woman  will  desire  a 
completely  new  system  in  international  affairs.  The 
only  men  who  will  desire  to  prolong  the  present  system 
are  statesmen,  sensational  journalists,  and  armament 
makers — the  men  who  profit  by  slaughter,  either  in 
credit  or  in  cash,  without  running  any  risk  of  being 
slaughtered  themselves.  Since  these  men  will  control 
the  actual  Congress,  they  will  be  able  to  postpone  the 
inauguration  of  a  happier  age,  unless  America  under- 
takes the  championship  of  mankind  against  the 
warring  governments.  All  humane  people  in  Europe 
would  wish  America  to  participate:  if  possible,  they 
would  wish  the  Congress  to  take  place  in  the  neutral 
atmosphere  of  Washington,  with  Mr.  Wilson  as  its 
President.     The  Governments  may  oppose  this  plan, 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    97 

from  the  wish  of  officials  to  retain  power  in  their  own 
hands,  and  of  combatants  to  avoid  having  to  hear  the 
voice  of  reason.  But  public  opinion  is  against  the 
Governments  in  this  question,  though  for  the  moment 
it  has  difficulty  in  expressing  itself. 

New  methods  in  international  affairs  are  required 
not  in  the  interests  of  one  side  or  the  other,  but  in  the 
interests  of  mankind,  lest  civilisation  and  humanity 
should  perish  from  the  world.  It  would  be  disastrous 
if  new  methods  were  imposed  by  the  victors  upon  the 
vanquished  as  part  of  the  humiliation  of  defeat :  they 
ought  to  be  adopted  by  all,  at  the  suggestion  of  neu- 
trals, as  an  escape  from  the  tragic  entanglement  which 
has  dragged  a  horrified  Europe,  as  though  by  the 
compulsion  of  an  external  Fate,  into  a  cataclysm  not 
desired  beforehand  by  one  man  in  a  hundred  in  any 
of  the  nations  involved  in  the  struggle.  In  every 
nation,  men  believe  they  are  fighting  for  the  defence 
of  home  and  country  against  wanton  aggression, 
bcause  they  know  that  they  themselves  have  not 
desired  war,  and  they  know  or  suspect  the  sins  of 
foreign  governments  while  they  are  ignorant  of  the 
sins  of  their  own.  In  every  nation  when  this  war 
comes  to  an  end,  men  will  welcome  any  means  of 
avoiding  the  risk  of  another  such  war  in  the  future. 

Most  of  the  friends  of  peace  are  agreed  in  advocat- 
ing some  kind  of  International  Council  to  take 
cognisance  of  all  disputes  between  nations  and  to 
urge  what  it  regards  as  a  just  solution.  But  it  is 
not  easy  to  agree  either  as  to  the  powers  or  as  to  the 
composition  of  Council. 

The  Council  ought  not  to  be  composed  merely  of 


98  JUSTICE   IN  WARTIME 

diplomatists.  A  diplomatist  represents  national 
prestige,  and  his  credit  among  liis  confreres  depends 
upon  his  skill  in  securing  supposed  advantages  for  his 
own  nation.  He  focusses  in  his  own  person  the  spirit 
of  rivalry  between  States  which  is  the  chief  obstacle 
to  internationalism.  The  mental  atmosphere  in  which 
he  lives  is  that  of  the  eighteenth  century,  with  its 
"Balance  of  Power"  and  other  shibboleths.  Classi- 
fication by  nations  is  only  one  way  of  classifying  man- 
kind, but  the  diplomatic  machine  ignores  all  other 
ways.  The  world  of  finance,  the  world  of  learning, 
the  world  of  Socialism — to  take  only  three  examples — 
are  international,  each  of  great  importance  in  its  own 
way,  each  having  certain  interests  which  cut  right 
across  the  divisions  of  States.  If  each  nation  appointed 
to  the  Council  not  only  a  diplomatist  but  also  a 
financier,  a  representative  of  learning,  and  a  cham- 
pion of  labour,  there  would  often  be  cross-divisions, 
and  the  voting  would  not  always  be  by  nations.  Inter- 
national interests,  as  opposed  to  merely  national 
advantage,  would  have  some  chance  of  a  hearing  in 
such  a  Council,  and  it  might  occasionally  happen  that 
the  welfare  of  civilisation  would  be  the  decisive  con- 
sideration. Foreign  policy  has  remained  everywhere 
the  exclusive  domain  of  an  aristocratic  clique.  What 
they  have  made  of  it,  we  see.  It  is  time  to  secure  a 
less  ignorant  and  less  prejudiced  conduct  of  affairs 
by  the  admission  of  the  democracy  to  an  active  admin- 
istrative share. 

The  deliberations  of  the  Council  should  be  public 
and  it  should  refuse  to  regard  as  binding  any  treaty, 
agreement,  or  understanding  of  which  the  terms  had 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?    99 

been  kept  secret.  By  means  of  secrecy,  an  air  of 
mystery  and  hocus-pocus  is  preserved,  of  which  the 
sole  use  and  purpose  is  to  keep  power  in  official  hands, 
and  to  prevent  the  intrusion  of  common  sense  into  the 
arcana  of  diplomacy.  The  public  is  hoodwinked  by  the 
assurance  that  secrecy  is  essential  to  national  security. 
Hitherto,  on  this  plea,  even  the  most  democratic 
countries  of  Europe  have  handed  over  their  destinies 
blindfold  to  men  who  have  abused  their  trust  by  poli- 
cies diametrically  opposed  to  what  their  followers 
desired.  Only  publicity  can  prevent  a  repetition  of 
this  crime. 

In  urging  that  men  who  are  not  professional  diplo- 
matists ought  to  take  part  in  the  International 
Council,  I  am  not  wishing  to  suggest  that  diplomatists, 
as  individuals,  are  any  worse  than  other  men,  but  only 
that  their  training,  their  traditions,  their  way  of  life, 
and  the  fact  that  they  represent  the  national  interest 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  considerations,  must  tend 
to  close  their  minds  to  an  order  of  ideas  which  lies 
outside  the  scope  of  their  official  duties.  Even  men 
who  are  wholly  estimable  in  private  life  will  be  gov- 
erned in  their  political  ideas  by  the  interest  which 
they  represent.  The  secretary  of  the  Automobile 
Association — I  speak  hypothetically,  since  I  do  not 
know  who  he  is — may  be  an  ardent  patriot,  and 
anxious,  as  an  individual,  to  bear  his  share  of  the 
expense  of  the  Navy,  but  he  will  infallibly  protest 
when  it  is  proposed  to  put  a  tax  on  petrol.  The 
editor  of  the  Licensed  Victuallers'  Gazette  may  be  a 
zealous  temperance  man  in  his  private  capacity,  but 
as  an  editor  he  is  bound  to  raise  an  outcry  when  any 


100  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

fresh  burden  is  placed  upon  ' '  The  Trade. "  So  a  diplo- 
matist may,  during  his  holidays,  be  an  international 
pacifist,  but  in  his  working  hours  he  will  struggle 
to  obtain  small  advantages  for  his  country,  even  by 
threatening  war  if  necessary.  This  is  the  inevitable 
effect  of  the  interest  which  he  represents,  and  can  only 
be  counteracted  by  men  who  represent  interests  which 
conflict  less  with  those  of  civilisation  in  general. 

Should  the  powers  of  the  Council  include  military 
intervention  for  the  enforcement  of  its  awards  ?  Very 
strong  arguments  may  be  urged  on  both  sides. 

It  is  assumed  that,  when  a  dispute  arises,  the  Coun- 
cil will  at  once  invite  the  Powers  concerned  to  submit 
to  its  arbitration,  and  that,  if  one  party  expresses 
willingness  to  abide  by  its  award  while  the  other  does 
not,  it  will  throw  whatever  weight  it  possesses  against 
the  intractable  party.  It  should  also  have  the  power 
of  examining  questions  likely  to  cause  disputes  in  the 
future,  and  of  suggesting  such  adjustments  and  com- 
promises as  may  seem  just.  But  if  its  authority  is 
flouted,  shaU  it  rely  upon  moral  force  alone,  or  shall 
it  have  power  to  invoke  the  armed  support  of  all  those 
neutrals  which  send  delegates  to  it? 

In  favour  of  armed  intervention,  it  may  be  urged 
that  otherwise  the  Council  will  be  futile,  and  will 
afford  no  security  against  an  aggressive-  jnilitary 
Power.  It  will  therefore  not  allay  panics,  prevent 
wars,  or  tend  to  diminish  armaments.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  neutrals  can  be  relied  upon  to  be  willing  to 
threaten  armed  intervention,  and  if  their  intervention 
would  always  secure  an  overwhelming  preponderance 
of  force  on  one  side,  then  the  mere  threat  would  be 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?  101 

sufficient,  and  actual  war  would  be  prevented. 

But  this  argument  involves  many  doubtful 
hypotheses,  and  is  perhaps  inspired  less  by  a  sober 
review  of  the  facts  than  by  the  wish  to  find  a  short 
cut  to  universal  peace.  Unless  almost  all  the  Powers 
sincerely  desire  peace,  an  alliance  among  the  more 
bellicose  Powers  might  be  strong  enough  to  flout  all 
the  others,  and  in  that  case  the  only  result  of  the 
Council  would  be  to  make  the  war  world-wide.  Also 
it  is  much  to  be  feared  that  neutrals  could  not  be 
trusted  to  intervene  by  force  of  arms  in  a  dispute  in 
which  they  had  no  interest  beyond  the  desire  to  pre- 
serve the  peace :  the  whole  system  would  be  in  danger 
of  breaking  down  just  when  it  was  most  needed.  The 
most  pacific  Powers — notably  the  United  States — 
would  probably  refuse  altogether  to  enter  a  system 
entailing  such  vast  and  manifold  obligations.  And 
within  each  nation,  the  necessity  of  being  constantly 
prepared  to  go  to  war  would  run  counter  to  the 
wishes  of  peaceful  people,  although  it  would  be  from 
such  people  that  the  scheme  would  have  to  derive 
its  support,  since  its  aim  would  be  the  revention  of 
war.  For  these  reasons,  it  does  not  seem  desirable  at 
present  that  the  decisions  of  the  International  Council 
should  be  enforced  by  military  intervention. 

I  do  not  think  the  decisions  of  the  Council  would 
have  no  weight  if  they  rested  upon  moral  force  alone. 
The  efforts  made  by  both  sides  in  the  present  war  to 
persuade  the  United  States  of  the  justice  of  their 
cause  show  how  much  the  sympathy  of  neutrals  is 
valued,  even  when  there  is  hardly  a  thought  of  their 
abandoning  neutrality.     And  the  mere  existence  of 


102  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

an  impartial  tribunal,  to  which  each  side  could  yield 
without  loss  of  dignity,  would  in  most  cases  suffice  to 
prevent  the  diplomatic  deadlock  which  precedes  war. 
Public  opinion,  which  at  present  has  no  means  of 
hearing  any  unbiassed  statement,  would  be  powerfully 
influenced  by  an  authoritative  award,  and  the  pacific 
forces  in  the  countries  concerned  could  bring  pressure 
to  bear  on  the  government  to  bow  to  the  decisions  of 
the  Council.  If  the  pacific  forces  were  strong,  this 
pressure  would  probably  be  sufficient;  if  not,  no  sys- 
tem could  make  peace  secure.  For,  in  the  last  resort, 
peace  can  only  be  preserved  if  public  opinion  desires 
peace  in  most  of  the  great  nations. 

(3)  Far  more  important  than  any  question  of 
machinery  is  the  problem  of  producing  in  all  civiUsed 
nations  such  a  horror  of  war  that  public  opinion  wiU 
insist  upon  peaceful  methods  of  settling  disputes. 
When  this  war  ends,  probably  every  nation  in  Europe 
will  feel  such  an  intense  weariness  of  the  struggle  that 
no  great  war  will  be  probable  for  another  generation. 
The  problem  is,  so  to  alter  men's  standards  and  out- 
look that,  when  the  weariness  has  passed  away,  they 
shall  not  fall  back  into  the  old  bad  way,  but  shall 
escape  from  the  nightmare  into  a  happier  world  of 
free  co-operation. 

The  first  thing  to  make  men  realise  is  that  modern 
war  is  an  absurdity  as  well  as  a  crime,  and  that  it  can 
no  longer  secure  such  national  advantages  as,  for 
example,  England  secured  by  the  Seven  Years'  War. 
After  the  present  war,  it  should  be  easy  to  persuade 
even  the  most  ignorant  and  high-placed  persons  of  this 
truth. 


IS  A  PERMANENT  PEACE  POSSIBLE?  103 

But  it  is  even  more  necessary  to  alter  men's 
conceptions  of  ' '  glory ' '  and  ' '  patriotism. ' '  Beginning 
in  childhood,  with  the  school  text-books  of  history, 
and  continuing  in  the  Press  and  in  common  talk,  men 
are  taught  that  the  essence  of  "glory"  is  successful 
robbery  and  slaughter.  The  most  "glorious"  nation 
is  the  one  which  kills  the  greatest  numbers  of  for- 
eigners and  seizes  the  greatest  extent  of  foreign  terri- 
tory. The  most  "patriotic"  citizen  is  the  one  who 
most  strongly  opposes  any  attempt  at  justice  or  mercy 
in  his  country 's  dealings  with  other  countries,  and  who 
is  least  able  to  conceive  of  mankind  as  all  one  family, 
struggling  painfully  from  a  condition  of  universal 
strife  towards  a  society  where  love  of  one's  neighbor 
is  no  longer  thought  a  crime.  The  division  of  the 
world  into  nations  is  a  fact  which  must  be  accepted, 
but  there  is  no  reason  to  accept  the  narrow  nationalism 
which  envies  the  prosperity  of  others  and  imagines  it 
a  hindrance  to  our  own  progress.  If  a  better  and  saner 
world  is  to  grow  out  of  the  horror  of  futile  carnage, 
men  must  learn  to  find  their  nation's  glory  in  the 
victory  of  reason  over  brute  instincts,  and  to  feel  the 
true  patriotism  which  demands  that  our  country 
should  deserve  admiration  rather  than  extort  fear.  If 
this  lesson  can  be  taught  to  all,  beginning  with  the 
children  in  the  schools,  we  may  hope  for  a  lasting 
peace,  and  the  machinery  for  securing  it  wiU  grow  out 
of  the  universal  desire.  So  long  as  hate  and  fear  and 
pride  are  praised  and  encouraged,  war  can  never 
become  an  impossibility.  But  there  is  now,  if  men 
have  the  courage  to  use  it,  an  awakening  of  heart  and 
mind  such  as  the  world  has  never  knoAvn  before :  men 


104  JUSTICE  IN  WAR-TIME 

see  that  war  is  wicked  and  that  war  is  foolish.  If  the 
statesmen  will  play  their  part,  by  showing  that  war 
is  not  inevitable,  there  is  hope  that  our  children  may 
live  in  a  happier  world,  and  look  back  upon  us  with 
the  wondering  pity  of  a  wiser  age. 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

In  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  men 
commonly  congratulated  themselves  that  they  lived 
in  an  era  of  enlightenment  and  progress,  very  far 
removed  from  the  ignorance,  superstition  and  bar- 
barity of  the  dark  ages.  Progress  in  civilisation  came 
to  seem  natural  and  certain,  no  longer  needing  de- 
liberate effort  for  its  realisation.  Under  the  influence 
of  a  fancied  security,  men  gradually  came  to  value 
less  consciously  the  effort  after  mental  advancement. 
But  history  gives  no  justification  for  the  sense  of 
security,  and  the  present  war,  to  those  who  view  it 
as  an  historical  event,  not  simply  as  a  vehicle  for 
their  own  passions,  affords  grave  reason  for  fear 
that  the  civilisation  we  have  slowly  built  up  is  in 
danger  of  self-destruction.  This  aspect  of  the  war 
has  been  too  little  considered  on  both  sides,  the  fear 
of  defeat  and  the  longing  for  victorj'-  have  made 
men  oblivious  of  the  common  task  of  Europe  and  of 
the  work  which  Europe  had  been  performing  for 
mankind  at  large.  In  all  that  has  made  the  nations 
of  the  West  important  to  the  world,  they  run  the  risk 
of  being  involved  in  a  common  disaster,  so  great  and 
BO  terrible  that  it  will  outweigh,  to  the  historian  in 
the  future,  all  the  penalties  of  military  defeat  and 
all  the  glories  of  military  victory. 

Over  and  over  again,  in  the  past,  the  greatest 
civilisations  have  been  destroyed  or  degraded  by  war. 
The  fighting  which  Homer  has  taught  us  to  regard 


108        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

as  glorious  swept  away  the  Myeenean  civilization, 
which  was  succeeded  by  centuries  of  confused  and 
barbarous  conflict.  The  speech  of  Pericles  to  the 
Athenians  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war 
has  been  thought  worthy  of  a  place  among  recruit- 
ing appeals  in  the  London  Underground  Railway ; 
yet  the  war  which  he  recommended  by  recalling  the 
greatness  of  Athenian  civilisation  proved  in  fact  to 
be  its  end,  and  Athenians  born  after  the  war  added 
almost  nothing  to  the  world's  permanent  possessions. 
It  is  impossible  to  imagine  a  more  sinister  precedent 
than  that  war,  in  which  the  most  fruitful  and  splen- 
did civilisation  the  world  has  known  was  brought 
to  an  end  for  ever  by  pride  of  power  and  love  of 
battle.  The  Roman  civilisation  which  succeeded  it, 
though  less  productive,  might  have  seemed  secure 
by  its  great  extent,  yet  it  perished  almost  completely 
in  the  barbarian  invasion.  The  remnants  out  of  which 
the  modern  world  has  grown  were  preserved,  not 
by  the  men  who  fought  against  the  barbarians,  but 
by  monks  who  retired  from  the  strife  and  devoted 
their  lives  to  religion.  And  in  more  modern  times, 
the  Thirty  Years'  War  had  an  influence,  impossible 
to  overestimate,  in  brutalising  the  German  char- 
acter and  making  the  level  of  humane  feeling  lower 
than  that  of  nations  less  subject  to  the  degrading 
influence  of  invasion  and  rapine. 

"When  we  consider  the  world  in  a  broad  historical 
retrospect,  it  is  what  nations  have  added  to  civilisa- 
tion that  makes  us  permanently  honour  them,  not 
what  they  have  achieved  in  conquest  and  dominion. 
Great  conquerors,  such  as  Attila,  Timur  and  Zenghis 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION       107 

Khan,  trample  across  the  pages  of  history  full  of 
noise  and  fury,  signifying  nothing :  like  an  earth- 
quake or  a  plague,  they  come  and  pass,  leaving  only 
a  record  of  destruction  and  death.  The  Jews  and 
Greeks,  the  Romans,  and  the  modern  nations  of 
Western  Europe,  have  contributed  almost  everything 
that  has  been  added  in  historical  times  to  creation 
and  diffusion  of  what  is  permanently  valuable  in  hu- 
man life.  The  Romans  spread  throughout  their  Em- 
pire what  had  been  created  by  the  Jews  in  religion, 
by  the  Greeks  in  art  and  science ;  on  this  foundation, 
after  a  long  interval  of  barbarism,  the  Italians,  the 
French,  the  English  and  the  Germans  built  the  world 
in  which  we  have  hitherto  lived.  The  progress  in  which 
we  have  rejoiced  has  not  grown  up  by  itself:  it  has 
been  created  and  sustained  by  individual  and  col- 
lective effort.  What  great  men  have  done  in  litera- 
ture, in  art,  in  natural  knowledge,  has  been  made 
available  to  large  numbers  by  education.  Private 
violence  has  been  suppressed ;  the  rudiments  of  learn- 
ing have  become  more  and  more  accessible  to  all 
classes ;  and  mental  activity  has  been  continually 
stimulated  and  broadened  as  the  progress  of  science 
liberated  more  and  more  men  from  the  need  of  man- 
ual labour. 

It  is  this  achievement,  imperfect  as  it  has  hitherto 
been,  which  chiefly  entitles  the  Western  nations  to 
respect.  It  is  the  furtherance  of  civilisation  which 
makes  us  admire  the  Roman  Empire  more  than  that 
of  Xerxes,  or  the  British  Empire  more  than  that  of 
China.  It  is  this  service  to  mankind  that  is  being 
jeopardised  by  the  present  war.     Whether,  w-hen  it 


108        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

ends,  the  English,  the  French,  or  the  Germans  will 
still  have  the  energy  and  will  to  carry  on  the  progress 
of  the  past,  is  a  very  doubtful  question,  depending 
chiefly  upon  the  length  of  the  war  and  the  spirit 
fostered  by  the  settlement.  Of  all  the  reasons  for  de- 
siring an  early  peace,  this  is,  to  my  mind,  the  strong- 
est. The  danger,  great  and  pressing  as  I  believe  it 
to  be,  is  obscured  amid  the  clash  of  national  ambi- 
tions, because  it  requires  us  to  fix  our  attention  on 
individuals,  not  on  States.  There  is  some  risk  of 
forgetting  the  good  of  individuals  under  the  stress  of 
danger  to  the  State:  yet,  in  the  long  run,  the  good 
of  the  State  cannot  be  secured  if  the  individuals  have 
lost  their  vigor.  In  what  follows,  I  shall  ignore  po- 
litical issues,  and  speak  only  of  the  effect  on  separate 
men  and  women  and  young  people ;  but  a  correspond- 
ing effect  on  the  State  must  follow  in  the  end,  since 
the  State  lives  only  by  the  life  of  its  separate  citizens. 
This  war,  to  begin  with,  is  worse  than  any  previous 
war  in  the  direct  effect  upon  those  who  fight.  The 
armies  are  far  larger  than  they  have  ever  been  be- 
fore, and  the  loss  by  death  or  permanent  disable- 
ment immensely  exceeds  what  has  occurred  in  the 
past.*  The  losses  are  enhanced  by  the  deadlock,  which 
renders  a  purely  strategical  decision  of  the  war 
almost  impossible.  We  are  told  to  regard  it  as  a 
war  of  attrition,  which  means  presumably  that  victory 
is  hoped  from  the  gradual  extermination  of  the  Ger- 
man armies.     Our  military  authorities,  apparently, 

♦According  to  Mr.  Balfour,  Great  Britain^  which  has  suffered 
far  less  than  France,  Russia,  Germany  or  Austria-Hungary,  has 
had  more  casualties  in  the  first  year  than  Germany  had  in  the 
war  of  1870. 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION       109 

contemplate  with  equanimity  a  three  years'  war,  end- 
ing only  by  our  excess  of  population :  when  prac- 
tically all  Germans  of  military  age  have  been  killed 
or  maimed,  it  is  thought  that  there  will  still  remain 
a  good  many  English,  Russians,  and  Italians,  and 
perhaps  a  sprinkling  of  Frenchmen.  But  in  the 
course  of  such  destruction  almost  all  that  makes  the 
Allied  nations  worth  defending  will  have  been  lost: 
the  enfeebled,  impoverished  remnants  -will  lack  the 
energy  to  resume  the  national  life  which  existed  be- 
fore the  war,  and  the  new  generation  will  grow  up 
listless  under  the  shadow  of  a  great  despair.  I  hope 
that  the  men  in  authority  are  wiser  than  their  Avords ; 
but  everything  that  has  been  said  points  to  this  re- 
sult as  what  is  intended  by  those  who  control  our 
fate. 

The  actual  casualties  represent  only  a  smaU  part 
of  the  real  loss  in  the  fighting.  In  former  wars, 
seasoned  veterans  made  the  best  soldiers,  and  men 
turned  from  the  battlefield  with  their  physical  and 
mental  vigour  unimpaired.  In  this  war,  chiefly  ow- 
ing to  the  nerve-shattering  effect  of  shell-fire  and  con- 
tinual noise,  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  All  troops 
gradually  deteriorate  at  the  front:  the  best  troops 
are  those  who  are  fresh,  provided  they  are  adequately 
trained.  In  all  the  armies,  a  number  of  men  go  mad, 
a  much  larger  number  suffer  from  nervous  collapse, 
becoming  temporarily  blind  or  dumb  or  incapable  of 
any  effort  of  will  and  almost  all  suffer  considerable 
nervous  injury,  causing  loss  of  vitality,  energy,  and 
power  of  decision.  In  great  part,  no  doubt,  this  effect 
is  temporary ;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that 


110        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

in  most  men  something  of  it  will  be  permanent,  and 
in  not  a  few  the  nervous  collapse  will  remain  very 
serious.  I  fear  it  must  be  assumed  that  almost  all 
who  have  seen  much  fighting  will  have  grown  inca- 
pable of  great  effort,  and  will  only  be  able,  at  best, 
to  slip  unobtrusively  through  the  remaining  years 
of  life.  Since  the  fighting  will,  if  the  war  lasts  much 
longer,  absorb  the  bulk  of  the  male  population  of 
Europe  between  18  and  45,  this  cause  alone  will 
make  it  all  but  impossible  to  maintain  and  hand  on 
the  tradition  of  civilisation  which  has  been  slowly 
acquired  by  the  efforts  of  our  ancestors. 

"We  are  told  by  advocates  of  war  that  its  moral 
effects  are  admirable ;  on  this  ground,  they  say,  we 
ought  to  be  thankful  that  there  is  little  prospect  of  an 
end  to  wars.  The  men  who  repeat  this  hoary  false- 
hood must  have  learnt  nothing  from  the  reports  of 
friends  returned  from  the  war,  and  must  have  re- 
frained from  talking  with  wounded  soldiers  in  hos- 
pital and  elsewhere.  It  is  true  that,  in  those  who 
enlist  of  their  own  free  will,  there  is  a  self-devotion 
to  the  cause  of  their  country  which  deserves  all 
praises;  and  their  first  experience  of  warfare  often 
gives  them  a  horror  of  its  futile  cruelty  which  makes 
them  for  a  time  humane  and  ardent  friends  of  peace. 
If  the  war  had  lasted  only  three  months,  these  good 
effects  might  have  been  its  most  important  moral 
consequences.  But  as  the  months  at  the  front  pass 
slowly  by,  the  first  impulse  is  followed  by  quite 
other  moods.  Heroism  is  succeeded  by  a  merely 
habitual  disregard  of  danger,  enthusiasm  for  the  na- 
tional cause  is  replaced  by  passive  obedience  to  orders. 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION        111 

Familiarity  with  horrors  makes  war  seem  natural, 
not  the  abomination  which  it  is  seen  to  be  at  first. 
Humane  feeling  decays,  since,  if  it  survived,  no  man 
could  endure  the  daily  shocks.  In  every  army,  re- 
ports of  enemy  atrocities,  true  or  false,  stimulate  fer- 
ocity, and  produce  a  savage  thirst  for  reprisals.  On 
the  Western  front  at  least,  both  sides  have  long  ceased 
to  take  prisoners  except  in  large  batches.  Our  news- 
papers have  been  full  of  the  atrocities  perpetrated 
by  German  soldiers.  "Whoever  listens  to  the  conver- 
sation of  wounded  soldiers  returned  from  the  front 
will  find  that,  in  all  the  armies,  some  men  become 
guilty  of  astonishing  acts  of  ferocity.  "Will  even  the 
most  hardened  moralist  dare  to  say  that  such  men 
are  morally  the  better  for  their  experience  of  war? 
If  the  war  had  not  occurred,  they  would  probably 
have  gone  through  life  without  ever  having  the  ^vild 
beast  in  them  aroused.  There  is  a  wild  beast  slum- 
bering in  almost  every  man,  but  civilised  men  know 
that  it  must  not  be  allowed  to  awake.  A  civilised  man 
who  has  once  been  under  the  domain  of  the  wild 
beast  has  lost  his  moral  self  respect,  his  integrity 
and  uprightness:  a  secret  shame  makes  him  cynical 
and  despairing,  without  the  courage  that  sees  facts  as 
they  are,  without  the  hope  that  makes  them  better. 
"War  is  perpetrating  this  moral  murder  in  the  souls 
of  vast  millions  of  combatants;  every  day  many  are 
passing  over  to  the  dominion  of  the  brute  by  acts 
which  kill  what  is  best  within  them.  Yet,  still  our 
newspapers,  parsons,  and  professors  prate  of  the  en- 
nobling influence  of  war. 
The  war,  hitherto,  has  steadily  increased  in  ferocity, 


112        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

and  has  generated  a  spirit  of  hatred  in  the  armies 
which  was  absent  in  the  early  months.  If  it  lasts 
much  longer,  we  may  be  sure  that  it  will  grow  still 
worse  in  these  respects.  The  Germans,  hitherto,  have 
prospered,  but  if  the  tide  turns,  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  their  " f rightfulness "  in  the  past  will  be  child's 
play  compared  with  what  will  happen  when  they  be- 
gin to  anticipate  defeat.  They  have  already  aroused 
among  the  Allies  a  hatred  which  is  the  greatest  danger 
that  now  menaces  civilisation;  but  if  the  war  lasts 
much  longer,  and  if  the  Germans  are  driven  by  fear 
into  even  greater  crimes  against  humanity  than  they 
have  hitherto  committed,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  a 
blind  fury  of  destruction  wall  drive  us  on  and  on 
until  the  good  and  evil  of  the  old  world  have  perished 
together  in  universal  ruin.  For  this  reason,  if  for 
no  other,  it  is  of  the  last  importance  to  control  hatred, 
to  realise  that  almost  all  that  is  detestable  in  the 
enemy  is  the  result  of  war,  is  brought  out  by  war, 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  on  our  side  as  well  as  on 
the  other,  and  will  cease  with  the  conclusion  of  peace 
but  not  before.  If  the  terrible  deeds  that  are  done 
in  the  war  are  merely  used  to  stimulate  mutual 
hatred,  they  lead  only  to  more  war  and  to  still  more 
terrible  deeds:  along  that  road,  there  is  no  goal  but 
exhaustion.  If  universal  exhaustion  is  to  be  avoided, 
we  must,  sooner  or  later,  forget  our  resentment,  and 
remember  that  the  war,  whatever  its  outcome,  is 
destroying  on  both  sides  the  heritage  of  civilisation 
which  was  transmitted  to  us  by  our  fathers  and 
which  it  is  our  duty  to  hand  on  to  our  children  as 
little  impaired  as  possible. 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION       113 

When  the  war  is  over,  the  men  who  have  taken 
part  in  it  will  not  easily  find  their  place  again  among 
the  occupations  of  peace.  They  will  have  become 
accustomed  to  act  under  the  strong  stimulus  of 
danger,  or  in  mere  obedience  to  orders;  and  they 
will  be  physically  and  mentally  exhausted  by  the  ter- 
rible strain  of  life  in  the  trenches.  For  both  reasons, 
they  will  have  little  will-power,  little  capacity  for 
self-direction.  It  will  be  hardly  possible  to  find  room 
for  them  all  in  the  labour  market,  and  the  first  im- 
pulses of  patriotism  in  their  favour  will  probably 
soon  die  down.  We  cannot  hope  that  very  many  of 
them  will  ever  again  be  as  useful  citizens  as  they 
would  have  been  if  the  war  had  not  occurred.  The 
habit  of  violence,  once  acquired,  however  legitimately, 
is  not  easily  set  aside,  and  the  respect  for  law  and 
order  is  likely  to  be  much  less  after  the  war  than  it 
was  before.  If  this  state  of  mind  concurs,  as  is 
likely,  with  serious  distress  and  labour  troubles 
ruthlessly  repressed  by  a  government  grown  used 
to  autocratic  power,  the  effect  upon  the  national 
life  will  be  disastrous  and  profound. 

In  the  minds  of  most  men  on  both  sides,  the  strong- 
est argument  for  prolonging  the  war  is  that  no  other 
course  will  secure  us  against  its  recurrence  in  the 
near  future.  In  the  opinion  of  Englishmen  and  Ger- 
man alike,  their  enemies  have  such  a  thirst  for  war 
that  only  their  utter  overthrow  can  secure  the  peace 
of  the  world.  We  are  an  essentially  peace-loving  na- 
tion— so  both  contend — and  if  we  had  the  power,  we 
should  prevent  such  a  war  as  this  from  occurring 
again.    On  this  ground,  it  is  urged  by  both  that  the 


114       THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

war  must  continue,  since  both  believe  that  their  own 
side  will  ultimately  be  completely  victorious. 

I  believe  that  in  this  both  sides  are  profoundly 
mistaken.  I  shall  not  discuss  the  question  from  a 
political  point  of  view,  though  I  believe  the  political 
argument  is  overwhelming.  "What  I  wish  to  urge  is 
the  effect  of  war  upon  the  imaginative  outlook  of  men, 
upon  their  standard  of  international  conduct,  and 
upon  the  way  in  which  they  view  foreign  nations. 
Individual  passions  and  expectations  in  ordinary 
citizens  are  at  least  as  potent  as  the  acts  of  govern- 
ments in  causing  or  averting  wars,  and  in  the  long 
run  it  is  upon  them  that  the  preservation  of  peace 
in  future  will  depend.  It  is  commonly  said  that 
punishment  will  have  an  effect  that  nothing  else  can 
have  in  turning  the  thoughts  of  our  enemies  away 
from  war  and  making  them  henceforth  willing  to 
keep  the  peace.  This  argument  assumes,  quite  falsely, 
that  men  and  nations  are  guided  by  self-interest  in 
their  actions.  Unfortunately  this  is  not  the  case, 
and  the  motives  which  do  guide  them  are  often  worse 
than  self-interest.  It  is  as  clear  as  noonday  that 
no  one  of  the  nations  involved  in  the  present  war 
would  have  fought  if  self-interest  had  been  its  prin- 
ciple of  action.  Pride,  prestige,  love  of  dominion, 
unwillingness  to  yield  a  triumph  to  others  or  to  be- 
have in  a  way  which  would  be  thought  dishonourable, 
these  are  among  the  motives  which  produced  the  war. 
Each  motive,  no  doubt,  wove  a  myth  of  self-interest 
about  it,  since  people  do  not  wish  to  think  their 
actions  harmful  to  their  own  interests ;  but  if  self- 
interest  had  been  genuinely  operative,   the  nations 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION        115 

would  have  made  friends  and  co-operated  in  the  works 
of  peace.  And  if  self-interest  has  not  prevented 
this  war,  why  should  we  expect  that  it  will  prevent 
future  wars?  Yet  it  is  only  by  an  appeal  to  self- 
interest  that  punishment  can  hope  to  be  effective. 

It  is  peace,  not  war,  that  in  the  long  run  turns 
men 's  thoughts  away  from  fighting.  No  doubt  when  a 
great  war  ends  there  is  a  weariness  which  ensures  a 
number  of  years  of  peace  and  recuperation ;  however 
this  war  may  end,  and,  if  it  ended  tomorrow,  no  mat- 
ter on  what  terms,  it  would  not  break  out  again  at 
once,  because  the  impulse  to  war  is  exhausted  for  the 
moment.  But  for  the  future  every  additional  month 
of  war  increases  the  danger,  since  it  makes  men  in- 
creasingly view  war  as  a  natural  condition  of  the 
world,  renders  them  more  and  more  callous  to  its 
horrors  and  to  the  loss  of  friends,  and  fills  their 
imagination,  especially  the  imagination  of  those  who 
are  now  young,  with  war  as  something  to  be  expected 
and  with  the  thought  that  some  foreign  nations  are  so 
wicked  as  to  make  it  our  duty  to  destroy  them. 

If  the  war  is  brought  to  an  end  by  reason,  by  a 
realisation  on  all  sides  that  it  is  an  evil,  it  may  be 
possible  to  combat  the  imaginative  outlook  which  it 
is  engendering  and  to  bring  about  an  effective  \\'ill 
to  peace.  But  if  only  exhaustion  ends  the  war,  any 
revival  of  energy  may  lead  to  its  renewal,  especially 
if  the  positive  ideals  which  make  for  peace  have 
perished  meanwhile  in  the  universal  death  of  all  hu- 
mane and  civilised  aspirations. 

Through  the  effects  of  the  war  upon  education, 
the  mental  calibre  of  the  next  generation  is  almost 


116        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

certain  to  be  considerably  lower  than  that  of  genera- 
tions educated  before  the  war.  Education,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  is  in  constant  danger  of  be- 
coming a  mere  mechanical  drill  in  which  the  young 
are  taught  to  perform  certain  tasks  in  the  way  that 
is  considered  correct,  and  to  believe  that  all  intel- 
lectual questions  have  been  decided  once  for  all  in 
the  sense  declared  by  the  text-books.  The  education 
inspired  by  this  spirit  destroys  the  mental  activity 
of  the  young,  makes  them  passive  in  thought  and 
active  only  in  pursuing  some  humdrum  ambition. 
It  is  this  spirit  which  is  the  most  insidious  enemy 
of  progress  in  an  old  civilisation,  since  it  inculcates 
constantly,  with  a  great  parade  of  knowledge  and 
authority,  a  Byzantine  attitude  of  superstitious  re- 
spect for  what  has  been  done  and  contempt  for  the 
credit  of  what  is  attempted  in  our  own  day.  The 
mental  life  of  Europe  has  only  been  saved  from  com- 
plete subjection  to  this  spirit  by  a  small  percentage 
of  teachers,  more  full  of  vitality  than  most,  and  more 
filled  with  a  genuine  delight  in  mental  activity.  These 
men  are  to  be  found  almost  exclusively  among  the 
younger  teachers,  the  men  whose  hopes  have  not  yet 
faded,  who  have  not  yet  become  the  slaves  of  habit, 
who  have  enough  spring  of  life  to  take  lightly  the 
weariness  and  expense  of  spirit  in  their  daily  task. 
It  is  this  comparatively  small  number  of  teachers  who 
keep  alive  the  mental  vigour  that  leads  to  new  dis- 
coveries and  new  methods  of  dealing  with  old  prob- 
lems. "Without  them,  there  would  be  no  progress; 
and  without  progress,  we  could  not  even  stand  still. 
What  is  known  bears  now  such  a  large  proportion 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION       117 

to  what  our  ovrn  age  can  hope  to  discover  that  the 
danger  of  traditionalism  is  very  great ;  indeed  it  has 
only  been  averted  by  the  continual  triumph  of  the 
men  of  science. 

After  the  war,  the  number  of  teachers  with  any 
power  of  stimulating  mental  life  must  be  enormously 
diminished.  Many  of  the  younger  teachers  will  have 
been  killed,  many  others  incapacitated;  of  those  who 
remain,  most  will  have  lost  hope  and  energy.  For 
a  number  of  years,  teaching  will  be  much  more  in  the 
hands  of  the  old  and  middle-aged,  while  those  teach- 
ers who  are  still  young  in  years  will  have  lost  much 
of  the  spirit  of  youth  in  the  strain  of  the  war.  The 
result  will  be  that  the  new  generation  will  have  less 
expectation  of  progress  than  its  predecessors,  less 
power  of  bearing  lightly  the  burden  of  knowledge. 
It  is  only  a  small  stock  of  very  unusual  energy  that 
makes  mental  progress ;  and  that  small  stock  is  being 
wasted  on  the  battle-field. 

What  is  true  in  the  purely  intellectual  sphere  is 
equally  true  in  art  and  literature  and  all  the  creative 
activities  of  our  civilisation.  In  all  these,  if  the  war 
lasts  long,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  great  age  of 
Europe  will  be  past  and  that  men  will  look  back  to 
the  period  now  coming  to  an  end  as  the  later  Greeks 
looked  back  to  the  age  of  Pericles.  Who  then  is 
supreme  in  Europe  will  be  a  matter  of  no  importance 
to  mankind;  in  the  madness  of  rivalry,  Europe  will 
have  decreed  its  own  insignificance. 

All  the  difficulties  of  restoring  civilisation  when 
the  present  outburst  of  barbarism  has  passed  will  be 
increased  by  economic  exhaustion.    Hitherto,  in  Eng- 


118       THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

land,  most  men  have  hardly  begun  to  feel  the  econom- 
ic effects  of  the  war,  and  if  peace  were  to  come 
this  autumn  it  is  possible  that  the  economic  effects  in 
this  country  would  not  be  very  profound  or  very 
disastrous.  But  if  the  war  drags  on  after  the  period 
of  easy  borrowing  is  past,  great  and  general  impover- 
ishment must  result.  Those  who  still  have  capital 
"will  be  able  to  exact  a  continually  increasing  rate  of 
interest ;  probably  it  will  become  necessary  to  borrow 
largely  in  America,  and  the  interest  will  represent  a 
perpetual  tribute  which  Europe  will  have  to  pay 
to  America  as  the  price  of  its  indulgence  in  war. 
The  enormous  production  of  munitions  will  either 
cease  suddenly  with  a  violent  dislocation  of  the  labour 
market,  or  will  be  continued  out  of  deference  to  vested 
interests,  causing  a  constant  stimulus  to  new  wars  and 
to  mutual  suspicions  and  fears  on  the  part  of  the 
rival  states.  The  reabsorption  of  the  men  who  have 
been  fighting  will  be  difficult,  especially  as  their 
places  will  have  been  largely  taken  by  women  at  lower 
wages,  and  casualties  will  have  increased  the  number 
of  widows  and  single  women  anxious  to  earn  their 
own  living.  The  men  who  return  from  the  front  will 
have  grown  accustomed  to  a  higher  standard  in  food 
than  that  of  the  ordinary  workingman,  and  will  feel 
themselves  heroes;  both  causes  will  make  it  difficult 
for  them  to  settle  down  to  a  poorer  living  than  they 
had  before  the  war,  yet  it  is  almost  certain  that  that 
is  what  they  will  have  to  do.  The  Government,  hav- 
ing grown  accustomed  to  almost  absolute  power  dur- 
ing the  war,  having  unlimited  soldiers  under  its 
orders,  and  having  no  organized  opposition  to  fear, 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION        119 

will  be  far  more  ruthless  than  it  has  hitherto  been 
in  suppressing  strikes  and  enforcing  submission.  This 
will  probably  lead  to  much  revolutionary  feeling, 
without  the  energy  or  the  abilitj^  that  could  make 
revolution  successful. 

In  these  circumstances,  there  will  be  little  money 
available  for  education  or  the  promotion  of  art  and 
science.  In  order  to  be  able  still  to  keep  up  huge 
armaments,  the  governing  classes  will  diminish  ex- 
penditure on  the  objects  they  consider  least  import- 
ant; among  these,  education  is  sure  to  be  included. 
Their  object  will  be  to  produce  a  proletariat  un- 
skilled in  everything  except  shooting  and  drill,  docile 
through  ignorance  and  formidable  through  military 
discipline.  This  must  result  in  either  apathy  or  civil 
war.  Unless  the  war  ends  soon,  it  is  apathy  that 
will  result;  but  in  either  event,  our  civilisation  is 
imperiled. 

There  are  some  who  hold  that  the  war  will  result 
in  a  permanent  increase  in  the  rate  of  wages.  But 
there  are  several  broad  grounds  for  thinking  that  this 
view  is  mistaken.  To  begin  with,  many  young  and 
vigorous  workers  will  have  been  killed  or  disabled 
in  the  war,  and  the  population  will  contain  a  larger 
proportion  than  before  of  old  men,  women  and  chil- 
dren. The  more  productive  sections  of  the  population 
will  be  diminished,  and  the  production  of  goods  per 
head  will  be  less  than  it  was  when  the  war  broke  out. 
As  there  will  be  less  to  divide,  some  one  must  suffer. 
The  capitalist  is  not  likely  to  suffer,  since  the  demands 
of  war  enable  him  to  secure  a  good  rate  of  interest 
now,   and  the   reconstruction  of  what  the  war  has 


120        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

destroyed  will  cause  a  great  demand  for  capital  for 
some  time  after  the  war.  It  is  unlikely  that  the 
land-owner  will  suffer,  since  he  will  be  able  to  impose 
tariffs  on  the  plea  of  revenue  and  protection  against 
German  competition.  It  seems  inevitable  that  the 
loss  must  fall  upon  wage-earners.  In  bringing  about 
this  loss,  capitalists  will  find  the  growth  of  cheap 
female  labour  during  the  war  a  great  help,  and  this 
opportunity  will  be  improved  by  the  enormous  num- 
bers of  discharged  soldiers  and  munitions  workers 
seeking  emplojTnent.  I  do  not  see  how  this  situation 
can  result  otherwise  than  in  a  great  fall  of  wages. 

To  sum  up :  the  bad  results  which  we  have  been 
considering  do  not  depend  upon  the  question  of  vic- 
tory or  defeat:  thej^  will  fall  upon  all  the  nations, 
and  their  severity  depends  only  upon  the  length  and 
destructiveness  of  the  war.  If  the  war  lasts  much 
longer,  very  few  healthy  men  of  military  age  will 
have  failed  to  be  injured  physically  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent  in  any  of  the  nations  involved ;  the  moral 
level  everywhere  will  be  lowered  by  familiarity'-  with 
horrors,  leading,  in  most  men,  to  an  easy  acquiescence ; 
the  mental  efficiency  of  Europe  will  be  greatly  dimin- 
ished by  the  inevitable  deterioration  of  education  and 
by  the  death  or  nervous  weakening  of  many  of  the 
best  minds  among  the  young;  and  the  struggle  for 
life  will  almost  certainly  become  more  severe  among 
all  classes  except  the  idle  rich.  The  collective  life  of 
Europe,  which  has  carried  it  on  since  the  Renaissance 
in  the  most  wonderful  upward  movement  known  to 
history,  will  have  received  a  wound  which  may  well 
prove  mortal.     If  the  war  does  not  come  to  an  end 


THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION       121 

soon,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  we  are  at  the  end  of  a 
great  epoch,  and  that  the  future  of  Europe  will  not 
be  on  a  level  with  its  past. 

Is  there  any  conceivable  gain  from  the  continuation 
of  the  war  to  be  set  against  this  loss?  It  is  difficult 
to  imagine  any  gain  which  could  outweigh  so  terri- 
ble a  loss,  and  none  of  the  gains  which  are  suggested 
can  compare  with  it  for  a  moment.  But  in  fact  even 
the  gains  which  are  suggested  are  illusory.  It  is 
fairly  clear  now  that  neither  side  ean  hope  for  the 
absolute  and  crushing  victory  which  both  expected  at 
the  outset,  except  at  a  cost  which  cannot  be  seriously 
contemplated.  Sooner  or  later,  negotiation  will  have 
to  end  the  war.  The  claims  of  Belgium,  which  are  for 
us  an  obligation  of  honour,  will,  it  is  known,  be 
recognised  by  Germany  in  return  for  compensations 
elsewhere.*  The  argument  that,  if  we  do  not  crush 
Germany,  we  cannot  be  safe  from  a  recurrence  of  the 
present  war  in  the  near  future,  is  probably  the  one 
that  carries  most  weight.  But  in  fact  it  will  not 
bear  a  moment's  examination.  In  the  first  place, 
most  miUtary  authorities  are  agreed  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  crush  Germany.  In  the  second  place,  there 
have  been  wars  before  in  which  Germany  was  not  our 
enemy,  and  there  may  be  such  wars  in  future :  unless 
the  spirit  of  rivalry  is  checked,  the  removal  of  one 
rival  is  only  the  prelude  to  the  growth  of  another. 
In  the  third  place,  if  the  war  lasts  much  longer  we 
shall  incur  now  all  the  evils  which  we  might  incur 
in  the  future  if  the  war  broke  out  again,  and  the 
present  evils  are  certain  while  the  future  war  is  open 

•See  e.  g.  "The  Times",  Sept.  4,  1915. 


122        THE  DANGER  TO  CIVILIZATION 

to  doubt.  Germany  has  suffered  appalling  losses, 
and  is  in  a  very  different  mood  from  that  in  which 
it  began  the  war,  as  may  be  seen  by  the  growing  con- 
demnation of  the  Hymn  of  Hate.  A  peace  now,  giv- 
ing no  definite  victory  to  either  side,  would  probably 
leave  Germany,  for  many  years,  determined  not  to 
go  to  war  again;  and  no  peace  can  insure  us  against 
wars  a  generation  hence.  In  continuing  the  war,  we 
are  incurring  great  and  certain  evils  for  a  very 
doubtful  gain.  The  obligation  of  honour  towards 
Belgium  is  more  fully  discharged  if  the  Germans 
are  led  to  evacuate  Belgium  by  negotiation  than  if 
they  are  driven  out  at  the  cost  of  destroying  what- 
ever they  have  left  unharmed.  Both  on  their  side 
and  on  ours,  the  real  motive  which  prolongs  the  war 
is  pride.  Is  there  no  statesman  who  can  think  in 
terms  of  Europe,  not  only  of  separate  nations?  Is 
our  civilisation  a  thing  of  no  account  to  all  our  rulers  ? 
I  hope  not.  I  hope  that  somewhere  among  the  men 
who  hold  power  in  Europe  there  is  at  least  one  who 
will  remember,  at  this  late  date,  that  we  are  the 
guardians,  not  only  of  the  nation,  but  of  that  common 
heritage  of  thought  and  art  and  a  humane  way  of 
life  into  which  we  were  born,  but  which  our  children 
may  find  wasted  by  our  blind  violence  and  hate. 


THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 
A  Reply  to  Professor  Gilbert  Murray. 

I.     Introduction. 

There  are  some  among  us  who  hold  that,  if  our 
foreign  policy  in  recent  years  had  been  conducted 
with  more  courage,  more  openness,  and  more  idealism, 
there  is  a  likelihood  that  the  present  European  War 
would  never  have  occurred.  In  holding  this  view, 
we  are  in  no  way  concerned  to  defend  the  German 
Government;  it  is  clear,  at  least  to  me,  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  is  much  more  to  blame  than  our 
own,  both  for  the  outbreak  of  war  and  for  the  way 
in  which  the  war  has  been  conducted.  But  Germany's 
guilt  is  no  proof  of  our  innocence.  And  if  we  remain 
to  the  end  wrapped  in  self-righteousness,  impervious 
to  facts  which  are  not  wholly  creditable  to  us,  we 
shall,  in  the  years  after  the  war,  merely  repeat  the 
errors  of  the  past,  and  find  ourselves,  in  the  end, 
involved  in  other  wars  as  terrible  and  destructive  as 
the  one  which  we  are  now  waging. 

The  criticism  of  British  foreign  policy  which  seems 
to  us  necessary  is  not  a  personal  criticism  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey:  he  has  been  merely  the  instrument, 
the  man  who  carried  on  an  ancient  tradition.  I  cannot 
discover  any  matter,  great  or  small,  in  which  the 
policy  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  different  under  his 
administration  and  under  Lord  Lansdowne 's.*  It  is 
not  the  man,  but  the  maxims  which  he  has  inherited, 
that  must  be  criticised. 

•South  African  affairs,  mentioned  by  Professor  Murray,  are 
not  under  the  Foreign  Office. 


124       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  190-1-1915 

Professor  Gilbert  Murray,  under  the  tutelage  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  has  written  an  elaborate  defence 
of  Sir  Edward  Grey.*  In  criticising  Professor  Mur- 
ray, I  shall  not  be  concerned  with  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
personality,  but  merely  with  the  policy  which  he 
inherited  and  developed. 

Before  embarking  upon  the  history  of  British  for- 
eign policy,  Professor  Murray  begins  by  a  very  mis- 
leading description  of  the  state  of  mind  of  those  whom 
he  calls  "pro-Germans",  among  whom  he  instances 
Mr.  Brailsf ord  and  myself.  They  are,  he  says,  ' '  often 
very  clever",  but  "not  at  present  in  a  state  of  mind 
which  enables  them  to  see  or  even  to  seek  the  truth." 
"The  Pro-Germans" — he  says — "are  in  a  very  small 
minority  and  have  to  fight  hard.  And  many  of  them 
become  so  wrapped  up  in  their  own  immediate  con- 
troversy that,  as  far  as  their  combative  feelings  are 
concerned,  the  central  enemy  of  the  human  race  is 
Sir  Edward  Grey;  next  to  him  come  the  British 
Cabinet  and  the  most  popular  generals.  The  Kaiser 
is  to  them  a  prisoner  in  the  dock,  a  romantic  unfor- 
tunate, to  be  defended  against  overwhelming  odds. 
It  needs  great  strength  of  mind  for  a  member  of  a 
small  fighting  minority,  like  this,  to  be  even  mod- 
erately fair  in  controversy." 

Perhaps  it  does  require  some  strength  of  mind, 
even  to  belong  to  so  small  a  minority;  but  whatever 
strength  of  mind  is  required  to  be  "even  moderately 
fair"  when  one  belongs  to  a  great  fighting  majority 
has  been  denied  to  Professor  Murray.    He  has  fallen 

♦The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  1906-15,  by  Gilbert 
Murray.     Clarendon  Press  l-6d. 


INTRODUCTION  125 

into  the  absurd  assumption — which  no  man  makes  in 
the  private  quarrels  in  which  he  is  not  personally 
involved — that  if  one  side  is  to  blame,  the  other  must 
be  innocent. 

As  for  the  "central  enemy  of  the  human  race", 
that  is  a  melodramatic  conception :  most  Germans, 
apparently,  regard  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  this  light, 
while  Professor  Murray,  like  most  Englishmen, 
regards  the  Kaiser  in  this  light.  Those  whom  he 
attacks  as  not  "even  moderately  fair",  protest  against 
such  sensationalism.  We  perceive  that  in  previous 
wars  similar  views  have  been  held  on  each  side,  to  be 
unanimously  discarded  by  subsequent  historians ;  and 
we  do  not  believe  that  what  has  always  been  false 
before  has  now  suddenly  become  true.  If  we  seem 
to  emphasise  the  faults  on  our  side,  that  is  because 
they  are  ignored  by  our  compatriots ;  if  we  seem  to 
say  little  about  the  faults  on  the  other  side,  that  is 
because  every  newspaper  and  professor  throughout  the 
country  is  making  them  known.  Moreover  it  is  more 
profitable  to  be  conscious  of  our  own  faults  than  of 
the  faults  of  our  enemies :  we  can  amend  our  own  faults 
if  we  become  aware  of  them,  whereas  we  only  increase 
hatred  on  both  sides  by  proclaiming  the  faults  of  the 
enemy.  As  for  the  Kaiser,  ever  since  I  first  began  to 
know  Germany,  20  years  ago,  I  have  abominated  him ; 
I  have  consistently  regarded  him,  and  I  now  regard 
him,  as  one  of  the  sources  of  evil  in  the  world;  and 
in  what  I  have  written  on  the  war  there  is  not  a  word 
or  a  syllable  which  could  be  construed,  by  any  ingenu- 
ity, into  a  defence  of  the  Kaiser.  But  if  Professor 
Murray  were  "even  moderately  fair  in  controversy", 


126        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

he  would  perceive  that  the  Kaiser 's  guilt  cannot  alone 
suffice  to  establish  the  immaculate  sinlessness  of  our 
Foreign  Office. 

"With  the  whole  of  what  Professor  Murray  says  as 
to  the  wickedness  of  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium 
I  am  in  complete  agreement.  But  except  the  pleasure 
derived  from  denunciation,  no  good  is  achieved  by 
dwelling  upon  the  sins  of  our  enemies,  since  they  very 
naturally  pay  no  attention  to  our  opinions,  while  we 
become  puffed  up  with  self-righteousness.  In  the 
opinion  that  Mr.  Brailsf ord  and  1  ' '  are  not  at  present 
in  a  state  of  mind  which  enables  them  to  see  or  even 
to  seek  the  truth",  Professor  Murray  will  find  unani- 
mous agreement  throughout  Europe,  not  excepting 
Germany,  Austria  and  Turkey.  My  pamphlet,  which 
he  regards  as  pro-German,  has,  I  am  informed,  been 
prohibited  in  Austria*  on  the  ground  of  the  vehemence 
of  its  pro-English  bias.  It  is  a  comfort  in  these  times 
to  find  any  matter  upon  which  all  the  warring  nations 
are  agreed.  The  sinfulness  of  impartiality  is  such 
a  matter,  and  to  have  brought  out  this  fundamental 
agreement  is  perhaps  as  great  a  reward  as  we  can 
hope  for. 

When  the  war  broke  out,  the  view  taken  by  most 
Liberals  in  England  was  that  our  participation  was 
due  to  the  German  violation  of  Belgium  and  our  obli- 
gations under  the  treaty  of  1839.  This  was  not  the 
opinion  of  Unionists:  it  was  repeatedly  combated  by 
"The  Times"  (see  especially  the  leading  article  of 
March  8,  1915 ;  see  also  Spectator,  Dec.  19,  1914)  and 

•But  not  apparently  in  Hungary.  See  "Morning  Post',  Sep. 
25.   1915. 


INTRODUCTION  127 

Belgium  was  not  mentioned  in  the  official  Unionist 
communication  of  August  2,*  a  promising  support  to 
the  Government  if  they  took  part  in  the  war.  Fortu- 
nately it  was  not  the  view  taken  by  France  and  Russia ; 
unfortunately  it  was  not  the  view  taken  by  Germany. 
Professor  Murray  does  not  commit  himself  fully:  he 
speaks  of  the  German  attack  on  Belgium  as  "one  of 
the  obvious  and  important  events  leading  up  to  the 
war."  This  phrase  is  vague.  But  I  do  not  think 
there  can  now  be  two  opinions  as  to  the  part  played 
by  Belgium  in  our  participation :  if  the  Germans  had 
not  attacked  Belgium,  there  would  have  been  more 
resignations  in  the  Cabinet  and  less  unanimity  of 
public  opinion,  but  the  Government  would  have  found 
it  impossible  to  stand  aside  while  France  was  being 
crushed.  France,  not  Belgium,  was  for  us  the  deci- 
sive factor.  But  as  Professor  Murray  seems  anxious 
to  suggest  a  doubt  on  this  point,  let  us  see  what  the 
evidence  is. 

The  German  Ambassador  asked  Sir  Edward  Grey 
whether  he  could  promise  neutrality  if  not  only  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  France  (including 
colonies),  but  also  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  were 
respected.  Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  that  he  could 
give  no  such  promise.  (White  Paper,  No.  123.)  On 
this  Professor  Murray  comments  as  follows : 

•The  following  is  the  text  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law's  letter  to  Mr. 
Asquith,   of  Aug.    2,   1914: 

Dear  Mr.  Asquith,  Lord  Lansdowne  and  I  feel  it  our  duty  to 
Inform  you  that,  in  our  opinion  as  well  as  in  that  of  all  the 
colleagues  whom  we  have  been  able  to  consult,  it  would  be  fatal 
to  the  honour  and  security  of  the  United  Kingdom  to  hesitate  in 
supporting  France  and  Russia  at  the  present  juncture  ;  and  we 
offer  our  unhesitating  support  to  the  Government  in  any  meas- 
ures they  may  consider  necessary  for  that  object. 

Yours  very  truly,  A.   Bonar  Law. 


128       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

"If  Germany,  from  whatever  motive,  chose  to  use 
the  Austro-Serbian  dispute  as  an  occasion  for  making 
war  on  France,  then  we  must  have  our  hands  free. 
We  could  not  tell  Germany  how  much  we  would  take 
to  stand  aside  while  France  was  crushed.*  We  could 
not  arrange  with  Germany  for  a  limited  crushing  of 
France.  .  .  .  All  such  bargaining  was  both  dis- 
honourable and  illusory  and  dangerous." 

That  is  to  say,  honour  or  interest,  or  both,  so  bound 
us  to  France  that  we  could  not,  even  to  save  Belgium 
from  invasion,  stand  aside  while  France  was  attacked. 
So  far  from  Belgium  being  the  cause  of  our  interven- 
tion, we  were  precluded  from  making  any  effective 
diplomatic  attempt  to  protect  Belgium  by  the  fact 
that  we  could  not  promise  neutrality  even  if  Belgium 
w-ere  respected.  In  this  the  situation  differed  from 
that  of  1870,  when  Belgium  was,  for  us,  the  decisive 
factor,  and  was,  consequently,  efficiently  protected 
by  our  diplomacy.  Professor  Murray,  who  maintains 
that  we  did  not  know  that  Germany  would  invade 
Belgium,  cannot  reply  that  we  were  certain  in  advance 
of  the  fruitlessness  of  such  a  policy  from  the  Belgian 
point  of  view. 

Before  the  question  of  Belgium  had  arisen,  on  Au- 
gust 2,  we  had  already  promised  France  to  intervene 
if  the  German  Navy  attacked  the  Northern  or  West- 
ern coasts  of  France.      (This  was  an  obligation  of 

•So  far  is  this  from  being  a  correct  statement  of  the  case  that 
even  at  the  eleventh  hour  Germany  snatched  at  the  chance  of 
France  remaining  neutral,  which  seemed  to  be  presented  owing 
to  a  misunderstanding.  See  telegrams  published  by  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  Aug.  20,  1914,  Sept.  5,  1914,  quoted 
on  pp.  256,  258  of  Price's  "Diplomatic  History  of  the  War."  See 
also  Sir  E.  Grey's  reply  in  House  of  Commons  to  Lord  R.  Cecil, 
Aug.   28,  1914. 


INTRODUCTION  129 

honour,  resulting  from  the  fact  that,  as  a  conse- 
quence of  our  military  and  naval  conversations  with 
the  French,  their  Navy  had  been  withdrawn  from  the 
Mediterranean,  leaving  their  Channel  and  Atlantic 
coasts  only  protected  by  our  ships.)  In  Sir  E.  Grey's 
speech  of  August  3,  Belgium  forms  only  a  small 
part  of  his  case ;  and  in  his  later  speeches  it  was  chiefly 
France  that  he  spoke  of.  He  always  made  it  plain, 
both  in  his  speeches  and  in  the  despatches  in  the 
White  Paper,  that  in  his  view  we  were  bound  to 
come  to  the  help  of  France.  And  of  any  supporter 
of  the  war  is  asked:  "Would  you  have  been  pre- 
pared to  stand  aside  while  France  was  crushed  ? "  he 
is  all  but  certain  to  answer  that  he  would  not.  Bel- 
gium showed  Germany  at  its  worst,  but  it  did  not 
show  us  at  our  best.  It  gave  Germany  an  occasion 
for  brutal  violence ;  it  gave  our  Foreign  Office  an 
occasion  for  hypocrisy. 

Not  only  should  we  have  taken  part  in  the  war  if 
Belgium  had  not  been  involved,  but  if  our  national 
interests  had  been  on  the  side  of  Germany  we  should 
not  have  taken  part,  even  though  the  Germans  had 
violated  Belgium.  In  1887,  there  was  severe  ten- 
sion between  France  and  Germany  and  war  was  ex- 
pected. The  likelihood  of  the  Germans  marching 
through  Belgium  was  admitted,  and  prominent  news- 
papers of  both  parties  discussed  our  obligations  in 
case  that  should  happen.*  The  conclusion  they  came 
to  was  that  we  need  not  regard  our  obligation  as  re- 
quiring us  to  go  to  war.     Yet  our  obligation  then, 

•Cf.  "Standard".  Feb.  4,  1887;  "Pall  Mall  Gazette"  (at  that 
time  Liberal),  Feb.  4  and  5,  1887;  "Spectator",  Feb.  5,  1887. 
What  these  newspapers  said  is  given  in  Appendix  A. 


130       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

whatever  its  nature,  was  precisely  the  same  as  in  1914, 
since  it  rested  wholly  on  the  treaty  of  1839.  What 
then  had  changed  in  the  interval  ?  Our  view  of  Brit- 
ish interests  had  changed,  and  nothing  else.  In 
1887,  we  had  quarrels  with  France  and  Russia,  but 
no  quarrel  with  Germany;  our  leaning  was  towards 
the  Triple  Alliance,  and  in  a  European  War  we 
should  have  hoped  for  the  victory  of  Germany.  That 
is  why  we  then  made  light  of  our  obligation  to  Bel- 
gium. And  in  1914  we  made  much  of  our  obligation 
to  Belgium  because  we  were  against  Germany.  So 
far  at  least  as  our  Foreign  Office  is  concerned,  to  say 
that  we  were  against  Germany  because  we  were  for 
Belgium  is  to  invert  cause  and  effect;  the  truth  is 
that  we  were  for  Belgium  because  we  were  against 
Germany. 

It  was  clearly  the  desire  and  intention  of  the  For- 
eign Office  to  support  France  in  the  event  of  a  war 
between  France  and  Germany.  But  no  formal  alli- 
ance could  be  concluded,  because  it  was  very  doubt- 
ful whether  Liberal  and  Radical  opinion  would,  in 
quiet  times,  support  the  Government  if  it  attempted 
to  make  such  an  alliance.  Most  Englishmen  now  are 
of  opinion  that  the  Government  was  wiser  than  its 
doubtful  supporters ;  like  Professor  Murray,  they 
hold  that  criticism  which  formerly  seemed  justified 
has  been  proved  by  Germany  to  have  been  ill-founded. 
This  misses  the  point  of  the  criticism.  Almost  all 
the  critics  had  long  believed  in  the  existence  of  a 
powerful  war-party  in  Germany,  and  in  a  wide-spread 
intention  to  use  the  German  Navy  for  aggressive  pur- 
poses.    Criticism  of  our  foreign  policy  does  not  rest 


INTEODUCTION  131 

upon  denial  of  these  now  obvious  facts ;  it  rests  upon 
the  fact  that  our  foreign  policy  strengthened  the  war 
party  in  Germany,  made  the  task  of  German  friends 
of  peace  an  impossible  one,  and  supported  France 
and  Russia  in  enterprises  which  were  inherently  in- 
defensible. While  German  policy  was  still  doubtful, 
while  there  was  still  a  considerable  chance  that  ag- 
gressive tendencies  might  be  held  in  check,  we,  by 
our  hostility,  roused  the  combativeness  and  national 
pride  of  the  Germans,  and  fostered  the  belief  that 
they  could  only  escape  defeat  by  aggression.  And  it 
was  this  belief  which  precipitated  the  war. 

A  candid  defender  of  our  foreign  policy  might,  I 
think,  state  the  case  somewhat  as  follows : 

''During  the  Boer  War,  we  were  faced  with  the 
unanimous  ill-will  of  Europe,  and  for  some  months 
there  was  grave  danger  lest  France,  Germany  and 
Russia  should  combine  against  us.  This  danger  was 
averted,  partly  by  the  unappeasable  hostility  of 
France  to  Germany,  partly  by  the  fact  that  the  com- 
bined navies  of  France,  Germany  and  Russia  were 
at  that  time  hardly  a  match  for  the  British  Navy. 
With  the  German  Navy  Laws  of  1898  and  1900,  how- 
ever, it  became  clear  that  we  were  entering  upon  a 
new  epoch:  we  could  no  longer  hope  to  be  superior 
at  sea  to  a  combination  of  all  the  continental  Powers. 
It  became  necessary  to  have  friends  on  the  Continent, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of  a  coalition  against  us. 
We  had  offered  our  friendship  to  Germany,  through 
the  medium  of  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,*  but  this 
offer  had  been  refused.**     Germany's  refusal,  taken 

•Mr.   Chamberlain's  Birmingham  speech,   May   13,   1898. 
•♦See   Billow,    Imperial   Germany,    pp.    31    ff,    for   grounds   of 
Germany's  rejection. 


132        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

in  conjunction  with  the  German  Navy  Law  of  1900, 
made  us  believe  that  Germany  was  aiming  at  naval 
supremacy,  and  forced  us  to  seek  the  friendship  of 
France  and  Eussia.  As  soon  as  the  Boer  War  was 
ended,  we  began  negotiations  with  France  to  settle 
outstanding  questions,  and  in  1904,  we  concluded  the 
Anglo-French  Entente,  in  which  we  promised  to 
support  the  French  claim  to  Morocco  in  return  for 
French  recognition  of  our  position  in  Egypt.  Some- 
what parodoxically,  the  conclusion  of  the  Entente  was 
facilitated  by  recollection  of  the  Fashoda  incident, 
which  had  shown  the  French  that  their  colonial  ex- 
pansion could  not  be  effected  in  opposition  to  Great 
Britain. 

"The  conclusion  of  the  Entente  with  Russia  was 
a  more  difficult  matter.  For  the  protection  of  our 
interests  in  India  and  the  Far  East,  we  had  allied 
ourselves  in  1902  with  Japan,  which,  under  the  shelter 
of  the  alliance,  was  able  successfully  to  resist  Russia 
in  the  war  of  1904-5.  This  war  produced  great  ten- 
sion in  our  relations  with  Russia,  and  would  prob- 
ably have  led  to  hostilities  through  the  Dogger  Bank 
incident,  but  for  our  Entente  with  France  and  the 
hope  of  an  Entente  with  Russia.  In  the  end,  the 
Russo-Japanese  war,  like  Fashoda,  facilitated  our  new 
policy,  since  it  showed  Russia  the  difficulty  of  suc- 
ceeding in  opposition  to  us.  As  soon  as  the  war  was 
ended,  we  effectively  reconciled  Russia  and  Japan, 
joined  France  in  providing  a  much-needed  loan  for 
the  Russian  Government,  and  by  the  partition  of 
Persia  enabled  Russia  to  secure  peacefully  a  long- 
desired  object  which  we  should  formerly  have   op- 


INTRODUCTION  13:^ 

posed  by  force  of  arms.  In  this  way  our  friendship 
with  France  and  Russia  was  cemented  by  mutual 
advantage. 

"In  this  situation,  we  might  reasonably  hope  that 
Germany  would  hesitate  to  attack  so  strong  a  group 
as  the  Triple  Entente,  and  at  first  everything  seemed 
to  encourage  our  hopes.  Germany's  Bagdad  Railway 
scheme  lingered  on  in  a  state  of  suspended  animation, 
smothered  in  the  complications  of  international  fi- 
nance. The  French  claim  to  Morocco,  which  we  had 
been  unable  to  sustain  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war, 
was  successfully  asserted  in  1911,  though  Germany's 
face  was  saved  by  compensation  in  the  Cameroons. 
Russia,  being  satisfied  in  Persia  and  definitely 
thwarted  in  the  Far  East,  turned  its  attention  to 
the  Balkans,  where  Germany  had  to  submit  to  the 
defeat,  first  of  Turkey,  then  of  Bulgaria,  in  the  two 
Balkan  wars.  Owing  to  German  friendship  with  the 
Turk,  the  Tripoli  war  definitely  estranged  Italy  from 
the  Central  Empires.  In  all  these  respects  our  policy 
was  successful.  Soon,  owing  to  the  Three  Years' 
Service  Law  in  France,  the  reorganisation  of  the  Rus- 
sian army,  and  the  projected  strategic  railways  in 
Poland,  the  position  of  the  Triple  Entente  would  have 
been  unassailable.  But  at  this  moment  the  Austrian 
attack  on  Serbia  came  as  a  challenge  to  the  Triple 
Entente;  Russia's  prestige  precluded  surrender,  and, 
though  the  moment  was  inopportune,  the  war  was 
felt  to  be  unavoidable." 

An  equally  candid  defender  of  German  foreign 
policy,  with  exactly  the  same  national  aspirations  as 
those  which  inspire  our  diplomatists,  would  view  the 


134       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

same  series  of  events  in  quite  a  different  way.  His 
reply  would  be  something  like  this : 

"Germany  has  been  growing  rapidly  in  population, 
in  wealth,  and  in  trade;  more  and  more,  the  liveli- 
hood of  Germans  is  becoming  dependent  upon  the 
Open  Door,  the  power  of  exporting  manufactures,  and 
security  for  imports  of  food.  France,  whose  popula- 
tion and  trade  are  stationary,  has  a  Colonial  Empire 
four  times  as  great  as  ours.  Austria-Hungary  and 
Turkey,  our  only  friends,  are  threatened  with  dis- 
ruption by  the  revolutionary  activity  and  the  ruthless 
warfare  of  the  South  Slavs,  protected  and  favoured 
by  Russia.  England,  by  its  Navy,  can  at  any  moment 
cut  off  part  of  our  food-supply  and  strangle  our 
trade.  We  have  tried  every  means  of  escaping  from 
this  situation  without  war,  but  in  vain.  In  1905,  we 
asked  that  the  status  of  Morocco,  which  had  been 
decided  by  an  international  agreement  (the  Madrid 
Convention  of  1880),  should  only  be  altered  by  a 
new  international  agreement.  In  spite  of  the  obvious 
justice  of  our  demand,  England  and  France  opposed 
us,  and  yielded  only  to  the  threat  of  force.  At  the 
resulting  Algeciras  Conference,  we  submitted  to  the 
asquisition  of  special  rights  by  France  and  Spain, 
although  at  that  time  (when  Russia  was  occupied  in 
Manchuria)  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  pre- 
ponderance of  force  was  on  our  side. 

"France  secured  a  free  hand  for  the  Moroccan  ad- 
venture by  acknowledging  the  British  position  in 
Egypt,  by  withdrawing  opposition  to  Italian  ambi- 
tions in  Tripoli,  and  by  giving  the  Mediterranean 
coast  of  Morocco  to  Spain.     "When  at  last  it  became 


INTRODUCTION  135 

clear  that  France  meant  to  occupy  Morocco,  we  de- 
manded that,  in  justice,  we,  like  England,  Italy  and 
Spain,  should  receive  some  compensation  for  our  ac- 
quiescence. In  this  demand,  also,  it  was  only  by 
threatening  war  that  we  succeeded,  and  then  very  in- 
adequately. In  Llesopotamia,  we  discovered  a  coun- 
try capable  of  great  fertility,  but  rendered  barren  by 
misgovernment.  Here  again,  our  plans  were  thwarted 
by  the  opposition  of  England,  Russia's  initial  op- 
position being  withdrawn  after  the  Potsdam  Agree- 
ment of  1910.  The  Tripoli  war  and  the  two  Balkan 
Wars,  of  which  we  remained  merely  spectators,  were 
all  decided  in  a  way  inimical  to  our  interests.  At 
last  it  became  clear  that  the  ambitions  of  the  Triple 
Entente  must  prosper  at  Germany's  expense  so  long 
as  peace  was  preserved  among  the  Great  Powers,  and 
that  the  precisely  similar  ambitions  of  Germany  could 
never  prosper  except  by  the  use  of  our  incomparable 
army.  If  we  had  remained  longer  inactive,  the 
strengthening  of  Russia  and  the  growth  of  the  South 
Slavs  would  have  rendered  us  powerless,  and  we 
should  have  been  unable  to  obtain  the  share  of  the 
Empire  which  is  our  due.  Our  love  of  peace  has  been 
proved  during  the  last  forty-four  years;  only  the 
intolerable  policy  of  encirclement  has  at  last  com- 
pelled us  to  draw  the  sword." 

This  imaginary  speech  does  not,  of  course,  repre- 
sent my  owm  views,  any  more  than  the  speech  which 
I  put  into  the  mouth  of  a  defender  of  our  policy.  The 
two  speeches  are  merely  intended  to  represent  the 
best  that  can  be  said  for  the  two  policies  without 
actual  denial  of  plain  facts.     I  have  presented  our 


136        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

case  and  that  of  Germany  without  the  moral  indig- 
nation in  which  they  are  usually  clothed.  Germans, 
to  account  for  the  Navy  Law  of  1900,  will  point 
out  how  they  longed,  in  1899,  to  come  to  the  rescue 
of  gallant  little  South  Africa,  when  we  committed 
what  was  regarded  as  an  international  crime,  the  rea- 
sons for  so  regarding  it  being,  as  Professor  Murray 
quaintly  says,  "perhaps  four".*  Germans  will  say 
that  their  inability  to  succour  the  oppressed  on 
that  occasion,  their  incapacity  to  defend  right 
against  might  and  democracy  against  militarism,  first 
showed  them  that  they  must  have  a  navy  if  justice 
was  to  prevail  in  the  world  and  small  nations  were 
to  be  safe  from  their  big  neighbours.  All  this  is  of 
course  hypocrisy  on  their  part,  and  I  have  omitted 
it  from  the  statement  of  their  case.  If  there  seem  to 
he  any  omissions  in  the  statement  of  our  case,  the 
motive  is  the  same. 

Stripped  of  parliamentary  verbiage,  the  funda- 
mental fact  about  the  European  situation  is  that  all 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  have  precisely  the  same 
objects:  territory,  trade  and  prestige.  In  pursuit  of 
these  objects  no  one  of  the  Great  Powers  shrinks  from 
wanton  aggression,  war  and  chicanery.  But  owing 
to  the  geographical  position  of  Germany  and  our 
naval  supremacy,  England  can  achieve  all  its  pur- 
poses by  wars  outside  Europe,  whereas  English  and 
Russian  policy  has  shown  that  Germany  cannot 
achieve  its  aims  except  by  a  European  war.    We  have 

*"Most  decently-informed  people  in  almost  every  region  of  the 

world  regard  the  German  attack  on  Belgium with  vivid 

indignation  as  a  obvious  international  crime.  The  reasons  for  so 
regarding  it  are  perhaps  four."     Murray,  p.  6. 


INTRODUCTION  137 

made  small  wars  because  small  wars  were  what  suited 
our  purpose ;  Germany  has  made  a  great  war  because 
a  great  war  was  what  suited  Germany 's  purpose.  We 
and  they  alike  have  been  immoral  in  aim  and  brutal 
in  method,  each  in  tiie  exact  degree  which  was  thought 
to  be  to  the  national  advantage.  If  either  they  or 
we  had  had  loftier  aims  or  less  brutal  methods,  the 
war  might  have  been  avoided.  As  far  as  they  are 
concerned,  English  readers  will  admit  this  at  once; 
it  is  my  object  in  what  follows  to  prove  that  it  is 
equally  true  of  the  Entente. 


II.    MOROCCO. 

The  influence  of  the  Moroccan  question  in  stimulat- 
ing warlike  feeling  both  in  Germany  and  in  France  is 
little  appreciated  in  this  country,  and  could  certainly 
not  be  discovered  from  Professor  Murray's  account. 
An  Italian  learned  journal,  "Scientia,"  has  invited 
articles  by  learned  men  of  all  countries,  and  the  Edi- 
tor has  finally  summed  up  his  own  editorial  conclu- 
sions. On  the  subject  of  Morocco,  the  Editor  says 
C'Scientia,"  June- July,  1915,  pp.  44,  45). 

"The  first  tangible  result  of  the  Triple  Entente 
as  it  affected  Germany  was  her  complete  and  definite 
exclusion,  at  the  risk,  twice  occurring,  of  a  European 
War,  from  Morocco This  exclusion  was  per- 
haps an  error  for  the  cause  of  European  peace, 
because  of  the  great  disappointment  and  the  lively 
invitation  which  the  incident  left  throughout  Ger- 
many. Contributing  more  than  any  other  fact  to 
strengthen  the  conviction  among  the  German  govern- 
ment classes  and  in  Iperialist  circles  that  Germany 
could  never  satisfy  her  imperialist  aspirations  without 
the  conquest  of  colonies,  it  was  this  which  established 
in  the  Imperialist  German  mind  the  determination,  at 
any  cost,  not  to  let  the  last  res  nullius  remaining,  i.  e. 
Turkey,   which  was  really   exceptionally  important, 

escape    from    German    influence It    therefore 

became  more  imperative  than  ever  that  Austria 
should  maintain  her  hegemony  in  the  Balkans,  for  the 


MOROCCO  139 

sake  of  German  designs,  and  ultimately  of  acquiring 
Salonika."* 

From  our  point  of  view  the  history  of  Morocco  be- 
gins with  the  Anglo-French  treaty  of  April  8,  1904. 
This  treaty  consisted  of  two  parts,  one  public  and 
one  secret.  The  secret  part  first  appeared  in  French 
newspapers  late  in  1911,  after  the  Morocco  crisis  of 
that  year  was  past. 

The  public  Treaty  contains  a  French  acknowledg- 
ment of  our  position  in  Egypt,  and  an  English  ac- 
knowledgment, as  regards  Morocco,  "that  it  apper- 
tains to  France,  more  particularly  as  a  Power  whose 
dominions  are  coterminous  for  a  great  distance  with 
those  of  Morocco,  to  preserve  order  in  that  country, 
and  to  provide  assistance  for  the  purpose  of  all  admin- 
istrative, economic,  financial  and  military  reforms 
which  it  may  require."  The  two  governments  agree 
not  to  permit  the  erection  of  fortifications  on  the  Moor-^ 
ish  coast  anywhere  near  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  and 
France  agrees  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Spain 
in  regard  to  this  portion  of  the  coast.  England  and 
France  reciprocally  promise  each  other  diplomatic 
support  in  carrying  out  the  agreement,  and  declare 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  altering  the  political 
status  of  Egypt  or  Morocco. 

The  secret  articles  are  concerned  with  what  is  to 
happen  if,  nevertheless,  England  or  France  should 
decide    to    alter    the    political    status    of    Egypt    or 

*The  history  of  Morocco  has  been  so  well  told  by  Mr.  Morel 
(Morocco  in  Diplomacy".  Smith,  Elder  &  Co.,  1912,  reprinted 
as  "Ten  Tears  of  Secret  Diplomacy,  An  Unheeded  Warning", 
1915)  that  any  new  account  not  designed  simply  to  whitewash 
the  English  and  French  Governments  can  only  repeat  what  is  to 
be  found  in  this  book,  even  when,  like  what  follows,  it  is  derived 
from  other  sources. 


140        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

Morocco.  The  article  assigning  the  share  of  Spain 
is  as  follows : 

"The  two  Governments  agree  that  a  certain  ex- 
tent of  Morrish  territory  adjacent  to  Melilla,  Ceuta, 
and  other  presides  should,  whenever  the  Sultan  ceases 
to  exercise  authority  over  it,  come  within  the  sphere 
of  influence  of  Spain,  and  that  the  administration 
of  the  coast  from  Melilla  as  far  as,  but  not  includ- 
ing, the  heights  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Sebou  shall 
be  entrusted  to  Spain. 

"Nevertheless,  Spain  would  previously  have  to  give 
her  formal  assent  to  the  provisions  of  Articles  IV 
and  Vll  of  the  Declaration  of  today's  date,  and  un- 
dertake to  carry  them  out.* 

"She  would  also  have  to  undertake  not  to  alienate 
the  whole,  or  a  part,  of  the  territories  placed  under 
her  authority  or  in  her  sphere  of  influence, ' ' 

Thus  the  manner  in  which  Morocco  was  to  be  par- 
titioned between  France  and  Spain  was  already  pro- 
vided for,  in  such  a  way  as  to  allay  our  fear  of  seeing 
any  strong  naval  Power  established  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  The  Treaty  contem- 
plated the  complete  absorption  of  Morocco  by  France, 
except  along  the  Mediterranean  coast,  where  our  naval 
interests  had  to  be  safeguarded. 

When  the  Entente  with  France  was  concluded, 
there  was  almost  universal  rejoicing  in  England. 
Liberal-minded  people  were  glad  to  co-operate  with 
the  great  leader  of  continental  democracy  and  liber- 
alism; the  friends  of  peace  were  glad  that  all  causes 

•These  concern  the  Open  Door,  and  the  absence  of  fortifica- 
tions near  Gibraltar. 


MOROCCO  141 

of  friction  had  been  removed  between  two  great  na- 
tions which  had  always  respected  each  other;  but, 
strange  to  say,  the  Jingoes  and  Imperialists  were  also 
delighted,  and  the  Entente  was  concluded  by  the 
same  Government  which  had  made  the  South  African 
War.  This  should  have  made  radicals  and  pacifists 
think,  but  it  did  not.  Sir  E.  Grey,  in  blessing  the 
Entente,  said  "it  seemed  as  if  some  benign  influence 
were  at  work, ' '  bringing  friendship  instead  of  enmity 
into  the  relations  of  England  and  France.  Looking 
back  now,  we  can  see  what  the  benign  influence  was ; 
it  was  the  German  Navy.  This  was  the  decisive  factor 
that  led  us  to  swing  over  on  to  the  side  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance.  It  was  not  love  of  French  liberal- 
ism, nor  even  of  Russian  police  methods,  that  produced 
the  Entente :  it  was  fear  of  Germany.  ' '  Our  future 
is  on  the  sea,"  said  the  Kaiser,  and  interpreted  this 
as  meaning :  ' '  Our  future  is  over  England 's  grave. ' ' 
Now  I  do  not  say  that  our  fear  was  irrational  or 
groundless,  and  I  do  not  say  that  we  were  wrong  to 
take  precautions.  What  I  do  say  is  that  the  measures 
which  we  actually  took  were  ideally  calculated  to 
bring  the  danger  nearer,  to  increase  the  aggressive 
temper  which  was  beginning  to  grow  up  in  Germany. 
to  persuade  Germans  that  we  would  yield  nothing 
whatever  to  the  claims  of  justice.  I  say  that  the 
measures  we  adopted  were  dictated  by  panic,  and 
lacked  the  wisdom,  the  cool  courage,  which  a  calmer 
survey  would  have  inspired.  I  say  that  the  ends  pur- 
sued by  our  foreign  policy  were  exactly  similar  to  the 
ends  pursued  by  the  German  foreign  policy,  and  were 
pursued  by  methods  which  made  us  accomplices  in 


142        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

abominable  crimes  against  humanity  and  freedom.  I 
say  that  our  policy  revived  warlike  feeling  in  France, 
and  fostered  it  in  Germany.  I  say  that  in  1911  our 
readiness  to  provoke  a  European  war  was  greater  than 
that  of  Germany,  and  that  our  reluctance  in  1914 
cannot  therefore  be  wholly  attributed  to  disinterested 
virtue.  All  this,  I  think,  can  be  proved  by  an  impar- 
tial recital  of  facts.  In  this  recital,  the  first  and  most 
important  chapter  is  Morocco. 

The  foreign  secretary  in  France  at  the  time  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  Entente  was  the  same  as  at  the  time 
of  Fashoda,  and  the  same  as  the  foreign  secretary 
now,  M.  Delcasse.  Before  the  negotiation  of  the  En- 
tente, M.  Delcasse,  in  pursuit  of  the  policy  of  colonial 
expansion,  was  vehemently  anti-English,  Since  the 
conclusion  of  the  Entente,  he  has  been  vehemently 
anti-German,  because  the  policy  of  the  Revanche  has 
again  seemed  feasible.  Ever  since  the  conclusion  of 
the  war  of  1870,  the  fundamental  desire  of  national- 
ist feeling  in  France  has  been  for  revenge  on  Ger- 
many and  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  But  for 
long  years  this  policy  has  seemed  so  hopeless  of  suc- 
cess that  French  ambitions  were  turned  in  other  direc- 
tions, and  especially  towards  the  acquisition  of 
colonies.  This  policy  produced  friction  with  Eng- 
land, and  as  an  anti-English  policy  it  came  to  grief 
at  Fashoda.  The  Entente  produced  a  new  possibility ; 
the  combination  of  colonial  expansion  with  the  policy 
of  the  Revanche,  both  in  co-operation  with  England. 
Anti-German  feeling,  which  despair  had  made  silent 
and  subterranean,   came   again  to  the  surface  with 


MOROCCO  143 

the  revival  of  hope,  and  found  its  protagonist  in  M. 
Delcasse. 

This  policy  was  not  that  of  Liberal  elements  in 
France ;  it  was  that  of  the  re-actionaries,  the  Clericals, 
the  Militarists,  and  certain  financial  interests.  Liberal 
opinion  in  France,  seeing  that  colonial  adventures 
and  war-scares  were  the  enemies  of  social  reform, 
was  anxious  to  abandon  hostility  to  Germany  and  to 
be  conciliatory  as  regards  Morocco.  This  party,  which 
had  the  majority  of  French  Parliament,  was  feared 
by  our  Foreign  Office  and  by  "The  Times,"  which 
allied  themselves  with  all  that  was  least  liberal  and 
least  pacific  in  French  opinion.  If  we  had  genuinely 
desired  peace  in  Europe,  we  should  have  rejoiced 
in  any  sign  of  better  relations  between  France  and 
Germany.  In  fact,  however,  we  did  what  we  could 
to  make  the  French  nation  suspicious  of  those  French- 
men who  tried  to  be  conciliatory  in  their  dealings 
with  Germany,  and  to  suggest  that  we  regarded  the 
progressive  elements  in  French  public  life  as  lack- 
ing in  loyalty  to  the  Entente. 

M.  Delcasse  failed  to  notify  the  Morocco  Treaty 
formally  to  the  German  Government,  presumably  in 
order  to  show  his  indifference  to  German  opinion.  At 
the  moment,  however,  Germany  showed  no  resentment. 

M.  Delcasse  next  negotiated  a  secret  treaty  and  a 
public  declaration  with  Spain,  concluded  on  October 
3rd,  1904.  The  public  declaration  states  that  France 
and  Spain  "remain  firmly  attached  to  the  integrity 
of  the  Moorish  Empire  under  the  Sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan."  The  secret  treaty  delimits  the  respective 
spheres  of  France  and  Spain  in  Morocco,  and  arranges 


144       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

what  is  to  happen  "in  case  the  continuance  of  the 
political  status  of  Morocco  and  of  the  Shereefian 
Government  should  become  impossible."  The  secret 
treaty  first  became  known  to  the  world  through  its 
publication  by  "Le  Matin"  in  Nov.  1911.  Not  even 
the  public  declaration  was  officially  notified  by  France 
to  the  German  Government. 

To  those  who  are  unaccustomed  to  diplomatic 
methods,  there  is  something  repellent  in  the  con- 
tradictory character  of  the  public  declarations  and 
secret  understandings  of  England,  France  and  Spain 
in  the  matter  of  Morocco.  Publicly,  they  stated  that 
they  "remained  firmly  attached"  to  the  integrity  of 
Morocco.  Secretly,  they  arranged  how  the  booty  was 
to  be  divided  in  case  this  attachment  should  become 
less  firm.  If  two  men  were  to  proclaim  publicly 
that  they  had  no  intention  of  stealing  their  neigh- 
bour's goods,  and  were  at  the  same  time  to  draw  up 
and  sign  a  careful  secret  contract  as  to  how  his  goods 
were  to  be  shared  in  case  they  came  into  possession  of 
them,  they  would  not  be  believed  if  they  declared, 
on  being  caught,  that  at  the  time  they  sincerely  hoped 
they  would  remain  honest.  France  and  Spain  had 
no  right  to  Morocco  except  that  of  contiguity — the 
very  same  right  which  the  King  had  to  Naboth's 
Vineyard.  The  Moorish  Empire  was  independent,  and 
its  international  status  was  regulated  by  the  Madrid 
Convention  of  1880.*  If  misgovernment  were  to  pro- 
duce a  genuine  need  for  European  intervention,  the 
obviously  right  course  was  to  make  the  intervention 

*  Which  provided  (inter  alia)  that  all  the  signatories  (among 
whom  Germany  was  included)  should  enjoy  most-favoured- 
nation treatment  in  Morocco. 


MOROCCO  145 

international,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Boxers  in  China. 
But  this  was  not  the  course  adopted  by  England, 
France  and  Spain.  While  publicly  declaring  that  they 
hoped  the  integrity  of  Morocco  could  be  preserved, 
they  secretly  arranged  who  was  to  have  what  in  case 
Moroccan  independence  came  to  an  end.  And  this 
contingency  was  considered  sufficiently  probable  for 
France  to  be  willing,  on  account  of  it,  to  withdraw 
its  long-standing,  opposition  to  our  occupation  of 
Egypt.  The  analogy  is  exact  with  our  illustration 
of  the  two  burglars  with  the  addition  of  a  third  who 
is  paid  to  stand  out  of  the  job  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  two  are  publicly  protesting  their  wish  to 
remain  honest. 

Professor  Murray  has  a  charmingly  idyllic  ex- 
planation of  the  secrecy  which  was  preserved  as  to 
the  terms  of  partition.  No  diplomat,  I  feel  sure, 
could  have  thought  of  anything  so  idyllic — which 
shows  the  wisdom  of  summoning  outside  assistance 
for  the  defence  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Professor 
Murray's  explanation  is,  that  the  political  status  of 
Morocco  would  have  been  more  difficult  to  maintain 
if  it  had  become  known  that  England  and  France 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  having  to  change  it; 
and  so  anxious  were  the  two  Powers  to  do  nothing 
to  hasten  the  downfall  of  Morocco,  that,  like  benevo- 
lent bedside  doctors,  they  concealed  the  danger  from 
the  patient  and  from  his  friends.  This  was  very  kind, 
certainly.  But  the  kindness  did  not  end  here.  One 
of  the  doctors,  who  had  expectations  from  the  pa- 
tient's demise,  paid  the  other  to  leave  him  in  sole 
charge,   and  subsequently  administered  many  small 


146        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

doses  of  poison.  Finally,  the  patient  died,  and  the 
doctor  came  into  his  inheritance.  Those  who  can  be- 
lieve, with  Professor  Murray,  that  he  grieved  sin- 
cerely for  the  sick  man's  death,  are  to  be  congratu- 
lated on  their  charitable  disposition. 

Germany,  at  first,  raised  no  objections  to  the  Anglo- 
French  treaty  or  to  the  Franco-Spanish  declaration. 
France  proceeded  to  urge  upon  the  Moorish  Govern- 
ment a  series  of  reforms  which  even  Professor 
Murray  regards  as  ' '  perhaps  too  much  concerned  with 
French  interest  and  monopolies. ' '  What  ensued  may 
be  told  in  Professor  Murray's  words : 

"The  Shereef  procrastinated,  the  pressure  contin- 
ued, when  suddenly,  on  March  31st,  1905,  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  in  person  descended  in  his  private 
yacht  on  the  port  of  Tangier,  and  made  a  speech  to 
the  world  at  large.  He  announced  that  he  regarded 
the  Shereef  as  a  free  and  independent  sovereign,  not 
bound  to  obey  any  foreign  pressure ;  that  sudden  and 
sweeping  reforms  were  undesirable  in  Morocco;  and 
that  German  interests  must  be  safeguarded. 

This  speech  was  followed  by  a  demand  for  a  gen- 
eral Europ^ean  conference  to  settle  the  affairs  of 
Morocco." 

What  are  we  to  think  of  this  characteristically 
dramatic  action?  In  manner  it  was  brutal,  in  sub- 
stance it  showed  more  concern  for  German  national 
interests  than  for  friendly  relations  between  the 
Great  Powers.  In  both  these  respects  it  was  to  be 
condemned.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  it  was 
encouraged  by  the  weakness  of  Russia  owing  to  the 
Manchurian  defeats.    But  it  should  also  be  said  that 


MOROCCO  147 

the  existence  of  a  secret  Franco-Spanish  treaty  was 
known,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  its  terms,  as 
well  as  the  secret  articles  of  the  Anglo-French  treaty, 
had  been  discovered  by  the  German  secret  service. 
However  that  may  be,  the  Kaiser's  action  was  inde- 
fensible, on  the  broad  ground  that  it  was  calculated 
to  provoke  resentment  in  England  and  France. 

But  I  think  we  must  give  a  different  answer  when 
we  ask  whether  this  resentment,  however  natural, 
was  justified  by  the  facts.  The  Kaiser's  discourtesy 
was  only  a  retort  to  the  deliberate  discourtesy  of  M. 
Delcasse  in  not  notifying  the  German  Government  of 
the  treaty  of  April  and  the  declaration  of  October. 
The  exclusive  nationalism  of  the  Kaiser's  attitude 
was  merely  the  parallel  to  the  exclusive  nationalism 
of  England  and  France  in  attempting  to  dispose  of 
Morocco  as  suited  themselves,  without  considering 
the  natural  resentment  likely  to  be  felt  in  Germany. 
As  regards  the  substance  of  the  dispute,  Germany's 
legal  case  was  good  and  ours  was  bad.  Let  us  take 
the  points  mentioned  by  Professor  Murray.  The 
Kaiser  *' announced  that  he  regarded  the  Shereef 
as  a  free  and  independent  sovereign" — Franch  and 
Britain  had  made  practically  the  same  announce- 
ment in  their  public  treaty.  The  Shereef  could  only 
cease  to  be  free  and  independent  owing  to  the  military 
conquest  of  his  dominions,  or  the  financial  strangula- 
tion which  sometimes  secures  the  same  end  more 
cheaply.  The  Kaiser  had  as  good  a  right  to  declare 
him  free  and  independent  as  we  have  to  declare 
King  Albert  free  and  independent,  and  we  had  as 
little  legal  right  to  decree  the  subjection  of  Morocco 


148       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

as  the  Kaiser  has  to  decree  the  subjection  of  Belgium. 
I  admit  that  it  was  unplausible  to  maintain,  "that 
sudden  and  sweeping  reforms  were  undesirable  in 
Morocco,"  at  any  rate,  if  it  was  so,  Morocco  must 
have  differed  from  every  other  part  of  the  earth's 
surface.  But  the  men  who  wanted  to  reform  Morocco 
were  resisting  reforms  at  home,  and  were  demanding 
reform  in  their  own  interest,  rather  than  in  that  of 
Morocco.  So  much  is  implied  in  Professor  IMurray's 
allusion  to  "French  interests  and  monopolies."  The 
assertion  that  "German  interests  must  be  safe- 
guarded," though  not  one  with  which  I  sympathise, 
is  one  which  is  considered  the  duty  of  every  Govern- 
ment, and  for  which  Professor  Murray  praises  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  Mansion  House  speech  in  1911.  The 
Madrid  Convention  of  1880  guaranteed  to  Germany, 
along  with  other  Powers,  most-favoured-nation  treat- 
ment in  Morocco,  and  Germany's  right  to  safeguard 
this  position  was  indisputable.  Finally,  we  came  to 
the  Kaiser's  demand  for  an  international  Conference 
to  decide  the  status  of  Morocco.  This  demand  was 
so  unquestionably  just  that  Professor  Murray  can 
find  nothing  to  say  against  it.  "The  future  of 
Morocco,"  he  confesses,  "was  a  matter  of  public  in- 
terest, and  the  rest  of  Europe  had  the  right  to  be 
consulted. ' '  And  again :  ' '  France 's  case  was  not 
perfect ;  if  we  had  been  absolutely  disinterested  arbi- 
trators in  the  matter,  we  should  probably  have  de- 
cided that  France  ought  to  agree  to  a  conference." 
He  remarks,  in  his  amiable  way,  that  "the  end,  as  it 
happened,  seemed  exactly  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
justice."    But  the  demands  of  justice  were  not  satis- 


MOROCCO  149 

fied  until  Germany  had  threatened  war,  until  Eng- 
land had  shown  a  complete  willingness  to  fight  in  a 
quarrel  in  which  Professor  IMurray  admits  that  we 
were  in  the  wrong,  and  M.  Delcasse,  in  spite  of  our 
hot  support,  had  been  dismissed  from  office  by  the 
good  sense  of  the  French  nation,  not,  as  "The  Times" 
has  taught  Englishmen  to  believe,  at  the  insolent 
bidding  of  the  Kaiser. 

Professor  Murray  deals  with  our  initial  opposi- 
tion to  a  conference  in  the  following  terms : 

' '  France,  to  whom  we  had  promised  our  diplomatic 
support,  seemed,  in  her  indignation  at  being  bullied, 
to  be  inclined  to  refuse  a  conference.  And  we  took 
our  stand  firmly  at  her  side. 

"It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  our  repre- 
sentatives said  in  private  to  our  friends'  representa- 
tives. It  is  likely  enough  that  there  were  private 
warnings  and  appeals  for  moderation.  But  in  public, 
at  any  rate.  Great  Britain  stood  with  perfect  loyalty 
by  the  side  of  France.  Here,  no  doubt,  we  strike 
upon  one  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  cardinal  principles:  if  you 
make  an  engagement,  carry  out  your  engagement 
loyally  and  with  no  hedging. ' ' 

It  is  a  comfort  to  know  that  Sir  E.  Grey 
possesses  this  virtue ;  perhaps  Professor  Murray  is  also 
able  to  assure  us  that  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 
does  not  embezzle  public  funds  and  the  Home  Secre- 
tary does  not  levy  blackmail  on  burglars  in  return 
for  immunity  from  arrest.  I  am  sorry  Professor 
Murray  should  have  allowed  himself  to  imply  that 
Sir  E.  Grey  is  exceptional  among  British  Foreign 
Secretaries  in  the  practice  of  keeping  his  promises. 


150       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

the  more  so  as  he  was  not  Foreign  Secretary  at  the 
time  that  Professor  Murray  is  dealing  with.  The 
Kaiser's  visit  to  Tangier,  and  the  opposition  of  Eng- 
land and  France  to  a  conference,  occurred  while  Lord 
Lansdowne  was  still  at  the  Foreign  Office. 

What  Professor  Murray  says  about  loyalty  to  en- 
gagements and  the  likelihood  of  "private  warnings 
and  appeals  for  moderation"  is  exactly  what,  if  he 
were  a  German,  he  would  say  about  Germany's  atti- 
tude to  Austria  during  the  twelve  days.  The  cases 
are  exactly  similar;  we  do  not  know  what  was  said, 
but  such  evidence  as  we  possess  tends  to  show  that 
Germany  egged  on  Austria  and  England  egged  on 
France.  The  evidence  in  each  case  is  inconclusive, 
but  it  is  considerably  stronger  in  the  case  of  Eng- 
land and  France  in  1905*  than  in  the  case  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria  in  1914.  War  did  not  result  at 
the  earlier  date,  because  French  public  opinion  saw 
the  madness  of  M.  Delcasse  's  policy ;  war  was  averted 
by  democratic  control.  In  Austria,  with  its  monarch- 
ical constitution,  this  restraining  force  was  absent. 

It  is  not  very  easy  to  draw  conclusions  as  to  the 
extent  of  our  support  of  France  in  1905  from  the 
mass  of  contradictory  evidence,  of  which  I  have 
given  an  account  in  the  Appendix  B.  In  view  of  the 
line  which  we  know  to  have  been  taken  later  by  Sir 
E.  Grey,  the  most  probable  hypothesis  would  seem 
to  be  that  Lord  Lansdowne,  while  refusing  to  make  a 
promise,  consented  to  make  a  prophecy,  and  to  state 
that,  in  his  opinion.  Parliament  would  support  the 
Government  if  the  occasion  for  giving  armed  assist- 

♦See  Appendix  B. 


MOROCCO  151 

ance  to  France  should  rise.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  honour,  such  a  prophecy  has  very  nearly  the  same 
binding  force  as  a  promise.  Any  action  which  the 
French  might  have  taken  on  the  strength  of  it  would 
obviously  have  compelled  our  Government  to  exert 
all  its  influence  at  home  in  order  to  secure  the  realisa- 
tion of  its  prophecy,  and  if  our  Government  had 
failed,  no  one  could  deny  that  the  French  would 
have  had  a  legitimate  grievance  against  us. 

"Whether  or  not  our  action  in  1905  was  as  I  have 
supposed,  it  certainly  was  of  this  nature  in  the  later 
crisis  of  1911,  when  the  French  case  was  scarcely 
better  than  in  1905.  But  before  we  come  to  the  crisis 
of  1911,  we  must  say  a  few  words  about  the  Con- 
ference of  Algeciras  and  the  subsequent  actions  of  the 
French  at  Morocco. 

The  privileges  secured  by  the  French  under  the  Act 
of  Algeciras  were  very  few;  it  is  misleading  to  say, 
as  Professor  Murray  does,  that  the  delegates  "de- 
cided almost  all  points  in  favour  of  France  and 
against  Germany."  The  sum-total  of  the  conces- 
sions secured  by  France,  Spain  and  England  were 
the  three  following : 

(1)  There  was  to  be  a  force  of  native  police, 
numbering  between  two  thousand  and  two  thousand 
five  hundred,  which  was  to  be  under  Spanish  and 
French  inspectors  numbering  sixteen  to  twenty  offi- 
cers, and  thirty  to  forty  non-commissioned  officers — 
the  whole  being  subject  to  an  Inspector  General,  who 
was  to  be  a  superior  officer  of  the  Swiss  Army. 

(2)  A  Morocco  State  Bank  was  to  be  established 
as  the  financial  agent  of  the  Moorish  Government; 


152        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

this  Bank  was  to  be  subject  to  French  law,  to  have  its 
capital  subscribed  in  equal  shares  by  the  signatories 
of  the  Algeciras  Act,  and  to  have,  in  addition  to  the 
Board  of  Directors,  and  to  a  High  Commissioner 
appointed  by  the  Moroccan  Government  after  consul- 
tation with  the  directors,  four  Censors,  appointed  re- 
spectively by  the  German  Imperial  Bank,  the  Bank  of 
England,  the  Bank  of  Spain,  and  the  Bank  of  France. 
The  Censors  were  to  see  that  the  intentions  of  the 
Act  were  duly  executed,  but  must  "not  at  any  time, 
or  under  any  pretext  whatsoever,  be  allowed  to  in- 
terfere in  the  conduct  of  the  business  or  in  the  in- 
ternal administration  of  the  Bank."  The  annual 
Report  of  the  Censors  was  to  be  unanimous. 

(3)  On  the  Algerian  frontier,  and  in  the  Riff 
country,  the  carrying  out  of  the  regulations  made  by 
the  Act  as  regards  customs  and  the  trade  in  arms  and 
explosives  should  not  be  in  the  hands  of  an  interna- 
tional authority,  but  in  the  hands  of  France  and 
Morocco  in  the  former  region  and  Spain  and  Morocco 
in  the  latter. 

Thus  France  and  Spain  acquired  a  right  to  not  more 
than  sixty  inspectors  of  police  under  the  command  of 
a  Swiss;  to  a  majority  of  three  to  one  (counting  Eng- 
land as  on  their  side)  among  the  Censors,  whose 
powers,  however,  seem  to  have  depended  upon 
unanimity,  and  to  exclusive  co-operation  with  the 
Moors  in  carrying  out  certain  provisions  of  the  Act 
on  the  borders  of  their  own  territories. 

The  last  Article  (No.  CXXIII)  of  the  Act  is  as 
follows : 

"All  existing  Treaties,  Conventions,  and  Arrange- 


MOROCCO  153 

ments  between  the  Signatory  Powers  and  Morocco  re- 
main in  force.  It  is,  however,  agreed  that,  in  case 
their  provisions  be  found  to  conflict  with  those  of  the 
present  General  Act,  the  stipulations  of  the  latter 
shall  prevail." 

It  is  clear  that  the  Act  gave  to  every  signatory 
Power  the  legal  right  to  give  or  withhold  its  consent 
before  any  action  was  taken  which  contravened  the 
Act.  This  gave  Germany  its  locus  standi  in  subse- 
quent disputes.  The  formal  correctness  of  Germany's 
position  in  the  following  years  is  thus  indisputable, 
whatever  we  may  think  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
Kaiser  chose  to  press  his  claims. 

If  the  Moors  had  been  capable  of  preser\dng  order, 
the  Act  of  Algeciras  might  have  proved  an  insuperable 
barrier  to  French  ambitions.  It  may  be  that,  as  Pro- 
fessor Murray  maintains,  order  could  not  have  been 
preserved  by  the  Moorish  authorities  even  if  no  Euro- 
pean had  been  at  hand  to  profit  by  disturbances. 
However  that  may  be,  it  is  clear  that  the  usual  methods 
of  proving  the  incompetence  of  a  semi-civilised  Gov- 
ernment were  adopted.  As  Professor  Murray  ob- 
serves: "French  intrigues,  German  intrigues,  Span- 
ish intrigues,  intrigues  of  financiers  and  speculators 
free  from  any  particular  national  bias:  All  these 
causes  are  freely  alleged  to  have  been  in  operation, 
and  it  would  need  a  bold  man  to  meet  such  charges 
with  a  denial." 

In  any  case  France  (and  to  a  less  degree  Spain) 
profited  by  every  failure  of  the  Moors,  and  occupied 
one  portion  after  another  of  Moroccan  territory.  In 
February,  1909,  in  a  Franco-German  declaration,  the 


154       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

Germans  acknowledged  that  France  had  special  inter- 
ests in  Morocco,  while  the  French  promised  not  to 
obstruct  German  economic  interests  in  that  country, 
and  declared,  as  usual,  their  firm  attachment  to  its 
independence  and  integrity.  But  this  declaration 
proved  only  a  halting-place,  not  a  definite  solution. 

In  April,  1911,  owing  to  the  supposed  danger  to 
Europeans  in  Fez  from  neighbouring  tribes  in  revolt, 
the  French  sent  an  expedition  which  occupied  the 
town,  and  was  followed  by  a  larger  force  which  suc- 
ceeded in  putting  down  the  rebellion.  Frenchmen 
who  were  opposed  to  a  forward  policy  in  Morocco 
maintained,  with  much  force  or  argument,  that  there 
never  was  any  danger  to  Europeans  in  Fez.  Those 
of  us  who  remember  the  terrible  accounts  of  (wholly 
imaginary)  dangers  to  women  and  children  in  Johan- 
nesburg before  the  Jameson  Eaid  will  be  slow  to 
decide  that  the  danger  in  Fez  must  have  been  real. 
I  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  truth,  and  Pro- 
fessor Murray  also  has  apparently  been  unable  to  find 
evidence  of  danger,  for  he  says : 

"The  Radical  opposition  in  France  maintain, 
rightly  and  wrongly,  that  the  Europeans  in  Fez  were 
in  no  real  danger  and  that  the  expedition  was  unneces- 
sary ;  but  that  difficult  question  does  not  come  within 
our  present  purview." 

We  may  gather  from  this  admission  that,  whether 
there  was  danger  or  not,  our  Foreign  Office,  at  least, 
possesses  no  evidence  of  its  existence.  When  the 
French  expedition  started,  the  French  Government 
announced  that  it  would  withdraw  after  succouring 
the    Europeans,     But   the   pressure   of   the   French 


MOROCCO  155 

Colonial  Party  proved  too  strong,  and  the  troops 
remained  in  occupation  of  the  capital.  The  Germans, 
from  the  first,  adopted  an  attitude  which  was  per- 
fectly within  their  rights.  They  raised  no  objection 
to  the  relief  of  Fez,  but  they  pointed  out  that,  if  the 
occupation  continued,  it  could  no  longer  be  maintained 
that  Morocco  was  still  independent.  In  these  circum- 
stances, since  the  Act  of  Algeciras  was  to  be  modified, 
the  Germans  demanded  compensation  for  their  con- 
sent. France  was  obtaining  an  advantage  which  had 
been  refused  by  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and,  since  the 
old  German  policy  of  upholding  Moroccan  independ- 
ence had  become  impossible,  Germany  was  willing  to 
part  with  its  rights  in  Morocco  for  a  price.  This  is 
exactly  the  attitude  which  would  be  adopted  in  private 
life  by  a  business  man  in  a  similar  situation.  It  is 
not  a  noble  attitude,  not  an  attitude  compatible  with 
a  keen  desire  for  international  amity ;  but  it  is  an 
attitude  involving  only  that  degree  of  national  self- 
seeking  which  is,  unfortunately,  taken  for  granted 
in  the  foreign  policy  of  all  Great  Powers.  It  is  no 
better,  but  also  no  worse,  than  the  policy  of  other 
countries  in  similar  circumstances. 

Professor  Murray's  comment  on  Germany's  action 
is  as  follows: 

"If  there  was  plunder  going  she  insisted  that  she 
should  have  her  share.  Such  a  claim  was  not  particu- 
larly creditable  nor  strictly  just.  But,  in  the  atmos- 
phere of  colonial  policy,  it  was  intelligible." 

With  this  account,  in  the  main,  I  have  no  fault  to 
find.  I  agree  with  the  statement  that  the  German 
claim  was  "not  particularly  creditable."     It  would 


156       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

have  been  far  more  creditable  to  say:  ''France,  per- 
haps unavoidably,  has  broken  the  Act  of  Algeciras, 
and,  if  I  stood  on  the  letter  of  my  rights,  I  might 
demand  compensation.  But  goodwill  between  the 
iiations  is  more  important  than  the  acquisition  of 
colonies  by  Germany,  and  I  will  waive  my  rights  in 
order  to  show  that  I  wish  to  live  at  peace  with  all 
the  world. ' '  This  is  what  an  enlightened  and  humane 
Government  would  have  said,  and  this  is  not  what  the 
German  Government  said.  But  the  English  and 
French  Governments,  equally,  were  not  inspired  by 
enlightened  and  human  ideas;  if  they  had  been,  the 
crisis  would  never  have  arisen. 

To  say  that  the  German  Government's  demand  was 
"not  strictly  just,"  seems  to  me  to  be  going  too  far. 
Justice  was  the  one  merit  which  it  might  claim. 
France,  rightly  or  wrongly,  was  acting  contrary  to 
the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and  Germany  had  a  clear  legal 
right  to  expect  payment  for  acquiescence.  Germany 's 
formal  case,  as  in  1905,  was  good.  As  in  that  case, 
what  was  wrong  with  Germany  was  brutality  in 
method  and  indifference  to  international  good  will. 

France,  with  the  support  of  England,  showed  an 
equal  indifference  to  international  good  will,  and 
England  showed  an  almost  equal  brutality  of  method. 
Moreover,  the  French  case  was  technically  bad, 
whereas  the  German  case  was  technically  good.  In 
view  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  the  French  ought,  from 
the  first,  to  have  professed  a  willingness  to  seek  the 
consent  of  the  Powers  before  effecting  any  alteration 
in  the  status  of  Morocco.  Assuming  that  the  expedi- 
tion to  Fez  was  justified  by  danger  to  Europeans,  the 


MOROCCO  157 

French  ought,  at  the  moment  of  dispatching  it,  to 
have  declared  that,  since  the  independence  of  Morocco 
had  become  impossible,  they  were  willing  to  submit 
the  decision  as  to  its  future  to  a  new  conference.  Both 
legally,  and  from  the  broad  point  of  view  of  human- 
ity and  friendship  between  States,  this  is  what  France 
ought  to  have  done,  and  what  we  ought  to  have  ad- 
vised France  to  do. 

This,  however,  is  not  what  France  did,  or  what  we, 
apparently,  wished  France  to  do.  France,  says 
Professor  Murray,  "saw  no  good  reason  why  she 
should  make  sacrifices.  The  demands  for  compen- 
sation, whatever  they  were,  were  not  accepted;  the 
French  Government  showed  unwillingness  to  come  to 
a  private  understanding  with  Germany."  France 
"saw  no  good  reason!"  The  good  reason  was,  first, 
that  Germany's  demand  was  legally  justifiable;  sec- 
ondly, that  to  refuse  it  obviously  involved  risk  of  a 
European  war,  with  all  its  devastation,  for  the  sake 
of  an  essentially  petty  question  of  territory  in  equa- 
torial Africa.*  Thirdly,  that  by  not  giving  way  at 
once  it  would  be  made  apparent  to  Germany  that  bare 
justice  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  Triple  Entente 
except  by  force  or  the  threat  of  force ;  fourthly,  that 
the  French  action  accentuated  the  division  of  Europe 
into  two  camps,  and  was  ideally  calculated  to  increase 
the  growing  militarism  and  aggressiveness  of  the  Ger- 
mans. All  this  Professor  Murray  passes  by  in  silence ; 
all  this,  which  subsequent  history  has  bitterly  eon- 
firmed,  he  regards  as  too  unimportant  to  mention. 

•Territory  in  Morocco  was  never  in  question.     See  below. 


158        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

In  the  Agadir  crisis**  the  methods  and  purposes 
of  England  and  Germany  were  exactly  similar ;  the 
despatch  of  the  Panther  was  provocative  and  brutal, 
and  so  was  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  Mansion  House  speech. 
The  chief  difference  is  that,  in  1911,  we  were  willing 
to  fight  and  the  Germans  were  not.  The  main  facts 
are  not  in  dispute,  and  are  quite  enough  to  establish 
the  reckless  folly  of  our  policy  at  that  time. 

After  France  had  shown  unwillingness  to  come  to  a 
private  understanding  with  Germany  on  the  question 
of  compensation  elsewhere  for  the  recognition  of  the 
French  protectorate  in  Morocco,  the  German  Govern- 
ment sent  a  gunboat,  the  Panther,  followed  by  a 
cruiser,  the  Berlin,  to  the  harbour  of  Agadir  on  the 
south  coast  of  Morocco.  (July  1,  1911).  This  action 
was  provocative  and  tactless;  the  only  thing  to  be 
said  in  extenuation  is  that  it  was  only  taken  after 
the  French  had  shown  themselves  unwilling  to  yield 
to  the  claims  of  mere  justice.  It  was  intended  to 
show  that  Germany  was  in  earnest,  and  to  produce 
a  more  yielding  spirit  on  the  part  of  France  in  the 
matter  of  compensation.  What  troubled  our  Foreign 
Office,  however,*  was  not  the  fear  of  war  between 
France  and  Germany,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  fear 
that  they  might  reach  an  agreement  which  would  be 

••Professor  Murray  has  performed  a  service  to  the  critics  of 
diplomacy  and  its  methods  by  his  account  of  the  Agadir  crisis. 
Most  Englishmen  who  have  not  made  a  study  of  foreign  policy 
find  it  difficult  to  believe  that  our  Government  can  have  done 
things  which  in  fact  it  did  do.  The  evidence  is  mostly  contained 
In  old  newspapers,  Land  Blue  Books,  and  is  therefore  somewhat 
inaccessible.  But  Professor  Murray's  statement  of  the  facts  is 
quite  sufficient  to  establish  the  case  against  our  Foreign  Office, 
and  includes  everything  that  is  stated  without  special  authority 
in  what  follows.  While  intending  to  praise  England  and  decry 
Germany,  he  involuntarily  makes  it  plain  that  the  facts  totally 
fail  to  establish  his  client's  innocence. 


MOROCCO  159 

prejudicial  to  our  interests.  We  feared,  or  professed 
to  fear,  that  the  Germans  might  acquire  a  naval  base 
on  the  Atlantic,  and  that  our  trade  interests  might 
be  injuriously  affected.  Neither  France  nor  Germany 
in  the  period  from  July  1  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George 's  Man- 
sion House  Speech  (July  21),  kept  us  adequately  in- 
formed of  the  course  of  the  negotations,  although  Sir 
E.  Grey,  on  July  4,  informed  the  German  Ambassador 
that  we  could  not  be  disinterested  in  the  matter  of 
Morocco.  We  were  afraid  that  the  bargain  was  going 
to  be  conducted  without  our  participation,  and  this, 
it  was  felt,  could  not  be  borne. 

Several  reasons  have  been  given  why  we  had  to 
intervene.*    Let  us  examine  them. 

(1)  "We  had  our  own  definite  interests  in 
Morocco ;  our  Moroccan  trade,  and  the  strategical  im- 
portance of  the  north  coast. ' ' 

As  regards  our  strategical  interests,  it  is  enough 
to  point  out  that  Germany  made  it  clear  from  the 
first  that  what  was  sought  as  compensation  was  not 
a  portion  of  Morocco,  **  but  a  portion  (or,  some  said, 
the  whole)  of  the  French  Congo,  where  our  strategical 
interests  were  too  minute  to  deserve  serious  considera- 
tion.    And  so  far  as  trade  is  concerned,  our  interest 

•The  reasons  examined  are  those  given  by  Professor  Murray. 
They  are  the  same  as  those  given  by  other  apologists.  The 
quotations  are  from  him. 

••M.  de  Selves  (the  French  Foreign  Minister),  stated  in  the 
Debate  of  Dec.  14,  1911,  that,  in  reply  to  the  French  cla.im  to 
Morocco,  Germany  replied :  "Right,  we  accept.  Talte  Morocco, 
establish  your  Protectorate  there.  But  since  you  have  made 
a  treaty  with  England  in  this  matter,  since  you  have  made  a 
treaty  with  Italy,  since  you  have  made  a  treaty  with  Spain,  on 
what  basis  will  you  treat  with  us?  Our  public  opinion  does  not 
permit  that  we  should  not  obtain  elsewhere  some  compensation 
for  our  abandonment  in  your  favour  and  the  promise  which  we 
shall  give  you  that  our  diplomacy  will  assist  in  getting  the 
Powers  to  ratify  the  arrangement  we  arrive  at."  (Quoted  by 
Morel,  p.   177). 


160       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

is  exactly  the  same  as  Germany 's  in  any  territory  con- 
trolled by  Prance,  namely,  the  preservation  of  the 
Open"  Door.  "We  had  secured  this  for  thirty  years  in 
1904,  the  Germans  secured  it  permanently  in  1911.  It 
should  have  been  obvious  to  our  diplomatists  that  any 
change  demanded  by  the  Germans  as  regards  trade 
must  be  to  our  advantage.  This  first  reason  thus  falls 
to  the  ground. 

(2)  It  is  argued  that  we  had  to  guard  against  two 
opposite  dangers :  Germany  might  force  war  on 
France,  or  might  make  friends  with  France  and  de- 
tach her  from  Great  Britain.  The  first  of  these  alter- 
natives seems  to  have  troubled  us  very  little;  for  if 
France  felt  a  wish  for  our  help,  France  could  appeal 
for  it,  and  make  us  a  party  to  the  negotiations.  What 
troubled  us  was,  that  we  were  not  a  party  to  the 
negotiations;  and  in  this  France  need  not  have  con- 
curred except  by  her  own  choice.  It  is  perfectly  clear 
throughout  the  crisis  that  what  we  feared  was  not 
a  rupture,  but  an  agreement  prejudicial  to  our  inter- 
ests, and  it  seems  that  ''The  Times,"  at  least,  would 
have  regarded  as  prejudicial  to  our  interests  any 
agreement  which  produced  genuinely  friendly  rela- 
tions between  France  and  Germany.*  This  is  also 
the  view  of  Professor  Murray.    He  says : 

' '  Germany  might  try  the  policy  of  detaching  France 
from  Great  Britain.  We  had  ourselves  had  the  ex- 
perience of  her  attempt  to  detach  us  from  France. 
(See  below,  pp  115ff.)  She  might  now  be  trying  to 
persuade  France  privately  to  promise  neutrality  in 
Germany's  next  war,   as  she  tried  in  the  previous 

•See  "Times"  of  July  20,  despatch  from  Paris. 


MOROCCO  161 

year  to  persuade  us.  There  was  naturally  a  party  in 
Prance  which  was  somewhat  shy  of  commitments  to 
Great  Britain,  and  might  be  glad  to  obtain  temporary 
security  at  the  price  of  dissolving  the  Entente.  This 
danger  would  become  greater  if  Great  Britain  took  no 
step  to  show  that  she  would  stand  by  France  in  the 
present  difficulty.  So  from  this  point  of  view,  also, 
we  are  bound  to  show  our  interest  in  France. ' ' 

This  paragraph  is  truly  astonishing.  On  referring 
to  p.  115,  to  see  what  Macchiavellian  plot  Germany 
had  attempted  to  entice  us  into,  we  find  the  follow- 
ing, in  the  account  of  the  Anglo-German  negotiations 
of  1909:  "The  Chancellor's  general  proposal  of  co- 
operation centred  in  an  engagement  that,  in  the  event 
of  either  Power  being  attacked  by  a  third 
Power  or  group  of  Powders,  the  Power  attacked 
should  remain  neutral."  That  is  to  say,  the 
dark  design  of  Germany,  which  put  us  on  our  guard 
during  the  Agadir  crisis,  was  a  design  to  induce  us 
to  promise  not  to  take  part  in  an  aggressive  war 
against  Germany.  We  refused,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor Murray,  to  give  any  such  undertaking.  And 
if  we  had  given  it,  he  says :  ' '  The  confidence  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  would  have  been  sapped." 

Of  course,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  we  had  no  aggres- 
sive intentions.  At  the  same  time,  Germany  knew 
that  we  had  been  willing  to  fight  in  1905,  when 
France  had  a  bad  case  and  gave  way;  Germany  was 
to  find  us  still  willing  to  fight  in  1911,  when  France 
still  had  a  bad  case.  Is  it  surprising  if  Germany, 
remembering  that  we  had  lately  refused  to  promise 
neutrality  if  Germany  were  attacked,  seeing  that  we 


162       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

were  obviously  afraid  of  friendly  relations  between 
France  and  Germany,  and  not  afraid  to  threaten  war, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  we  desired  a  trial  of 
strength  between  Germany  and  the  Entente?  As 
regards  the  immense  majority  of  Englishmen,  this 
was  the  absolute  opposite  of  the  truth.  But  the  For- 
eign Office  and  "The  Times"  had  so  conducted  our 
affairs  that  the  Germans  could  not  well  come  to  any 
other  conclusion.  And  it  is  only  just  to  remember 
this  fact  when  we  condemn  them— as  we  are  right  in 
doing — for  their  bellicose  attitude  in  the  summer  of 
1914.* 

"There  was  naturally,"  we  are  told,  "a  party  in 
France  which  is  somewhat  shy  of  commitments  to 
Great  Britain."  There  was  indeed  such  a  party, 
just  as  there  was  in  England — a  party  which  con- 
tained almost  all  the  Radical  and  Labour  elements, 
and  all  who  regarded  the  preservation  of  peace  as  the 
most  important  aim  of  foreign  policy.  The  party  in 
France  which  desired  commitments  to  Great  Britain, 
like  the  party  in  Great  Britain  which  desired  commit- 
ments to  France,  consisted  of  the  militarists,  imperial- 
ists, and  reactionaries.  In  France,  as  in  England, 
it  was  this  party  which  controlled  the  acts  of  the 
Government,  while  the  Radical  party  as  a  rule  con- 
trolled its  speeches.  While  the  militarists  saw  with 
rejoicing  the  tendency  of  the  acts  of  the  two  Govern- 

•It  is  in  the  light  of  Professor  Murray's  references  to  p.  115 
of  his  pamphlet  that  we  must  interpret  his  statement  that 
Germany  "might  now  (in  July,  1911),  be  trying  to  persuade 
France  privately  to  promise  neutrality  in  Germany's  next  war, 
as  she  tried  in  the  previous  year  to  persuade  us"  (my  italics). 
That  is  to  say,  Germany  might  be  trying  to  persuade  France 
to  promise  neutrality  if  Germany  were  attacked.  It  is  this 
danger,  apparently,  which  Professor  Murray  regards  as  Justifying 
our  provocative  attitude  in  the  Agadir  crisis. 


MOROCCO  163 

ments,  the  Radicals  in  both  countries,  unsuspicious, 
anxious  for  promised  reforms  at  home,  and  mostly 
unversed  in  the  details  of  diplomacy,  were  placated 
by  soft  words,  and  by  assurances,  misleading  even  if 
verbally  accurate,  that  no  obligation  of  support  in 
war  existed  on  either  side. 

And  so,  in  spite  of  the  legal  rectitude  of  Germany's 
claim,  we  stood  by  France,  according  to  the  Foreign 
Office  apologist,  in  the  hope  of  securing  French  sup- 
port on  some  future  occasion  Avhen  we  might  be  ad- 
vancing some  equally  unjust  claim.  Truly  an  aston- 
ishing defence ! 

(3)  Finally  we  come  to  the  supreme  reason  for 
our  intervention:  the  fetich  of  "prestige."  What  we 
are  told  is  this : 

"Hardly  less  imperative  was  the  mere  matter  of 
prestige.  We  had  been  for  many  years  the  chief 
commercial  Power  in  Morocco ;  we  had  vital  interests 
in  the  north  coast.  We  had  taken  a  leading  part  in 
the  various  treaties.  We  could  hardly  submit  to  the 
indignity  of  being  suddenly  treated  as  non-existent, 
while  Germany  settled  with  France,  in  a  manner 
which  she  refused  to  explain  to  us,  the  future  of 
Morocco." 

I  am  glad  Professor  Murray  has  written  this  para- 
graph. If  I  had  written  it,  it  would  have  been  con- 
sidered a  gross  libel  upon  those  who  direct  our  policy. 
and  it  would  have  caused  my  printer  and  publisher 
to  be  sent  to  prison  under  the  Defence  of  the  Realm 
Act.  But  as  Professor  Murray  has  written  it,  we 
have  it  on  unimpeachable  authority  that  our  prestige 
in  the  matter  of  Morocco  was  considered  one  of  the 


164       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

grave  and  weighty  reasons  on  account  of  which  our 
Government  told  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  speak  as  he 
did  at  the  Mansion  House,  and  behaved  throughout 
the  crisis  in  a  way  that  must  embitter  our  relations 
with  Germany,  and  must  have  led  to  war  if  France 
and  Germany  had  not  both  been  more  reasonable 
than  England. 

There  is  a  homely  proverb  that  "sauce  for  the 
goose  is  sauce  for  the  gander."  It  appears  that 
Professor  Murray  does  not  believe  this  proverb,  for, 
when  discussing  M.  Delcasse's  failure  to  notify  the 
treaty  of  1904  to  the  German  Government,  he  says 
that  M.  Delcasse 

"Objected  strongly  to  the  idea  that  France  must 
submit  her  important  acts  of  foreign  policy  to  Ger- 
many for  approval,  except  in  matters  where  Germany 
was  directly  concerned.  Here  he  was  doubtless  right : 
the  claim  which  Germany  afterwards  made,  that  no 
treaty  should  be  made  in  any  part  of  the  world  with- 
out the  approval  of  Germany,  was  not  one  which  a 
self-respecting  nation  could  admit." 

Yet  this  claim,  which  "no  self-respecting  nation 
could  admit,"  was  precisely  analogous  to  the  claim 
of  prestige  which  we  advanced  in  1911,  when  we  de- 
cided that  "we  could  hardly  submit  to  the  dignity 
of  being  suddenly  treated  as  non-existent."  True, 
he  had  treaty  obligations  towards  the  French  in 
Morocco,  but  what  were  they?  To  leave  the  French 
a  free  hand,  and  to  give  them  diplomatic  support 
when  they  wanted  it.  Our  intervention  in  1911 
amounted  to  refusing  them  a  free  hand,  and  inter- 
vening on  the  side  of  one  party  in  their  political  dis- 


MOKOCCO  165 

putes.  This  was  not  demanded  of  us  by  the  treaty 
of  1904,  and  if  it  had  been,  the  French  would  never 
have  consented  to  conclude  such  a  treaty.  Our  claim 
of  prestige  had  nothing  to  do  with  treaty  obligations ; 
it  was  a  claim  of  national  pride,  exactly  analogous 
to  the  German  claim  which  we  are  all  agreed  in  re- 
garding as  preposterous. 

What  was  this  ''prestige"  which  we  felt  to  be  en- 
dangered by  the  negotiations  between  France  and 
Germany?  Apart  from  prestige,  our  trade  inter- 
ests and  our  strategical  interests  were  not  endangered, 
since  Germany  claimed  no  territory  in  Morocco,  and 
desired  the  Open  Door,  which  was  w^iat  our  trade 
required.  One  vital  interest  we  had,  if  our  policy 
was  to  continue  on  the  lines  pursued  since  1904:  it 
was  essential  to  our  policy  that  France  and  Germany 
should  remain  on  bad  terms  with  each  other.  This 
purpose,  which  we  could  not  avow,  was  achieved  by 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Mansion  House  speech;  but  this 
was  not  a  matter  of  mere  prestige.  Prestige  is  no- 
thing but  standing  on  one's  dignity — that  foolish 
kind  of  "dignity"  which  is  affected  by  people  who 
feel  their  position  insecure  and  are  always  looking 
out  for  insults.  Mr.  A.,  hearing  that  his  friend  Mr.  B.  is 
giving  a  dinner  party  to  which  he  has  invited  his 
rival  Mr.  C,  sends  word  to  Mr.  C.  that  unless  Mr. 
B.  is  induced  to  in\'ite  him  also,  Mr.  C.  shall  be 
starved,  his  outlying  fields  devastated,  and  anyone 
who  attempts  to  defend  them  killed.  Mr.  C.  replies 
that  Mr.  B.  has  a  right  to  invite  or  not  invite  any- 
one he  pleases,  but  if  he  yields  to  Mr.  A.'s  pressure, 
his  house  shall  be  burned  down,  his  labourers  put  to 


166       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

death,  and  himself  reduced  to  beggary.  Mr,  A.  re- 
torts that  Mr.  C.  is  a  brute;  Mr.  C.  rejoins  that  Mr. 
A.  is  an  insolent  busybody.  Meanwhile  Mr.  B.,  with 
infinite  trouble,  smooths  the  ruffled  dignity  of  his 
angry  neighbours,  who  have  made  him  the  pawn  in 
their  rivalry.  Strange  to  say,  he  is  expected  to  feel 
gratitude  to  Mr.  A.  for  the  dangers  to  which  Mr. 
A.  has  exposed  him.  This  is  the  Agadir  crisis  in  a 
parable — except  that  Germany's  attitude  was  more 
reasonable  than  that  of  Mr.  C. 

It  is  not  plain  to  every  man  possessed  of  either 
humanity  or  common  sense  that  this  whole  game  of 
prestige  is  childish  and  brutal?  The  only  true  in- 
terest of  England,  the  only  true  interest  of  mankind, 
in  the  Agadir  dispute,  was  that  it  should  be  set- 
tled in  the  manner  least  likely  to  lead  to  war  or  to 
leave  a  legacy  of  international  ill-will.  The  Germans 
chose  to  press  their  rights  to  the  utmost.  In  doing 
so,  they  were  acting  the  part  of  the  insecure  parvenu 
saying:  "I  am  a  Great  Power  too;  don't  you  for- 
get it!"  But  the  conduct  of  England,  instead  of 
being  such  as  to  allay  this  mood,  was  such  as  to  in- 
flame it.  England's  position  as  a  Great  Power,  one 
would  have  thought,  was  suflBciently  secure  to  be  able 
to  endure  an  outward  yielding  to  the  claims  of  a 
Power  whose  dignity  is  more  recent  and  more  un- 
easy. "We  ought  to  have  met  Germany's  desire  for 
school-boy  triumphs  with  the  tolerant  smile  of  an 
elder  brother.  Instead  of  doing  so,  we  refused  to 
acknowledge  the  badness  of  our  case,  and  reduced  our 
manners  to  the  German  level  by  putting  up  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  to  administer  a  scolding. 


MOROCCO  167 

We  had  desired  from  the  first  to  be  a  party  to  the 
Franco-German  negotiations,  and  on  July  4,  Sir  E. 
Grey  informed  the  German  Ambassador  that  we  could 
not  recognise  any  arrangements  that  might  be  come  to 
without  us.  As  nothing  came  of  this,  Sir  E,  Grey 
made  a  more  emphatic  statement  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador on  July  21,  and  on  the  very  same  evening 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  spoke  at  the  Mansion  House.  After 
the  usual  praise  of  peace,  he  proceeded  as  follows : 

"But  I  am  also  bound  to  say  this — that  I  believe 
it  is  essential  in  the  highest  interests,  not  merely  of 
this  country  but  of  the  world,  that  Britain  should 
at  all  hazards  maintain  her  place  and  her  prestige 
amongst  the  Great  Powers  of  the  world.  Her  potent 
influence  has  many  a  time  been  in  the  past,  and  may 
yet  be  in  the  future,  invaluable  to  the  cause  of  hu- 
man liberty.  It  has  more  than  once  in  the  past 
redeemed  Continental  nations,  who  are  sometimes 
too  apt  to  forget  that  service,  from  overwhelming 
disaster  and  even  from  international  extinction.  I 
would  make  great  sacrifices  to  preserve  peace.  I 
conceive  that  nothing  would  justify  a  disturbance 
of  international  good  will  except  questions  of  the 
gravest  national  moment.  But  if  a  situation  were  to 
be  forced  upon  us  in  which  peace  could  only  be  pre- 
served by  the  surrender  of  the  great  and  beneficent 
position  Great  Britain  has  won  by  centuries  of  hero- 
ism and  achievement,  by  allowing  Britain  to  be 
treated  where  her  interests  were  vitally  affected  as 
if  she  were  of  no  account  in  the  Cabinet  of  Nations, 
then  I  say  emphatically  that  peace  at  that  price 
would    be    a    humiliation    intolerable    for    a    great 


168       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

country  like  ours  to  endure." 

The  meaning  of  this  speech  could  not  be  doubt- 
ful. It  was  a  public  threat  to  Germany,  a  clear  inti- 
mation that  we  were  prepared  to  go  to  war  in  defence 
of  our  interests  in  the  Moroccan  question.  "What 
those  interests  were,  we  have  seen:  Treaty  obliga- 
tions towards  France,  which  were  not  in  question  and 
were  not  invoked  by  the  French;  prestige,  which  no 
rational  man  can  regard  as  anything  but  folly;  and 
lastly,  as  the  unavowed  motive  of  the  whole  policy, 
a  fear  of  good  relations  between  France  and  Ger- 
many, lest  France  should  fail  us  when  the  day  came 
for  a  trial  of  strength  between  us  and  the  Germans. 
That  the  German  Government  looked  forward  to 
such  a  day,  I  am  not  prepared  to  deny.  But  a  plain 
narrative  of  events  makes  it  evident  that  we  were, 
at  that  time,  even  more  willing  to  hasten  the  day 
than  the  Germans  were.  The  clash  between  the 
Entente  and  the  Central  Empires  was  brought  about 
by  a  series  of  steps,  some  great  and  some  small.  Some 
of  these  steps  were  taken  by  one  side,  some  by  the 
other.  One  of  the  longest  steps  towards  war  was 
taken  by  the  British  Government's  action  during  the 
Agadir  crisis,  culminating  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
diatribe  at  the  Mansion  House.  For  this  reason, 
among  others,  the  British  Government  cannot  escape 
its  share  of  responsibility  for  the  final  catastrophe. 

For  a  few  days  after  the  21st,  relations  between 
England  and  Germany  were  strained  almost  to  break- 
ing point.  But  the  forces  in  Germany  on  the  side 
of  peace — apparently  supported,  at  that  time,  by  the 
Kaiser — exerted  all  their  strength,  and  an  agreement 


MOROCCO  169 

was  arrived  at.  We  became  a  party  to  the  negoti- 
ations, the  German  claims  were  found  not  to  conflict 
with  our  interests,  and  on  November  4,  Conventions 
were  concluded  between  France  and  Germany  recog- 
nising the  French  protectorate  in  Morocco  in  return 
for  a  cession  of  territory  in  the  French  Congo.  So 
far  as  diplomacy  was  concerned,  these  Conventions 
constituted  the  final  solution  of  the  Moroccan  question. 
The  solution  itself  was  not  objectionable,  and  was 
such  as  might  have  been  reached  without  difficulty  by 
sensible  men  genuinely  desirous  of  coming  to  an  agree- 
ment. 

But  although  the  diplomatic  question  was  settled, 
the  bad  effects  on  public  opinion  remained.  The  Eng- 
lish, who  believed  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  be  a  genuine 
lover  of  peace,  were  persuaded  that  he  must  have 
had  grave  secret  reasons  for  his  outburst ;  the  Pa7ither 
at  Agadir  reminded  them  of  the  Kaiser's  speech  at 
Tangier  in  1905,  and  they  became  convinced  that 
German  policy  was  wantonly  aggressive,  always 
troubling  the  international  situation,  always  ready  to 
plunge  the  world  into  war;  misled  by  "The  Times," 
the  English  people  remained  ignorant  of  the  German 
case,  and  unaware  that  they  and  the  French  had  been 
the  real  aggressors.  The  French,  finding  that  the 
English  Government  was  ready  to  stand  by  them  in 
a  war  with  Germany,  became  far  more  bellicose  than 
they  had  been;  the  revanche  began  to  seem  a  possi- 
bility, men  who  had  been  pacifists  became  jingoes,  the 
Three  Years'  Service  Law  was  introduced,  and  the 
whole  tone  of  French  politics  was  changed.  As  for 
the  effect  on  Germany,  it  has  been  related  with  start- 


170       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

ling  candour  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.*  The  Ger- 
mans— unreasonably,  as  it  seems  to  us,  regarded  the 
agreement  which  was  reached  as  a  humiliation,  and 
decided  that  they  would  not  again  be  compelled  to 
submit  to  threats.  The  Kaiser — so  it  is  stated — be- 
came convinced  that  war  was  inevitable  before  long, 
and  joined  the  war-party  which  he  had  previously 
held  in  check.  Preparations  of  every  kind  were  pushed 
forward,  and  in  1914,  the  reasons,  whatever  they  were, 
which  made  Germany  fear  war  in  1911,  no  longer 
existed.  There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  Ger- 
many's unyielding  stiffness  in  1914  was  largely  due 
to  humiliation  at  having  yielded  to  our  threats  at 
the  time  of  the  Agadir  crisis,  just  as  Russia's  un- 
compromising attitude  was  caused  by  memory  of  hu- 
miliation in  1908  in  the  matter  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. Both  Germany  and  Russia  had  suffered  one 
humiliation,  and  each  felt  that  another  would  ruin 
its  prestige.  Each  stood  firm ;  and  the  war  is  the  price 
which  all  the  nations  have  to  pay  for  the  past  triumphs 
of  their  diplomatists. 

•See  especially  Chapter  I,  No.  5. 


III.   THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE 

On  August  31,  1907,  an  Agreement  v/as  concluded 
between  England  and  Russia,  by  which  their  outstand- 
ing differences  were  settled.  In  Tibet,  both 
parties  agreed  to  seek  no  advantages,  either  in 
the  way  of  territory  or  of  economic  concessions.  In 
Afghanistan,  Russia  recognized  British  suzerainty. 
In  Persia,  a  Russian  sphere  in  the  north  and  a  British 
sphere  in  the  south  were  marked  out,  with  a  neutral 
zone  between :  each  party  recognized  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  Persia,  but  nevertheless  each  recog- 
nized the  other's  special  rights  in  their  respective 
spheres.  The  Russian  sphere  included  the  capital, 
Teheran,  and  stretched  as  far  south  as  Ispahan.  The 
English  sphere  included  about  half  of  what  remained : 
it  gave  us  control  of  the  Gulf,  of  the  Baluchistan 
frontier,  and  of  the  oil  wells  which  have  since  been 
used  to  supply  fuel  to  our  battleships. 

In  the  rather  complicated  negotiations  which  pre- 
ceded the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement,  both  England 
and  Russia  showed  considerable  skill :  incidentally,  we 
could  not  but  help  the  Russian  Government  in  sup- 
pressing the  Duma,  in  reconquering  Poland,  and  in 
depriving  the  Finns  of  the  liberties  which  the  Tsar 
had  sworn  to  defend.  On  both  sides,  it  was  seen  that, 
owing  to  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  an  understand- 
ing between  England  and  Russia  was  necessary  in 
order  to  complete  the  Anglo-French  Entente.  But 
certain  difficulties  stood  in  the  way :  on  the  one  hand, 


172       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

our  alliance  with  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  the  strong 
tendency  of  Russian  policy  to  an  understanding  with 
Germany. 

The  original  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  1902  bound 
England  and  Japan  to  come  to  each  other's  assist- 
ance in  case  either  was  attacked  by  two  or  more 
Powers.  This  treaty  made  it  clear  that  it  would  not 
be  to  the  interest  of  Russia  to  invoke  the  aid  of  France 
in  the  Japanese  war  of  1904-5,  since  the  aid  of  France 
would  entail  the  enmity  of  England.  England  and 
France  were  thus  able  to  maintain  the  friendliness 
resulting  from  the  recent  Entente,  but  England  and 
Russia  were  on  very  bad  terms  throughout  the  time 
of  the  Manchurian  Campaign.  Public  opinion  in 
England  would  have  welcomed  war  with  Russia  in 
1904,  when  the  Russian  fleet  fired  upon  our  fishing 
boats  under  the  impression  that  they  were  Japanese 
Destroyers.  But  the  Cabinet,  notably  Mr.  Balfour, 
foreseeing  the  need  of  an  Entente  with  Russia,  calmed 
public  opinion  and  arrived  at  a  friendly  settlement  of 
the  dispute.  Nevertheless,  in  August,  1905,  at  almost 
the  same  moment  as  the  conclusion  of  peace  between 
Russia  and  Japan,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  was 
renewed  and  strengthened,  each  Power  now  binding 
itself  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  other  even  if 
only  one  Power  were  to  attack  it.  Although  this 
Treaty,  like  that  of  1902,  was  essentially  directed 
against  Russia,  it  facilitated  the  conclusion  of  our 
Entente  with  Russia,  since  it  destroyed  any  hope 
that  Russia  might  otherwise  have  had  of  renewing 
the  Far  Eastern  adventure  under  more  favourable 
circumstances.* 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE       173 

The  new  policy  is  very  clearly  expressed  in  a 
resolution  passed  by  the  Latin-Slav  League  in  Paris 
at  the  beginning  of  October,  1905.**  This  resolution 
is  as  follows : 

''As  the  war  of  Russia,  protector  of  the  Slavonic 
races,  against  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  is  defin- 
itely terminated,  the  political  situation  is  entirely 
changed.  German  expansion  constitutes  the  single 
danger  for  peace,  as  is  shown  by  the  Morocco  incident. 
The  Slavonic  races  are  continually  menaced  by  Ger- 
many and  her  Turkish  satellites.  The  League  has 
decided  to  protect  Slavonic  interests  by  the  propaga- 
tion of  an  Anglo-French-Russian  Alliance  to  stop  the 
extermination  of  the  Slavonic  races  and  put  an  end 
to  the  enslaving  of  white  races  in  Europe  during  the 
20th  century." 

Meanwhile  an  influential  party  in  Russia,  headed 
by  M.  Witte,  were  in  favour  of  an  Agreement  with 
Germany  rather  than  with  England.  This  project 
was  used,  both  by  the  Russians  and  by  the  English 
advocates  of  the  Entente  with  Russia,  to  make  Eng- 
land yield  claims  and  principles  which  otherwise 
might  have  formed  an  obstacle.  Imperialists  saw 
dangers  in  the  Russian  designs  on  Persia.  Radicals 
disliked  siding  with  the  bureaucracy  against  the  revo- 
lution which  broke  out  in  October,  1905.  The  Times 
St.  Petersburg  Government  Correspondent,  on  Octo- 
ber 2,  reports  that  the  Russian  Government  quite 
recognizes  the  desirability  of  coming  to  terms  with 
England,   but   is   very   much   averse    to   having   its 

•See  e.   g.   St.   Petersburg  Correspondent  in  The  Times,  Sep- 
tember 5,  7  and  8,  1905. 
**Times,  October  3,  1905. 


174       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

hand  forced,  and  considers  that  what  happens  in 
Persia  will  show  best  whether  England  is  anxious  to 
be  friends  or  not.  The  same  Correspondent,  mean- 
while, explains  that  the  Witte  school  means  to  play 
off  Germany  against  England  (September  25). 

"It  is  no  longer  a  secret,"  he  says  on  October  24*, 
"that  Germany  has  exerted  every  effort  to  defeat  the 
Anglo-Russian  Entente,  and  has  held  out  to  the  Rus- 
sian Government  the  most  alluring  inducements.  The 
precise  nature  of  Germany's  offers  has  not  yet  been 
divulged.  I  am  informed,  however,  that  the  proposals 
had  reference  to  joint  action  in  the  Baltic  and  in  the 
ultimate  apportionment  of  Austria-Hungary. ' ' 

The  German  scheme,  he  said,  found  a  ready  ad- 
vocate in  M.  Witte,  but  emphatic  opposition  from 
France.  The  Paris  Correspondent  of  The  Times,  on 
October  26,  at  the  height  of  the  Russian  Revolution, 
gives  details  of  Germany's  offers  to  Russia  on  the  oc- 
casion of  M.  Witte 's  visit  to  Berlin  reported  by  the 
("Petit  Parisien".)  Germany,  we  are  assured, 
offered  military  intervention  in  case  of  a  Polish  ris- 
ing, and  the  prospective  partition  of  Austria,  accord- 
ing to  which  Russia  was  to  have  Bohemia,  the  Polish 
provinces,  and  other  Slav  regions,  while  Germany 
took  the  German-speaking  regions  and  thus  secured 
a  route  to  the  Adriatic,  In  addition  the  Kaiser  is  said 
to  have  proposed  to  close  the  Baltic  and  to  guarantee 
the  Russian  and  German  ports  against  attack. 

It  is  not  credible  that  Germany  should  have  really 
offered  to  partition  so  firm  an  Ally  as  Austria-Hun- 
gary for  the  benefit  of  Russia,  which  could  never  be 

*  Times,  October  25 


THE  ANGLO-EUSSIAN  ENTENTE       175 

attached  to  the  German  interest  by  any  very  firm 
or  reliable  bond.  The  Eussian  motive  in  spreading 
such  reports  is  obvious:  fear  of  Germany  made  us 
more  willing  to  come  to  terms  with  Russia.  The  mo- 
tive of  The  Times  is  less  obvious ;  presumably  the  ob- 
ject was  to  weaken  the  public  opinion  at  home  which 
looked  with  suspicion  on  any  approach  to  alliance  with 
the  Russian  bureaucracy. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  Government's  need  of  sup- 
port, either  from  Germany  of  from  England  and 
France,  was  becoming  desperate.  The  disorders 
throughout  the  country  grew  worse  and  worse,  until 
on  October  31  the  Tsar  was  forced  to  grant  a  Consti- 
tution. The  Kaiser's  sympathies  were  of  course 
against  the  revolution  but  in  France  and  England 
every  generous  mind  saw  the  progress  of  events  with 
joy:  all  but  a  few  extreme  reactionaries  watched  with 
breathless  sympathy  the  devoted  courage  of  the  Rus- 
sian reformers,  and  hoped  passionately  for  the  end 
of  the  most  harmful  of  all  tyrannies  that  weighed 
down  the  human  spirit. 

At  this  point,  high  politics  intervened.  One  main 
reason  for  the  success  of  the  Revolution  was  the 
mutinous  condition  of  the  Russian  Army  and  Navy, 
which  could  not  be  remedied  without  considerable 
expenditure.  In  the  disturbed  state  of  the  country, 
it  was  difficult  to  raise  revenue.  The  partisans  of  the 
Duma,  which  had  been  granted  nominal  control  over 
taxation,  wished  to  secure  its  position  and  to  carry 
much-needed  reforms  before  relieving  the  Govern- 
ment of  its  financial  embarrassments.  The  German 
Government,  which  would  gladly  have  repressed  the 


176       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

Revolution,  had  no  capital  to  spare  from  its  own 
needs.  France,  which  had  hitherto  financed  Russia, 
began  to  feel  both  that  the  security  was  shaky,  and 
that  support  of  the  bureaucracy  was  unworthy  of  a 
Liberal  Power.  M.  Clemenceau,  in  the  {''Aurore"), 
warned  the  French  against  any  participation  in  Rus- 
sian loans  while  the  internal  condition  of  affairs  re- 
mained unsettled : ' '  After  having  furnished  the  Tsar, ' ' 
he  wrote,  "with  the  financial  resources  which  were 
destined  to  lead  to  his  defeat  abroad,  it  now  remains 
for  us  supply  him  with  the  financial  resources  des- 
tined to  assure  his  victory  over  his  own  subjects."* 
According  to  '^Gil  Bias",  the  representatives  of  Pa- 
risian finance,  during  January,  1906,  drew  up  con- 
ditions for  any  fresh  loan  to  Russian,  involving  the 
granting  of  full  control  over  finance  to  the  Duma.** 
All  Liberal  opinion  in  Russia  was  against  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  loan  while  the  powers  of  the  Duma  remained 
in  doubt.  On  April  9,  1906,  the  Times  Correspondent 
at  St.  Petersburg  telegraphed : — *** 

"The  Opposition  organs  continue  their  campain 
against  the  conclusion  of  a  foreign  loan  before  the 
Duma  meets.  A  host  of  arguments  is  adduced  in 
support  of  their  contention,  but  all  amount  to  this 
that  they  are  afraid  the  Government,  having  secured 
a  large  sum  of  money,  will  try  to  terrorize  the  Duma 
just  as  it  terrorized  the  elections.  The  Russian  Press 
has,  unfortunately,  too  deep  and  too  lasting  a  mis- 
trust of  its  Government." 

The  Correspondent,  of  course,  considered  this  mis- 

*  Times,  February  1,  1906. 
•*Times,  February  1,  1906. 
•••Times,  April  10,  1906. 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE        177 

trust  excessive — with  how  little  justice,  events  were 
soon  to  show, 

A  few  days  later,  the  loan  was  concluded — a  joint 
Anglo-French  loan,  the  first  (I  believe)  in  which 
England  had  participated  since  the  Crimean  War. 
The  part  played  by  the  Foreign  Office  in  advising 
the  City  is  not  easy  to  ascertain,  but  no  one  can  doubt 
that  our  financial  magnates  were  perfectly  conscious 
of  co-operating  with  the  Foreign  Office  when  they  un- 
dertook to  lend  money  to  the  Russian  Government.* 
.  The  first  Duma  was  opened  by  the  Tsar  on  May  9, 
and  dissolved  on  July  22.  With  its  dissolution,  the 
successful  period  of  the  Russian  Revolution  came  to 
an  end.  Too  late.  The  Times  realized  our  mistake. 
Its  leading  article  next  day  states  that  "the  Govern- 
ment's arbitrary  step,  indeed,  justifies  only  too  com- 
pletely those  Russian  reformers  who  besought  the 
friends  of  constitutional  liberty  in  the  West  not  to 
lend  more  money  to  the  autocracy The  Rus- 
sian Government  obtained  their  loan  by  what  now 
looks  uncommonly  like  false  pretences,  but  they  can- 
not live  on  it  for  ever How  can  they  hope  to 

hold  down  for  ever  an  exasperated  people"? 

The  hopes  of  The  Times  were  vain,  and  its  peni- 
tence was  brief.  Step  by  step,  the  Tsar  recovered  his 
power.  The  more  venal  of  his  opponents  were  bought, 
the  rest  were  dispersed  to  the  scaffold,  the  gaols,  and 
the    convict    settlements    of    Siberia.    Finland    was 

•Professor  Murray  mocks  at  opponents  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
Entente,  by  suggesting  that  they  considered  "our  first  step, 
for  example,  should  be  the  subsidizing  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionary parties  !"  He  does  not  mention  that  our  first  step  was 
the  subsidizing  of  their  opponents,  nor  explain  how  this  could  be 
reconciled  with  the  policy,  which  he  advocates,  of  non-interven- 
tion in  the  internal  affairs  of  Russia. 


178       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

punished  for  its  moment  of  freedom,  Poland  for  the 
hundredth  time  tasted  the  bitterness  of  bondage,  the 
army  was  reorganized,  and  soon  the  Tsar  was  at 
liberty  to  extend  the  blessings  of  his  rule  by  the  sup- 
pression of  freedom  in  Persia.  If  the  loan  had  been 
postponed  for  a  few  months,  none  of  these  results 
could  have  been  achieved.  Kussia's  gratitude  is  only 
to  be  secured  by  signal  services,  but  fortunately  for 
our  Foreign  Office  the  moment  was  one  at  which 
a  signal  service  was  possible.  A  Liberal  Russia,  which 
would  have  meant  a  new  Europe  and  a  new  Asia, 
was  prevented  by  our  timely  intervention.* 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  it  was  the 
English  and  French  command  of  capital  that  inclined 
Russia  to  reject  the  offered  friendship  of  Germany. 
The  experience  of  the  Western  Powers  during  the 
jBrst  Moroccan  crisis,  in  1905,  had  shown  them  the 
dangers  of  a  policy  of  conquest  while  Russia  was 
weak:  deliberately  and  patiently  they  set  to  work  to 
make  Russia  seem  strong  through  the  suppression  of 
liberty.  If  the  result  has  proved  disappointing,  it 
can  hardly  be  denied  that  England  and  France  have 

•There  is  reason  to  think  that  this  is  not  the  last  occasion 
on  which  our  Government  defeated  the  hopes  of  Russian  Liberals, 
as  appears  from  the  following  passage  in  Alexinsky's  "Russia 
and  the  Great  V7ar."  (Fisher  Unwin,  1915:  p.  177):  "The 
Russian  journal  Golos,  published  in  Paris,  stated,  in  its  Petrograd 
letter,  that  there  was  a  moment  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  when 
Tsarism  was  ready  to  make  great  concessions  in  its  domestic 
policy.  This  was  the  moment  when  Germany  had  already 
declared  war  upon  Russia,  but  when  the  final  decision  of  England 
was  not  yet  known.  The  Russian  Government  was  afraid  to  face 
Germany  alone,  and  was  conscious  of  its  weakness ;  it  was 
anxious  to  win  the  sympathies  of  its  people.  With  this  object 
in  view  it  was  actually  on  the  point  of  issuing  a  constitutional 
manifesto  more  comprehensive  than  that  of  October  30,  1905, 
but  at  the  very  last  moment  it  received  the  assurance  that 
England  would  join  in  the  war,  and,  its  external  situation  being 
strengthened,  Tsarism  no  longer  thought  it  necessary  to  make 
concessions   to  the  people,   and  the  manifesto  was  not  issued." 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  ENTENTE       179 

deserved  their  disappointment.  It  is  the  Russian 
people,  the  innocent  victim  first  of  repression  and  now 
of  invasion,  that  demands  our  sympathy  and  our  re- 
pentance. 

After  the  dissolution  of  the  first  Duma,  the  negotia- 
tions for  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  continued 
smoothly.  The  only  serious  question  at  issue  was  the 
extent  of  Persian  territory  that  was  to  be  recognized 
as  in  the  Russian  sphere :  Russia  claimed  the  whole, 
but  we  only  conceded  rather  more  than  half.  In 
August,  1907,  the  Agreement  was  concluded,  and  no 
obstacle  remained  to  the  "peaceful  penetration"  of 
Persia. 


180  IV.  PERSIA 

The  history  of  Persia  since  the  conclusion  of  the 
Anglo-Russian  Agreement  is  one  long  record  of 
perfidy,  cruelty  and  greed.  The  conduct  of  the  Rus- 
sians is  closely  analogous  to  that  of  the  Germans  in 
Belgium,  and  our  conduct  would  have  been  paralleled 
in  Belgium  if  we  had  not  only  brought  pressure  to  bear 
on  the  Belgians  to  make  them  submit  to  German  rule, 
but  had  ourselves  taken  Antwerp  and  Ostend  as  pay- 
ment for  our  support  of  the  Kaiser.  Persia  is  a  long 
way  off,  and  few  Englishmen  have  travelled  there  or 
acquired  a  knowledge  of  the  Persian  language.  In- 
convenient facts  concerning  such  a  remote  country 
can  easily  be  kept  out  of  the  newspapers,  especially 
when  silence  serves  the  interest  of  both  parties  be- 
cause the  Government  belongs  to  one  party  while  its 
policy  is  that  advocated  by  the  other.  Neither  the 
English  Government  nor  the  Russian  wished  the  truth 
to  be  known,  while  other  civilized  Powers  had  diffi- 
culty in  ascertaining  it,  and  no  direct  interest  to  make 
them  interfere.  The  almost  incredible  ignorance  re- 
peatedly shown  by  Sir  E.  Grey  in  Persian  affairs 
tends  to  prove  that  he  left  our  policy  in  that  part  of 
the  world  to  subordinates.  But  for  the  disinterested 
efforts  of  Professor  Edward  G.  Browne — one  of  the 
few  Englishmen  who  know  Persia  and  the  Persian 
language  and  literature  intimately,  without  having 
any  political  or  commercial  end  to  serve — the  facts 
which  the  English  and  Russian  Governments  wished 


PERSIA  181 

to  conceal  would  have  been  very  difficult  to  ascertain.* 
England  and  Russia  had  long  been  rivals  in  Persia, 
pursuing  the  usual  method  of  loans  to  spendthrift 
sovereigns  as  a  means  of  acquiring  political  influence. 
During  the  Boer  War  the  Russians  succeeded  in  be- 
coming the  sole  creditors  of  Persia,  which  paid  off 
a  previous  English  loan  with  money  borrowed  from 
Russia.  The  Russians  wished  to  absorb  Persia,  while 
we  wished  to  keep  them  away  from  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  the  neighbourhood  of  Baluchistan.  For  this  pur- 
pose, we  supported  the  integrity  and  independence 
of  Persia — though  not  to  the  exclusion  of  our  ambi- 
tions in  the  Gulf.  With  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Entente  in  1907,  the  rivalry  of  England  and 
Russia  in  Persia  came  to  an  end. 

The  subsequent  course  of  events  is  entangled  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Persia,  and  cannot  be  understood 
without  some  knowledge  of  the  struggle  between  the 

*I  have  derived  my  knowledge  of  these  facts  largely  from 
three  pamphlets  by  Professor  Browne,   namely  : 

A  brief  narrative  of  events  in  Persia,  followed  by  an  Appendix 
on  the  Persian  Constitution.  Luzac  &  Co.,  46,  Great  Russell 
Street,  W.  C,  1909. 

The  Persian  Crisis  of  December,  1911  ;  how  it  arose  and 
whither  it  may  lead  us.  Compiled  for  the  use  of  the  Persia 
Committee.     Privately  printed.     New  Tear's  Day,  1912. 

The  Reign  of  Terror  at  Tabriz :  England's  responsibility. 
"With  photographs  and  a  brief  narrative  of  the  events  of  Decem- 
ber, 1911,  and  January,  1912.  Compiled  for  the  use  of  the 
Persia  Committee.     October,   1912. 

I  am  compelled  to  suppose  that  Professor  Murray  has  not 
seen  these  pamphlets.  If  he  had,  it  seems  impossible  that  ha 
should  have  dealt  with  the  Persian  question  as  he  has  dealt 
with  it,  being,  as  he  is,  a  man  conspicuous  for  humane  feeling 
and  hatred  of  cruelty  and  oppression. 

The  third  of  the  above  pamphlets  is  the  subject  of  a  memo- 
randum by  Mr.  Shipley  (our  Consul  in  Tabriz),  No.  464  (p.  230), 
in  The  Blue  Book  Persia,  No.  1  (1913,  Cd.  6807.  This 
memorandum  is  intended  to  mitigate  the  force  of  Professor 
Browne's  indictment,  but  fails  entirely  in  its  object. 

Mr.  Shuster's  book,  "The  Strangling  of  Persia"  (Fisher  Unwin, 
1912),  is  very  important  to  all  who  wish  to  understand  the 
Persian  question. 


182       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

Constitutionalists  and  the  Shah,  which  began  in  1906 
and  continued  until  we  procured  the  final  defeat  of 
the  Constitutionalists  in  1911. 

The  Shah's  extravagances  had  led  him  to  need 
money,  and  the  need  of  money  had  made  him  sub- 
servient to  Eussia  in  order  to  get  loans.  His  sub- 
servience to  Russia,  and  his  misgovernment,  had 
roused  a  continually  growing  opposition  in  Persia, 
which  was  encouraged  in  its  hope  of  independence  by 
the  Japanese  victory  in  the  war  of  1904-5,  and  by  the 
subsequent  revolution  in  Russia.  The  English,  at  that 
time  still  more  or  less  hostile  to  Russia  owing  to  the 
Japanese  Alliance,  showed  sympathy  with  the  Per- 
sian nationalists.  In  July,  1906,  as  the  result  of  con- 
flicts between  the  people  and  the  soldiers,  the  malcon- 
tents asked  and  obtained  asylum  in  the  gardens  of 
the  British  Legation  in  Teheran,  at  first  in  small 
numbers,  but  finally  to  the  number  of  15,000.  They 
demanded  a  Parliament,  and  the  Shah,  on  August 
5,  1906,  issued  a  proclamation  agreeing  to  grant  their 
request.  The  Assembly  met  on  October  7.  It  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  the  consideration  of  much-needed 
reforms,  in  which  it  appears  to  have  shown  judgment 
and  patriotism.  Its  first  Budget,  which  was  presented 
in  1907,  undertook  the  task  of  converting  the  annual 
deficit  into  a  surplus,  which  was  vitally  necessary 
if  foreign  influence  was  to  be  diminished.  Since  it 
was  not  practicable  to  effect  this  by  increasing  the 
revenue,  it  had  to  be  effected  by  diminishing  the  ex- 
penditure, and  among  the  items  that  were  cut  down 
was  the  Shah's  Civil  List.  This,  though  he  had  sworn 
repeatedly  to  observe  the  Constitution,  increased  the 


PERSIA  183 

hostility  which  he  had  never  ceased  to  feel.  Never- 
theless, if  no  foreign  influence  had  intervened,  the 
Nationalists  could  have  easily  continued,  as  before,  to 
get  the  better  of  all  the  efforts  of  this  perjured  tyrant. 

But  meanwhile  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  had 
been  concluded  (August  31,  1907),  with  its  English 
and  Russian  spheres.  This  division  into  spheres 
naturally  alarmed  the  Persians,  in  spite  of  the  recog- 
nition of  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Persia. 
To  their  inquiry  whether  it  was  intended  to  partition 
Persia,  our  Minister  replied,  with  the  knowledge  and 
co-operation  of  the  Russian  Legation,  by  the  follow- 
ing official  communication : 

"Information  has  reached  me  that  the  report  is 
rife  in  Persia  that  the  result  of  the  Agreement  con- 
cluded between  England  and  Russia  will  be  the  inter- 
vention of  these  two  Powers  in  Persia,  and  the  parti- 
tion of  Persia  between  them.  Your  Excellency  is 
aware  that  the  negotiations  between  England  and 
Russia  are  of  a  wholly  different  character,  since  the 
Mushiru '1-Mulk  recently  visited  both  St.  Petersburg 
and  London,  and  discussed  the  matter  with  the  Minis- 
ters for  Foreign  Affairs  of  both  Powers,  who  explicitly 
declared  to  him  the  objects  aimed  at  by  their  represtive 
Governments  in  Persia,  which  assurance  he  has  no 
doubt  duly  reported. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  has  informed  me  of  the  substance 
of  his  conversations  with  the  Mushiru  l-Mulk,  and 
also  of  the  substance  of  M.  Isvolsky's  declarations, 
officially  communicated  to  the  British  Government. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  informs  me  that  he  has  ex- 
plained to  the  Mushiru '1-Mulk  that  he  and  M.  Isvol- 


184       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

sky  are  completely  in  accord  on  two  fundamental 
points, 

"Firstly,  neither  of  the  two  Powers  will  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  Persia  unless  injury  is  inflicted  on 
the  persons  and  property  of  their  subjects. 

**  Secondly,  negotiations  arising  out  of  the  Anglo- 
Eussian  Agreement  must  not  violate  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  Persia. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  also  observes  that  hitherto  an- 
tagonism has  existed  between  England  and  Russia, 
each  of  whom  has  endeavoured  to  prevent  the  contin- 
uance of  the  other  in  Persia,  and  had  this  antagonism 
been  prolonged  in  the  present  uncertain  state  of 
Persia,  one  or  both  of  these  two  Powers  might  have 
been  tempted  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Persia,  so  as  not  to  allow  the  other  to  profit  by  the 
existing  state  of  things,  or  to  profit  by  it  to 
the  detriment  of  others.  The  object  of  the  present 
negotiations  between  England  and  Russia  is  to  pre- 
vent such  difficulties  from  arising  between  them,  and 
these  negotiations  are  in  truth  in  no  Avise  directed 
against  Persia,  as  M.  Isvolsky  has  clearly  explained  to 
the  Mushiru'1-Mulk,  saying,  'Neither  of  the  two  Powers 
seeks  anything  from  Persia,  so  that  Persia  can  con- 
centrate all  her  energies  on  the  settlement  of  her  in- 
ternal affairs'.  Both  Ministers  are  entirely  in  accord 
as  to  the  policy  of  non-intervention  in  Persia,  and 
have  left  no  possible  ground  for  doubt  in  the  matter. 
M.  Isvolsky 's  words,  which  include  the  intentions  of 
England  are  as  follows:  'Russia's  general  principle 
will  be  to  refrain  from  any  kind  of  intervention  in 
the  internal   affairs   of   other   countries   so   long   as 


PERSIA  185 

nothing  injurious  to  her  interests  is  done;  and  it  is 
quite  impossible  that  she  should  deviate  from  this 
principle  in  this  present  case. ' 

"As  to  the  reported  partition  of  Persia  between 
Russia  and  England,  concerning  which  it  is  asserted 
that  the  two  Powers  above-mentioned  wish  to  define 
spheres  of  influence  for  themselves,  Sir  E.  Grey 
and  M.  Isvolsky  have  explicitly  declared  that  these 
reports  have  no  foundation.  What  the  two  Powers 
desire  is  to  come  to  an  agreement  which  will  prevent 
future  difficulties  and  disputes  from  arising,  by 
guaranteeing  that  neither  Power  will  aim  at  acquir- 
ing influence  in  those  parts  of  Persia  which  are  ad- 
jacent to  the  frontier  of  the  other.  This  agreement 
is  injurious  neither  to  the  interests  of  Persia  nor  to 
those  of  any  other  foreign  nation,  since  it  binds  only 
England  and  Russia  not  to  embark  on  any  course 
of  action  in  Persia  calculated  to  injure  the  interests 
of  the  other,  and  so  in  the  future  to  deliver  Persia 
from  those  demands  which  in  the  past  have  proved  so 
injurious  to  the  progress  of  her  political  aspirations. 
This  is  what  M.  Isvolsky  says : 

"  'This  Agreement  between  the  two  European 
Powers  which  have  the  greatest  interests  in  Persia, 
based  as  it  is  on  a  guarantee  of  her  independence 
and  integrity,  can  only  serve  to  further  and  promote 
Persian  interests,  for  henceforth  Persia,  aided  and 
assisted  by  these  two  powerful  neighbouring  States, 
can  employ  all  her  powers  in  internal  reforms. ' 

' '  From  the  above  statements  you  will  see  how  base- 
less and  unfounded  are  these  rumours  which  have 
lately  prevailed   in   Persia  concerning  the   political 


186       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

ambitions  of  England  and  Russia  in  this  country.  The 
object  of  the  two  Powers  in  making  this  Agreement  is 
not  in  any  way  to  attack,  but  rather  to  assure  forever 
the  independence  of  Persia.  Not  only  do  they  not  wish 
to  have  at  hand  any  excuse  for  intervention,  but  their 
object  in  these  friendly  negotiations  was  not  to  allow 
one  another  to  intervene  on  the  pretext  of  safeguard- 
ing their  interests.  The  two  Powers  hope  that  in 
the  future  Persia  will  be  forever  delivered  from  the 
fear  of  foreign  intervention,  and  will  thus  be  perfectly 
free  to  manage  her  own  affairs  in  her  own  way, 
whereby  advantage  will  accrue  both  to  herself  and  to 
the  whole  world." 

Nevertheless,  within  a  few  years,  more  than  half  of 
Persia  had  been  absorbed  by  Russia,  and  more  than 
half  the  remainder  had  come  under  our  power. 

When  questions  were  asked  in  the  House  about  this 
declaration,  it  appeared  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
no  knowledge  of  it.* 

About  the  end  of  February,  1908,  three  men,  who 
were  never  caught,  threw  a  bomb  at  the  Shah's  auto- 
mobile when  the  Shah  was  in  another  carriage.  The 
chauffeur  was  killed.  "Whether  the  bomb  was  thrown 
by  extremists  of  the  Constitutional  party,  or  by  ad- 
herents of  the  Shah  in  order  to  promote  a  reaction,  is 
not  known.  On  June  2,  three  months  later,  the  Rus- 
sian Minister,  supported  apparently  by  the  British 
Charge  d 'Affaires,  told  the  Persian  Foreign  Secre- 
tary that 

"The  life  of  the  Shah  is  in  jeopardy.    "What  busi- 

•December  14,  1911.  Mr.  Acland,  the  Under-Secretary,  had 
expressed  equal  ignorance  on  December  5.  Professor  Murray 
makes  no  mention  of  this  Declaration. 


PERSIA  187 

ness  have  these  Nationalists  to  interfere  with  His 
Majesty's  personal  servants,  especially  the  old  Amir 
Bahadur  Zang,  who  watches  over  his  master's  safety 
like  a  faithful  watch-dog  ?  The  anjumans  and  Nation- 
alists have  transgressed  all  bounds,  and  now  wish  to 
depose  the  Shah.  This  we  cannot  tolerate,  and  should 
it  happen,  Russia  will  be  compelled  to  interfere,  and 
will  do  so  with  the  approval  and  sanction  of  Eng- 
land." 

In  view  of  these  threats,  the  Nationalist  leaders 
decided  that  it  would  be  useless  to  resist  the  Shah 
by  force  of  arms,  since  the  only  result  would  be  for- 
eign intervention.  Meanwhile,  the  Shah,  emboldened 
by  Russian  support,  adopted  a  more  vigorous  policy. 
The  very  next  day  (June  3)  he  departed  from  the  city 
to  the  ''Shah's  Garden"  outside  the  walls,  where  he 
was  less  amenable  to  popular  pressure.  On  June  5,  he 
treacherously  arrested  some  leading  Nationalists  whom 
he  had  invited  to  confer  with  him.  On  June  28  he 
caused  his  Cossacks,  under  their  Russian  Colonel  Liak- 
hoff,  to  plant  artillery  round  the  Assembly,  shoot 
down  those  who  attempted  to  defend  it,  and  disperse 
the  remainder.  In  Teheran  he  was  completely  vic- 
torious, and  for  a  time  the  hopes  of  the  Nationalist 
movement  seemed  at  an  end. 

But  outside  the  capital  the  supporters  of  the  Parlia- 
ment proved  more  difficult  to  suppress.  Especially 
Tabriz,  in  the  north,  near  the  Russian  border,  offered 
a  vigorous  resistance,  and  in  April,  1909,  was  still 
withstanding  a  siege  by  the  Shah's  troops.  It  was 
said  that  the  European  Consuls  in  Tabriz  were  in 
danger,  and  on  this  ground  Russian  troops  crossed 


188       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

the  border,  raised  the  siege  and  encamped  just  outside 
the  town,  where,  until  they  occupied  the  town  itself 
in  December,  1911,  they  stayed  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
(at  any  rate  in  the  opinion  of  the  British  Government) 
there  was  no  valid  excuse  for  their  remaining. 

The  Russian  intervention  at  Tabriz  saved  the  Na- 
tionalist cause  at  that  time,  but  this  was  of  course  no 
part  of  the  motive  with  which  it  was  undertaken.  Sir 
Arthur  Nicholson,  then  our  Ambassador  at  Petrograd, 
now  permanent  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
expressed  the  official  view  of  both  Governments.  "It 
seems  to  me, ' '  he  wrote,  ' '  that  it  would  be  the  Nation- 
alists who  would  profit  by  the  arrival  of  the  Russian 
force,  but  I  submit  that  the  chief  object  to  be  kept  in 
view  is  the  safety  of  the  Consuls,  even  at  the  risk  of 
the  measures  which  circumstances  have  rendered  nec- 
essary proving  of  benefit  to  the  popular  movement  at 
Tabriz. '  *  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson  was  quite  right.  For 
the  moment,  the  Russians  regretfully  saved  the  Na- 
tionalist cause;  but  their  troops  at  Tabriz  proved 
themselves  capable,  when  the  time  came,  of  striking  a 
blow  against  human  liberty  which  must  have  surpassed 
even  that  astute  diplomatist's  expectations. 

The  Nationalist's  cause  prospered,  and  in  July, 
1909,  the  Shah's  Cossacks  were  defeated,  Teheran  was 
occupied  and  the  Shah  deposed.* 

♦These  Cossacks  were  under  Russian  officers,  who,  according: 
to  the  Times'  Correspondent,  were  "completely  under  the  control 
of  the  Russian  Government,  owing  to  the  fact  that  their  pensions 
and  their  prospect  of  future  re-instatement  depend  on  their 
actinET  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  St.  Petersburg."  Profes- 
sor Browne  points  out  that  Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  know  of  the 
unsuccessful  resistance  of  the  Shah's  Cossacks  to  the  National- 
ists, but  stated  on  three  separate  occasions  (July  27,  November 
27,  and  December  14,  1911),  that  if  their  Russian  officers  "had 
interfered  or  lifted  a  finger,  and  used  their  influence  in  Teheran, 
the  Shah  would  never  have  been  expelled." 


PERSIA  189 

A  Protocol  was  signed  in  August,  1909,  between 
the  Persian  Government  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Rus- 
sian and  British  Governments  on  the  other  hand,  by 
which  the  Persians  agreed  to  pay  the  ex-Shah  a  pen- 
sion of  £16,666  a  year,  while  Russia  agreed  to  pre- 
vent him  from  conducting  any  political  agitation 
against  Persia.  If  Russia  failed  to  prevent  this,  Per- 
sia was  to  be  free  to  stop  his  pension.**  This  contract, 
as  we  shall  see,  was  treated  by  Russia  as  a  "scrap  of 
paper." 

In  the  time  which  followed,  the  Russians  increased 
the  number  of  their  troops  in  Persia,  fomented  dis- 
order as  an  excuse  for  intervention,  and  with  our 
help  prevented  the  Persian  Government  from  borrow- 
ing the  money  required  to  suppress  disorder,  unless 
on  terms  which  would  have  meant  a  virtual  loss  of 
independence. 

In  November,  1910,  Russia  and  Germany  concluded 
the  Potsdam  Agreement,  which  gave  Russia  a  free 
hand  in  Persia.  This  strengthened  Russia's  hands, 
not  only  by  removing  German  opposition,  but  also  by 
making  England  fear  that  Russia  was  being  attracted 
into  "the  orbit  of  a  single  diplomacy",  as  Sir  E.  Grey 
expressed  it.  From  this  time  on,  we  became  com- 
pletely subservient  to  Russia  in  Persia,  since  we  lived 

••The  crucial  article  of  the  Protocol  is  Article  II,  which  says: 
"The  two  representatives  (i.  e.,  the  British  Minister  and  the 
Russian  Chargrfe  de'Affairs),  undertake  to  give  His  Majesty 
Mohammed  AH  Mirza  strict  injunctions  to  abstain  in  future 
from  all  political  agitation  against  Persia,  and  the  Imperial 
Russian  Government  promise  on  their  side  to  talte  all  effective 
steps  in  order  to  prevent  any  such  agitation  on  his  part.  If  His 
Majesty  Mohammed  Ali  Mirza  leaves  Russia,  and  if  it  is  proved 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  two  legations  that  in  any  country  otlier 
than  Russia  he  has  carried  on  political  agitation  against  Persia, 
the  Persian  Government  shall  have  the  right  to  cease  payment  of 
his  pension." — Cd.  5120. 


190       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

in  terror  of  a  rapproachement  between  the  Tsar  and 
the  Kaiser.* 

A  few  days  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Potsdam 
Agreement,  the  Persian  Foreign  Minister  informed 
the  English  and  Russian  Legations  that  he  had  dis- 
covered a  treasonable  correspondence  of  the  ex-Shah 
with  some  frontier  tribes,  and  that  he  proposed 
to  stop  that  noble  exile's  allowance  while  the  facts 
were  investigated.  The  English  and  Russians  re- 
fused to  investigate  the  charges,  and  caused  the  Per- 
sian Minister  to  be  shadowed  like  a  criminal  until 
the  money  was  paid.  He  had  been  educated  in  Eng- 
land, and  was  suspected  of  Anglophil  tendencies;  by 
the  end  of  December,  he  was  forced  to  resign.  Mean- 
while the  ex-Shah  left  Russia  and  began  organizing 
preparations  for  the  invasion  which  he  made  in  1911, 
entering  Persia  from  Russia  by  a  Russian  boat  on 
the  Caspian.  This  expedition  led  to  a  Civil  War  in 
which  the  ex-Shah  and  his  partisans  were  defeated. 
But  even  after  this  the  Persian  Government  was 
forced  to  continue  to  pay  him  a  pension.* 

The  situation  of  Persia  at  this  time  was  difficult, 
but  not  yet  hopeless.  The  Persians  have  been  recog- 
nized throughout  Islam  as  the  most  civilized  of  Ma- 
hometan races,  and  as  the  leader  in  poetry,  philos- 

•For  the  effect  of  the  Potsdam  Agreement  on  Persia  and  on 
British  policy  in  connection  with  Persia,  see  Shuster,  "The 
Strangling  of  Persia."  pp.  226  ff. 

•Professor  Murray  says: — "I  see  no  reason  to  suspect  the 
Russian  Government  of  having  connived  at  this  enterprise," 
namely  the  ex-Shah's  invasion.  But  "when  once  the  Shah  had 
landed,  Russia  was  not  disposed  to  suppress  him.  She  had  put 
down  one  Royalist  rebellion  after  another,  when  the  constitu- 
tional Government  had  been  unable  to  cope  with  them.  She 
had  by  nature  no  liking  for  Constitutionalists  as  against 
anointed  Kings,  and  she  proposed  to  Great  Britain  to  let  the 
Shah  have  Jtiis  chance  and  then  support  whatever  Government 


PERSIA  191 

ophy  and  art.  The  country,  however,  contains  many 
tribes  who  are  more  warlike  and  less  civilized  than 
the  true  Persians.  The  genuine  constitutional  en- 
thusiasm which  was  almost  universal  among  the  true 
Persians — except  for  a  few  who  had  some  private  in- 
terest in  the  old  regime — was  naturally  beyond  the 
mental  capacity  of  most  of  the  tribes.  They  took  one 
side  or  the  other  for  motives  which  had  little  to  do 
with  the  issue  of  constitutionalism  versus  absolutism. 
The  Government  could  have  kept  order  if  it  could 
have  got  money,  but  this  the  English  and  Russian 
Governments  prevented.  The  consequent  partial  fail- 
ure of  the  Constitutionalists  to  keep  order  was  used 
by  Russia  and  England  as  an  excuse  for  fresh  inter- 
ventions and  fresh  military  occupations;  ever  since 
April,  1909,  the  Russians  had  troops  in  the  north, 
whose  numbers  were  increased  from  time  to  time,  and 
in  October,  1911,  we  began  landing  Indian  troops  at 
Bushire.* 

At  the  request  of  the  Persian  Government,  an 
American  financial  mission  was  despatched  in  1911 
under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Shuster,  an  American 
financial  official  in  the  Philippines.  Mr.  Shuster 's 
mission,  which  had  to  deal  with  a  very  complicated 
state  of  affairs,  seemed  at  first  to  promise  the  regener- 

proved  to  have  the  greatest  hold  on  the  country.  Great  Britain 
maintained  firmly  that  he  could  not  be  recognized."  The 
Protocol  of  August,  1909,  is  not  mentioned  by  Professor  Murray: 
no  one  could  guess  from  his  account  that  the  attitude  which  he 
confesses  to  have  been  that  of  Russia  constituted  a  breach  of 
faith,  though  this  appears  even  from  the  Blue  Books  (e.  g. 
Cd.  6104,  Nos.  218,  244).  It  is  fairly  clear  that  Russia  desired 
disorders  in  Persia,  as  ah  excuse  for  intervention.  What  Russia 
seems  to  have  feared  most  was  a  definitive  victory  for  either 
party  before  her  own  schemes  had  matured. 

*Cd.  6105,  No.  75   (p.  32). 


192       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

ation  of  Persia,  but  brought  about  instead  the  final 
catastrophe.  Mr,  Shuster  and  his  coadjutors  began 
their  task  of  financial  organization  in  May,  1911. 
They  were  dismissed  as  the  result  of  a  Russian  ulti- 
matum presented  on  November  29,  1911.  Everything 
possible  has  been  done  by  The  Times,  Sir  E.  Grey 
and  Professor  Murray  to  represent  Mr.  Shuster  as 
an  impracticable  and  tactless  idealist,  whom  the  Rus- 
sians could  not  have  been  expected  to  endure.  The 
charges  against  him,  when  carefully  analyzed,  amount 
to  three:  (1)  that  he  devoted  himself  whole-heart- 
edly to  the  interests  of  Persia;  (2)  that  his  policy 
was  calculated  to  restore  order  and  independence  to 
Persia;  (3)  that  he  supposed  the  Russians  capable 
of  some  respect  for  their  promises.  All  these  charges 
have  been  proved  up  to  the  hilt ;  and  all  right-minded 
people  will  therefore  agree  that  he  was  unfit  for  his 
post.* 

In  order  to  be  able  to  collect  taxes,  Mr.  Shuster  set 
to  work  to  organize  a  gendarmerie,  of  which  he  of- 
fered the  command  to  Major  Stokes  of  the  Indian 

•An  interesting  conversation  between  M.  N6ratof  and  our 
Charpg  d' Affaires  in  Petro^ad,  took  place  on  October  19,  1911. 
"I  (Mr.  O'Beirne)  reminded  M.  N6ratof  that  Russia  had  recently 
vetoed  the  various  proposals  put  forward  with  the  object  of 
enabling  the  Persian  Government  to  restore  order  in  the  country 
— proposals  which,  for  our  part,  we  had  welcomed  as  affording 
Bome  hope  of  an  improvement  in  the  state  of  things  in  the 
south.  Russia  had  objected  to  these  proposals,  but  she  had  sug- 
gested nothing  to  take  their  place.  I  begged  His  Excellency 
to  tell  me  frankly  what  it  was  that  the  Russian  Government 
wished  done. 

"M.  N§ratof  replied  that  the  first  thing  necessary  was  that 
Mr.  Shuster  should  understand  that  he  must  act  in  concert  with, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of,  Russia,  and  of  course.  His 
Excellency  added,  of  Great  Britain  also.  The  Persian  reforms 
must  be  proceeded  with  gradually  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
take  Russian  interests  into  account.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  question  was  not  merely  one  of  the  good  of  Persia,  but 
also  of  the  special  position  of  Russia." 

(My  italics.    Cd.  6105,  No.  45,  p.  19.    Cf.  ib..  No.  56.) 


PERSIA  193 

Army.  Russia  objected,  on  the  ground  that  no  Eng- 
lishman must  be  allowed  authority  in  the  Russian 
sphere,  and  the  gendarmerie  would  have  to  operate 
in  the  Russian  sphere  as  well  as  elsewhere.  Means 
were  found  by  the  British  Government  to  bring  pres- 
sure to  bear  on  Major  Stokes*  and  he  resigned.  Mr. 
Shuster's  appointment  of  a  British  subject,  Mr. 
Lecoffre,  as  his  agent  in  Tabriz  was  made  a  ground 
of  complaint  by  Russia — not  unnaturally,  since  Rus- 
sia's conduct  in  Tabriz  shortly  afterwards  was  such 
as  Englishmen  must  not  witness  if  it  could  be  pre- 
vented. (It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Russians 
had  no  rights  in  Tabriz  except  those  of  conquest — 
the  very  same  that  the  Germans  have  in  Belgium). 
But  these  difficulties  could  perhaps  have  been  over- 
come; at  any  rate  it  was  not  through  them  that  the 
Russians  finally  asserted  themselves.** 

A  brother  of  the  ex-Shah,  Shoa-es-Sultaneh,  had 
taken  part  in  the  recent  rebellion,  and  his  property 
was  declared  confiscated  by  the  Persian  Government. 
But  the  Russian  Bank  asserted  that  his  house  was 
mortgaged  to  them,  and  objected  to  Mr.  Shuster's 
attempt  to  take  possession  of  it.  The  Persian  Gov- 
ernment protested  against  the  action  of  the  Rus- 
sian Consul-General,  who  sent  Russian  Cossacks  to 
the  house  with  threats  that  they  would  fire  on  the 

♦See  Cd.  6105,  No.  209  (p.  89)  ;  Cf.  ib..  No.  97  (p.  40). 

**Sir  E.  Grey  regretted  that  the  Russians  did  not  base 
their  interference  upon  the  appointment  of  Mr  Lecoffre  at 
Tabriz.  The  reply  of  the  Russian  Government  is  interesting. 
"M.  N6ratof  pointed  out  that  from  a  formal  point  of  view,  it 
would  be  difficult  for  them  to  protest  against  appointments  such 
as  that  of  Mr.  Lecoffre  to  Tabriz,  since  such  a  protest  would 
constitute  an  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Persia." 
Cd.  6105,  No.  113  (p.  46).  Mr.  Shuster's  excellent  grounds  for 
the  appointment  of  Mr.  Lecoffre  are  given  in  the  same  Blue 
Book,  No.  89. 


194       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

Persian  gendarmes.  The  incidents  of  the  dispute 
are  differently  related  by  the  two  sides:*  they  are 
complicated,  and  I  have  not  the  means  of  sifting  the 
evidence.  The  dispute  ended  in  the  Russians  present- 
ing two  successive  ultimatums,  which  put  an  end  to 
what  remained  of  Persian  liberty. 

The  dispute  about  the  house  arose  on  October  9, 
and  on  October  10  it  appeared  to  be  closed  owing 
to  the  Russian  Minister  dissociating  himself  from  the 
Consul-General.  But  this  appearance  was  deceptive. 
On  November  2,  the  Russian  Minister  presented  an 
ultimatum,  demanding  the  removal  of  the  gendarmes 
from  the  house,  and  an  apology  from  the  Persian 
Government.  The  Persian  Government  accepted  the 
ultimatum,  but  Mr.  Shuster  and  the  Majlis  resisted 
it.  Although  the  Persian  Foreign  Minister  tendered 
the  required  apology  for  an  offence  which,  according 
to  Persian  accounts,  had  never  been  committed,  the 

•Professor  Murray's  account  is  as  follows : — "The  final  clash 
came  in  a  curious  manner.  Mr.  Shuster  had  decided — not 
unjustly,  as  far  as  one  can  judge — to  confiscate  the  large 
estates  of  a  brother  of  the  ex-Shah,  Shoa-es-Sultaneh.  Part 
of  this  prince's  property  was  a  house  which  was  mortgaged  to 
the  Russian  Bank — or  so  at  least  the  Bank  claimed — and  which 
lay  close  to  the  Russian  Consulate.  Now  Russians  engaged  in 
commerce  and  the  Consular  service  seem,  naturally  enough,  to 
have  less  sense  of  correct  behaviour  or  less  control  over  their 
feelings  than  ministers  and  diplomats.  And  when  Mr.  Shuster's 
Treasury  Officials  came  to  seize  this  house  the  Russian  Consul 
sent  men  to  drive  them  away,  and  is  said  to  have  been  repri- 
manded by  his  Minister  for  doing  so.  Mr.  Shuster  immediately 
sent  one  gendarme  with  an  explanation  to  the  Consulate  and 
a  hundred  gendarmes  with  rifles  to  the  mortgaged  house.  There 
was  resistance  and  some  trouble,  and,  instead  of  apologizing,  or 
negotiating,  or  attempting  a  compromise,  Mr.  Shuster,  through 
the  Cabinet,  demanded  the  recall  of  the  Russian  Consul-General." 
Even  in  this  account,  the  excuse  seems  hardly  adequate  for 
destroying  a  nation's  freedom.  This  was  also  Sir  E.  Grey's  view : 
"I  said  it  was  unfortunate,  in  the  first  instance  that  the  Russian 
ultimatum  had  been  based  upon  the  question  of  the  property  of 
the  Shoa-es-Sultaneh  for  the  question  was  of  comparatively 
slight  importance,  and  the  Russian  case  with  regard  to  it  did 
not  seem  to  me  very  strong."  (Cd.  6105,  No.  212,  p.  90;  cf.  ib.. 
No.  109,  p.  45). 


PERSIA  195 

Russians  presented  a  second  ultimatum  (November 
29)  demanding  (1)  the  dismissal  of  Mr.  Shuster 
and  Mr.  Lecoffre ;  (2)  an  undertaking  not  in  future 
to  appoint  foreigners  in  the  Government  service  with- 
out the  consent  of  Russia  and  England;*  and  (3) 
the  payment  of  an  indemnity**  covering  the  ex- 
penses of  the  Russian  expedition  sent  against  Persia 
at  the  time  of  the  first  ultimatum,  and  not  recalled 
or  arrested  in  its  march  when  the  first  ultimatum 
was  accepted.  Mr.  Shuster  and  the  Majlis  continued 
to  hold  out,  but  the  Persian  Government  was  com- 
pelled to  yield.  Mr.  Shuster  was  dismissed,  the 
Majlis  came  to  an  end,  and  Persian  liberty  was  killed. 
It  has  been  made  an  accusation  against  Mr.  Shuster 
that  he  was  anti-Russian.*  It  would  be  exactly  as 
rational  to  blame  the  Belgian  Government  for  being 
anti-German.  The  Anglo-Russian  Agreement,  since 
Persia  was  not  a  party  to  it,  gave  the  Russians  no 

•This  was  the  demand  which  the  Persian  Government  was  the 
most  reluctant  to  yield,  since  it  constituted  a  sacrifice  of  inde- 
pendence. Both  the  English  and  the  Russian  Governments 
maintained  that  it  only  embodied  the  principle  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Agreeemnt  and  the  practice  since  its  conclusion." 
(Cd.  6105,  Nos.  168,  243;  but  Russia  finally  agreed  to  a  slight 
modification  in  this  demand,  ib.,  Nos.  273,  288,  and  Cd.  6264, 
No.  88,  Enclosures  1  and  2). 

•♦This  was  the  only  one  of  the  three  demands  that  Sir  E. 
Grey  objected  to.  Professor  Murray  speaks  of  it  as  "the  only 
cruel  part"  of  Russia's  demands. 

•Professor  Murray's  remarks  on  this  subject  are  curious. 
"He  considered  himself  the  servant  of  an  independent  Persia." 
"Mr.  Shuster  happened  to  be  both  a  very  headstrong  and  a 
prejudiced  Russophobe.  He  acted  like  the  head  of  an  inde- 
pendent kingdom."  He  "made  no  concealment  of  his  detestation 
of  Russia."  After  the  second  ultimatum,  "By  the  time  the 
(Russian)  troops  had  reached  Kasvin  the  ultimatum  was 
accepted,  and  a  few  weeks  later  Mr.  Shuster  had  left  Persia. 
It  ought  to  have  been  mentioned  that  he  had  spent  part  of  his 
scanty  leisure  in  writing  a  fierce  anti-Russian  pamphlet,  which 
was  translated  into  Persian  and  circulated  broadcast."  This 
was  his  letter  to  "The  Times"  of  Oct.  21,  1911,  which  is  reprinted 
as  an  Appendix  in  his  book,  "The  Strangling  of  Persia",  1912, 
pp.  313-326. 


196       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

rights  in  Persia.  If  there  had  been  an  Anglo-German 
Agreement  to  partition  Belgium,  that  would  not  have 
given  the  Germans  or  us  any  rights  against  the  Gov- 
vernment  of  Belgium.  If  the  Persian  Government 
chose  to  appoint  Englishmen  in  the  Russian  sphere, 
it  had  a  perfect  right  to  do  so.**  Only  four  years 
earlier,  in  1907,  our  Minister  in  Teheran  had  issued 
his  declaration  explaining  that  the  purpose  of  the 
Anglo-Russian  Agreement  was  to  facilitate  the  main- 
tenance of  Persian  integrity  and  independence. 
Russia,  deliberately  and  persistently  worked  to  absorb 
the  northern  half  of  Persia.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  intentions  of  the  Government  in  Petrograd,* 
the  methods  of  Russian  officials  in  Persia  and  on  the 
frontier  were  the  reverse  of  scrupulous,  involving,  as 
they  did,  the  encouragement  of  disorder,  brigandage 
and  dissension,  not  to  mention  the  breach  of  faith  in 
regard  to  the  ex-Shah.  In  opposing  the  Russians, 
Mr.  Shuster  was  adopting  a  counsel  of  despair;  but 
there  could  be  no  hope  for  Persia  if  Russia  were  not 
opposed.**  And  it  is  impossible  to  escape  the  con- 
clusion that  the  real  grievance  against  I\Ir.  Shuster 
was  the  hope  of  Persian  regeneration  which  his  vigour 


♦♦This  was  recogriized  by  Russia,  as  appears  from  the  state- 
ment of  M.  N6ratof  quoted  above   (Cd.  6105,  No.  113). 

♦I  do  not  think  the  Government  in  Petrograd  can  be  absolved. 
Whoever  doubts  this  should  read  the  correspondence  as  to  the 
second  ultimatum  in  Cd.  6105,  and  the  correspondence  on  the 
subject  of  a  loan  to  Persia  in  Cd.  6807.  In  discussing  the 
Anglo-Russian  Agreement  of  1907,  Professor  Murray  says:  "It 
is  clear  that,  if  honestly  carried  out,  it  did  not  increase  but 
greatly  limited  the  freedom  of  the  two  Powers  to  interfere  wih 
Persia."  It  would  seem  to  follow  that  Professor  Murray  must 
think  that  the  Agreement  was  not  "honestly  carried  out",  for 
it  was  constantly  invoked  as  a  general  ground  for  inter- 
ference when  Mr.  Shuster,  Major  Stokes,  and  Mr.  Lecoffre  were 
being  dismissed  by  Russia's  fiat. 

♦•See  Mr.  Shuster's  book,  "The  Strangling  of  Persia." 


PERSIA  197 

and  honesty  inspires,  I  was  early  offered,"  lie  said, 
"the  plain  choice  between  serving  the  Persian  peo- 
ple and  only  appearing  to  do  so,  while  actually  serv- 
ing foreign  interests  bent  on  Persia's  natural  de- 
struction. I  have  no  apologies  to  offer  for  my  course. ' ' 
I  do  not  think  any  unbiassed  person  can  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  Mr.  Shuster  was  in  the  right,  that 
Russia  was  brutal  and  tortuous,  and  that  England 
was  subservient  and  willing  to  profit  by  Russia's 
crime. 

At  the  end  of  December,  1911,  the  Russian  troops, 
who  had  been  stationed  just  outside  Tabriz  since 
April,  1909,  entered  the  city  and  established  a  reign 
of  terror.*  They  began  by  hanging  eight  of  the  lead- 
ing nationalists,  including  the  chief  Mullah  of  Azer- 
baijan, the  Sikat-el-Islam,  whose  position  corres- 
ponded to  that  of  Cardinal  Mercier.**  It  is  said  that 
he  was  anti-Russian,  and,  if  so,  of  course  he  deserved 
to  die.  After  they  had  executed  these  eight  men, 
they  admitted  Samad  Khan  Shuja-ud-Dowleh,  the 
man  who  had  been  leading  the  partisans  of  the  ex- 
Shah  in  their  attacks  on  Tabriz.*     With  their  ap- 

*The  best  evidence  for  what  occurred  at  this  time  is  that  of 
Mr.  G.  D.  Turner,  then  of  the  Indian  T.  M.  C.  A.,  now  in  the 
British  army  in  France.  He  happened,  in  the  course  of  mission- 
ary worlc,  to  be  in  Tabriz  shortly  after  this  time,  and  while 
there  he  obtained  photographs  of  atrocities,  some  of  which  are 
reproduced  in  Professor  Browne's  "Reign  of  Terror  in  Tabriz". 
The  other  evidence  is  mainly  that  of  Persian  refugees.  (Thif? 
evidence  is  more  or  less  open  to  question,  but  is  as  good  as  the 
evidence  on  which  much  of  the  Bryce  report  is  based.)  On  this 
evidence,  see  a  letter  from  Professor  Browne  to  the  Manchester 
Guardian  on  February  9,  1912  ;  the  same  paper,  on  September 
3,  1912,  printed  a  communication  from  Mr.  Turner  giving  h-s 
evidence.  What  follows  is  from  these  sources.  The  account  in 
the  Blue  Books  is  hopelessly  inadequate. 

**Our  Ambassador  in  Petrograd  spoke  of  the  execution  of  the 
Sikat-el-Islam  to  M.  Sazonof  as  "a  most  unfortunate  occur- 
rence as  well  as  a  grave  blunder".     Cd.  6264,  No.  52. 

*He  was  superseded  later,  though  Russia  pressed  for  his 
retention. 


198       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

proval  and  that  of  the  British  Consul  in  Tabriz,  this 
man  became  de  facto  Governor  of  Tabriz,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  show  what  resolute  government  could  do. 
The  Russians  did  nothing  to  interfere  with  Shuja's 
activities,  and  the  British  Consul  did  not  report  his 
atrocities.  A  few  samples  of  what  occurred  must 
.suffice. 

^'Mirza  Mahmud  of  Salmas,  one  of  the  Ulema  and 
one  of  those  elected  in  the  elections  of  the  first  degree 
to  membership  of  the  Majlis,  was  put  to  death  in  the 
house  of  Samad  Khan  with  all  sorts  of  torments. 
While  he  was  still  alive  they  plucked  out  his  eyes  and 
cut  out  his  tongue  (for  he  was  an  orator),  after  which 
they  slew  him.  Samad  Khan  offered  to  let  him  go 
on  payment  of  400  tomans,  but  this  sum  he  neither 
possessed  nor  could  obtain." 

"Amongst  the  victims  were  two  young  lads  named 
Hasan  and  Kadir,  aged  18  and  12  respectively,  whose 
only  fault  was  that  their  elder  brothers,  who  were 
national  volunteers,  had  succeeded  in  escaping  across 
the  Turkish  frontier,  where  they  are  still  wander- 
ing, hungry  and  starved  with  cold." 

"He  (Samad  Khan)  beheaded  Na'il  Yusef  of 
Hukmabad  and  afterwards  cut  his  body  in  two  halves 
like  a  sheep,  and  suspended  them  on  either  side  of 
the  bazaar."* 

The  foregoing  quotations  are  from  Nationalist 
refugees,    and   might   therefore    be    doubted   except 

•Photographs  of  the  two  halves  are  published  by  Professor 
Browne  in  "The  Reign  of  Terror  in  Tabriz".  These  are  not 
mentioned  by  Professor  Murray,  who  says :  "According  to 
Nationalist  statements,  they  cut  this  man  (the  chief  Mullah, 
not  Na'il  Yusef"),  in  two  pieces  and  marched  between  them  int» 
the  citadel."  This  statement  gives  no  hint  that  the  evidence 
for  what  really  did  occur  is  conclusive. 


PERSIA  199 

where  the  photographs  obtained  by  Mr.  Turner  sup- 
port them.  What  follows  is  all  from  Mr.  Turner's 
statement. 

"The  relinquishment  of  rifle  and  bayonet  was  only 
the  signal  for  the  appearance  of  the  gallows.  Even 
before  the  installation  of  the  Russians  as  Governor 
on  December  30th,  of  Samad  Khan  Shuja-ud-Dowleh 
the  hangings  begans,  and  Russia  is  responsible  not 
only  for  those  carried  out  by  her  own  officers  but 
for  those  nominally  directed  by  their  appointed  Gov- 
ernor. Nor  can  we  hold  Russia  free  from  the  re- 
sponsibility for  atrocities  perpetuated  by  this  same 
Governor,  such  as  beating  men  to  death  in  water 
ponds,  sewing  up  the  mouths  of  certain  who  had 
spoken  in  favour  of  the  Constitution,  nailing  horse- 
shoes on  men's  feet  and  driving  them  through  the 
bazaar,  and  other  unspeakable  barbarities.  Since 
last  December  the  life  of  no  man  who  was  even  sup- 
posed to  be  in  favour  of  the  Constitution  has  been 
safe,  no  matter  how  honourable  his  character  or  how 
high  his  position. 

"The  Sikat-ul-Islam  was  the  chief  Moslem  ecclesi- 
astic in  Tabriz.  He  was  a  man  of  very  unusual 
ability,  of  great  personal  charm,  and  singularly 
broadminded.  He  was  on  excellent  terms  not  only 
with  his  co-religionists  but  with  the  Christians  of 
the  city.  Early  in  December  he  had  called  on  the 
British  Consul  to  ask  if  he  might  seek  protection  in 
the  Consulate  in  the  event  of  danger  to  himself;  the 
reply  was  that  unless  he  was  in  some  immediate 
danger  the  Consulate  could  not  promise  protection. 
He  called  also  at  the  Russian  Consulate  and  was 


200       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

assured  that  whatever  happened  his  safety  would  be 
respected.  In  the  disturbances  already  described  he 
took  no  part  whatever,  although  he  was  in  sympa- 
thy with  the  Constitution  and  the  struggle  for  Per- 
sian independence.  Nevertheless  he  was  seized  by 
the  Russians,  his  house  was  searched  for  a  list  of 
men  in  favour  of  Constitutional  Government,  and  a 
large  sum  of  money  extracted  from  him  in  return 
for  a  promise  of  his  liberty. 

"His  trial  followed,  and  I  am  told  on  good  author- 
ity that  it  consisted  of  his  being  asked  if  he  had 
written  to  a  friend  in  Urumiah  a  letter  something  to 
the  following  effect :  '  The  Russians  have  attacked  us 
and  we  have  resisted  them,  so  far  effectively.  We 
trust  that  you  will  do  the  same.'  On  admitting  that 
it  was  his  letter,  he  was  dragged  off  to  the  gallows. 
The  gallows,  as  one  can  see  in  a  photograph  in  my 
possession,  was  gaily  painted  like  a  barber's  pole 
with  Russian  colours.  Eight  were  hung  together, 
the  Sikat-ul-Islam  in  the  middle  and  lowest  of  all. 
The  Persian  servants  employed  as  hangmen  by  the 
Russians  refused  to  do  their  work  in  his  case,  until 
they  were  brutally  beaten  by  Russian  officers  with 
their  knouts.  The  Russian  officers  are  to  be  seen 
standing  in  front  of  the  bodies  posing  for  their  photo- 
graph   It  should  be  added  that  this  execution 

took  place  without  the  knowledge  of  the  English 
Consul,  probably  to  avoid  a  protest  on  his  part. ' ' 

"Some  of  those  hung  were  known  personally  to 
Europeans  in  Tabriz,  who  are  positive  that  they  took 
no  part  in  the  fighting.  They  were  hung  simply  be- 
cause they  were  constitutionalists,  although  the  charge 


PERSIA  201 

brought  against  them  probably  was  that  they  incited 
or  encouraged  the  Fidais  to  resistance." 

Shuja  ud-Dowleh,  who  was  de  facto  Governor,  and 
directed  events  after  the  first  day  of  the  Russian 
occupation,  was  objected  to  by  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment. Both  the  Russians  and  the  English  urged  the 
Persians  to  appoint  him  formally  as  Governor,  even 
after  all  his  atrocities  had  been  committed.  Thus 
Sir  E.  Grey  telegraphed,  on  February  25,  1912,  to 
the  British  Minister  at  Teheran:  "Is  there  any 
prospect,  in  view  of  our  combined  action  concern- 
ing the  ex-Shah,  of  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Per- 
sian Government  to  the  appointment  of  Shuja-ud- 
Dowleh  to  the  post  of  Governor-General;  and,  if  so, 
what  confidence  could  they  place  in  his  loyalty  to 
them?"*  Finally  the  objections  of  the  Persian 
Government  were  allowed  to  prevail,  and  another 
Governor  was  appointed,  with  Shuja  as  his  assistant. 

Russian  and  British  action  extinguished  the  hopes 
of  Persia,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  they  can  be 
revived.  A  victorious  Germany  would,  no  doubt,  at 
first  proclaim  itself  the  protector  of  Islam,  and  might 
temporarily  restore  Persian  independence.  But  a 
Germany  established  in  Mesopotamia  and  on  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  would  soon  begin  to  treat  Persia  as  Russia 
has  treated  it.  All  the  Great  Powers,  in  their  deal- 
ings with  weak  nations,  are  predatory  and  brutal. 
In  criticizing  Russian  action  in  Persia,  I  do  not  wish 
to  suggest  that  Germany  would  have  acted  better;  I 
wish  only  to  make  it  clear  that  the  guiding  principles 

•Cd.  6264,  No.  232  (p.  96).  It  is  clear  that  Sir  E.  Grey  did 
not  know  how  Shuja  had  been  behaving. 


202       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

of  European  policy,  in  Asia  as  in  Africa,  are  such  as 
must  bring  horror  and  dismay  to  every  man  with  a 
spark  of  humanity  in  his  nature.*  The  only  hope 
for  Persia,  as  for  the  rest  of  Asia,  seems  to  lie  in  such 
a  weakening  of  all  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  either 
in  this  war  or  in  the  subsequent  wars  foretold  by  Pro- 
fessors here  and  in  Germany,**  as  shall  enable  the 
more  backward  nations  to  throw  off  the  yoke  fastened 
on  them  by  the  Cabinets  and  financiers  of  "civil- 
ized" States.  There  is  indeed  another  possibility: 
some  glimmering  of  justice  and  humanity  might  con- 
ceivably appear  in  the  external  policy  of  the  Powers. 
But  this  cannot  happen  so  long  as  their  worst  acts  are 
whitewashed  by  their  best  citizens.  So  long  as  we 
continue  to  know  the  faults  of  our  enemies,  and  to 
be  ignorant  of  the  faults  of  our  friends  and  ourselves, 
it  is  possible  for  men  who  have  no  bad  desires  to 
join  in  the  hatred  produced  by  pride  and  fear,  and 
to  contribute,  against  their  will,  to  the  forces  of  an- 
tagonism which  stand  in  the  way  of  a  better  spirit. 
Righteousness  cannot  be  born  until  self -righteousness 
is  dead. 

**Cf.  Professor  Ridgeway  as  reported  in  The  Times,  7th  May, 
1915,  who  is  reported  as  having  said:  "Far  from  this  being 
the  last  war,  the  hard  facts  pointed  rather  to  its  being  the 
first  of  a  vast  series  of  struggles  different  from  those  yet 
known" ;  and  in  an  exactly  similar  sense,  Eduard  Meyer  in 
"Scientia",  March,  1915. 


V.     WHAT  OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO 
HAVE  BEEN 

It  is  more  difficult  to  say  what  we  ought  to  have 
done  than  to  see,  now  that  war  has  come,  that  what 
we  did  was  not  the  best  possible.  The  most  effective 
defence  of  Sir  E.  Grey  consists  in  pointing  to  Ger- 
man aggressiveness  and  German  strength  and  asking 
how  otherwise  it  could  have  been  met.*  To  this 
there  are  answers  of  details,  and  there  is  a  broad 
answer  which  challenges  the  whole  spirit  and  pur- 
pose of  the  foreign  policy  pursued  by  all  the  Great 
Powers  of  Europe. 

Beginning  with  answers  of  detail,  we  find  that 
England,  on  various  occasions,  pursued  a  policy  of 
quite  needless  hostility  to  Germany,  and  acted  in  a 
way  which  was  ideally  suited  to  increase  the  hold 
of  militarism  and  aggression  on  German  public 
opinion.  How  we  acted  in  regard  to  Morocco  has 
already  been  shown.  In  helping  to  suppress  the  Rus- 
sian revolution,  we  were  not  only  committing  a  crime 
against  Russia,  a  crime  against  liberty,  and  a  crime 
against  humanity,  but  we  were  preventing  the  re- 
moval of  the  chief  argument  by  which  the  military 

•This  is  the  defence  with  which  Pofessor  Murray  concludes 
his  pamphlet.  Speaking  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  policy  in  Persia, 
he  says :  "As  a  Liberal  and  a  reasonable  man,  I  cannot  con- 
demn it,  though  I  admit  that  it  has  failed  to  achieve  its  full 
object."  And  again,  after  enumerating  various  views  with  which 
neither  he  nor  I  agree,  he  says :  "All  these  classes  of  politician 
have  a  right  to  attack  and  denounce  Sir  Edward  Grey  for  his 
policy  in  Persia,  but  Liberals,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  have  no 
right."  This  line  of  defence  is  by  far  the  strongest,  but  I  do 
not  think  it  will  bear  careful  examination. 


204       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

party  have  appealed  to  the  ordinary  citizen  in  Ger- 
many. Militarists  everywhere  base  their  appeal  up- 
on fear:  powerful  neighbors,  they  say,  are  ready  to 
attack  us,  and  unless  we  are  prepared  we  shall  be 
overwhelmed.  The  chief  bogey  used  by  German  mil- 
itarists for  this  purpose  was  Russia.  If  the  Russian 
revolution  had  been  successful,  this  bogey  would 
have  ceased  to  be  efficacious,  and  a  Liberal  move- 
ment in  Germany  would  have  had  a  far  better  chance 
of  success.  By  rehabilitating  the  Russian  autocracy, 
we  took  one  of  the  surest  means  of  reinforcing  Ger- 
man militarism. 

Our  opposition  to  German  Colonial  expansion  was 
another  source  of  encouragement  to  German  aggres- 
siveness.* Apart  from  the  Moroccan  question,  there 
was  the  Bagdad  Railway  question,  which  had  a  pro- 
found influence  upon  the  fate  of  Persia.  "We  op- 
posed the  railway,  and  German  enterprise  in  Meso- 
potamia, because  it  was  intended  that  the  railway, 
under  German  control,  should  have  a  terminus  on 
the  Persian  Gulf,  where  we  considered  that  we  had 
special  interests  on  account  of  India.  It  was  sup- 
posed that  a  German  naval  base  on  the  Gulf  would 
constitute  a  strategic  danger  to  our  naval  command 
of  the  Indian  Ocean.  On  this  ground,  we  opposed 
the  railway  unless  it  were  either  internationalised 
or  not  allowed  to  extend  south  of  Bagdad.    At  first 


•Professor  Murray  quotes  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  of  Nov. 
27,  1911,  in  which  he  stated  that  we  did  not  wish  to  indulge 
in  a  dog-in-the-manger  policy,  or  to  oppose  German  desires  for 
an  extension  of  territory  by  friendly  arrangement,  but  that  there 
were  certain  places  which,  on  account  of  British  interests,  we 
should  not  wish  to  see  in  other  hands.  In  practice,  however,  these 
places  have  been  found,  since  1904,  to  include  all  places  that 
Germany  in  fact  desired. 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  BEEN      205 

the  Russians  also  opposed  it,  but  after  the  Potsdam 
Agreement  of  1910,  they  withdrew  their  opposition 
in  return  for  a  free  hand  in  Persia.  If  we  had  been 
the  first  to  withdraw  our  opposition,  we  could,  if  we 
had  Avished,  have  procured  a  quid  pro  quo  which  would 
have  been  a  gain,  and  not  a  loss,  to  the  general 
interests  of  mankind.  We  could,  for  example,  have 
demanded  German  support  in  maintaining  the  in- 
dependence and  integrity  of  Persia.  The  strategical 
danger  which  we  feared  was  purely  imaginary:  so 
long  as  the  Germans  did  not  secure  command  of  the 
sea,  anything  which  caused  them  to  divide  their  Navy 
was  an  advantage  to  us,  as  has  been  shown  by  the 
fate  of  their  Pacific  fleet.  But  on  account  of  this 
imaginery  danger,  we  opposed  their  colonial  ambi- 
tions, and  drove  them  to  acquiesce  in  Russia's  Per- 
sian crimes. 

Another  example  of  the  recklessness  with  which  we 
allowed  our  relations  with  Germany  to  become  em- 
bittered is  the  Naval  Scare  of  1909,  which,  though 
not  connected  with  the  Foreign  Office,  had  such  an 
influence  on  Anglo-German  friction  as  to  require 
mention,* 

In  that  year,  Mr.  McKenna,  in  his  official  state- 
ment as  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  accused  the 
German  Government  of  secretly  accelerating  their 
naval  programme,  and  of  being  able  to  construct 
eight  Dreadnoughts  at  once  instead  of  four,  which 

•Accounts  of  this  scare  may  be  read  in  G.  H.  Perris,  "Our 
Foreign  Policy  and  Sir  Edward  Grey's  Failure"  and  "The  "War 
Traders :  an  Exposure"  ;  Hirst,  "The  Six  Panics"  ;  J.  T.  Walton 
Newbould,  "How  Asquith  Helped  the  Armour  Ring"  (National 
Labour  Press,  Id.)  ;  "Armaments  and  Patriotism,"  6  articles 
In  the  "Daily  News"  for  May,  1913. 


206       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

was  their  official  figure.  We  were  told  that  they  could 
build  ships  more  quickly  than  we  could,  and  that 
we  ran  a  risk  of  being  inferior  to  them  at  sea  during 
the  year  1912.  Mr.  McKenna  estimated  that  in 
April,  1912,  they  would  have  17  Dreadnoughts;  Mr. 
Balfour  estimated  that  they  would  have  21  or  25.  By 
the  middle  of  1912,  they  had  in  fact  13.  It  was  stated 
that  Krupp's  had  increased  the  number  of  their  em- 
ployees since  January,  1907,  from  64,000  to  100,000, 
when  in  fact,  as  appeared  from  "The  Times"  of 
January  4,  1910,  there  had  been  a  slight  decrease  in 
the  number  during  the  two  years  from  January,  1907, 
to  January,  1909.  The  accusation  of  trickery  against 
the  German  Government  was  made  the  basis  of  a 
terrific  alarmist  campaign,  by  our  Government  and 
still  more  by  Mr.  Balfour,  the  present  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  according  to  whom  it  was  too  late  to 
secure  our  naval  supremacy  in  the  year  1912,  and  we 
could  only  be  meek  and  hope  the  Germans  would  do 
nothing  until  we  had  again  caught  them  up.  His 
lugubrious  joy  was  part  of  the  campaign  against  the 
"People's  Budget,"  and  was  carried  on  throughout 
the  General  Election  of  January,  1910. 

The  "facts"  upon  which  the  Government  based  its 
Navy  Estimates  in  1909  were  wholly  false,*  and,  as 
the  Government  itself  was  subsequently  forced  to 
confess,  the  actual  numbers  of  German  Dreadnoughts 

♦Professor  Murray  on  the  subject  of  the  scare  says:  "There 
were  great  suspicions  of  secret  shipbuilding  in  this  year  and  the 
next,  and  in  1909  facts  which  came  to  the  knowledge  of  Mr. 
McKenna,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  made  him  demand 
an  unusual  increase  of  the  British  programme.  His  fears  were, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  not  realised,  though  the  statements  of  fact 
which  he  made  were  quite  accurate."  Professor  Murray  does 
not  mention  Mr.  Mulliner,  the  hero  of  the  melodrama. 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  BEEN      207 

in  the  following  years  fell  far  short  of  the  numbers 
expected  by  our  Admiralty.**  As  is  customary  in 
such  cases,  the  Government  did  not  reveal  the  source 
of  its  information.  Fortunately  the  man  who  had 
informed  them  of  our  danger  himself  boasted,  later 
on,  of  the  part  he  had  played  in  saving  the  Empire.*** 
The  man  from  whom  the  Government  derived  its 
information  was  Mr.  MuUiner,  the  enterprising  Man- 
aging Director  of  the  Coventry  Ordnance  Works,  a 
firm  which  obtained  fewer  orders  from  the  Admiralty 
than  it  thought  it  deserved.  On  March  3,  Mr. 
Mulliner  gave  evidence  before  the  Cabinet  as  to  the 
enormous  acceleration  in  Germany  in  the  production 
of  armaments,  and  particularly  of  guns  and  gun- 
mountings.  On  March  16,  Mr.  McKenna  introduced 
the  Naval  Estimates,  in  a  speech  based  upon  Mr. 
Mulliner 's  evidence.  He  asked  for  an  increase  of 
nearly  £3,000,000,  on  the  ground  that  Germany  was 
trying  to  steal  a  march  on  us  and  to  emerge  sud- 
denly with  a  Navy  stronger  than  ours.  The  House 
of  Commons  was  not  told  that  these  statements  rested 
upon  the  assertions  of  an  individual  with  a  strong 
financial  interest  in  the  increased  production  of  naval 
guns.  In  England,  most  men  accepted  the  statements 
as  gospel.  The  German  Government,  which  knew  them 
to  be  false,  very  naturally  supposed  that  our  Govern- 
ment wished  to  produce  a  quarrel.  No  doubt  our 
Government  was  deceived;  but  the  Germans  were 
pardonable  if  they  supposed  it  less  simple-minded 
than  it  was. 

♦*See  Mr.  McKenna's  reply  to  Mr.  Robert  Harcourt,  House  of 
Commons,   February  8,   1910. 

***See  "Times",  January  3,  1910. 


208       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

After  the  scare,  the  Coventry  Ordnance  Works 
secured  the  orders  it  desired,  but,  with  singular  in- 
gratitude, it  dispensed  with  the  further  services  of 
Mr.  MuUiner. 

The  fear  inspired  by  the  scare,  and  by  Mr.  Bal- 
four's speeches  on  the  Navy  in  the  following  months, 
did  much  to  persuade  the  English  people  that  war 
with  Germany  could  not  be  permanently  avoided. 
The  effect  on  the  popular  imagination  survived,  and 
so  did  the  effect  in  Germany  produced  by  an  official 
charge  of  underhand  dealing  preferred  against  Ger- 
many by  our  Government. 

The  view  now  widely  prevalent  in  England,  that 
Germany,  for  many  pears  past,  has  been  deliberately, 
without  provocation,  planning  and  preparing  for  the 
present  war,  is  not  one  which,  in  view  of  the  facts, 
can  be  maintained.*  It  is  clear  that  there  were  men 
in  Germany,  at  first  few,  but  gradually  more  and 
more,  who  expected  war  and  prepared  for  it  and  even 
desired  it.  There  were  such  men  also  in  England,  in 
France,  and  in  Russia,  though  in  the  end  probably 
not  so  many  as  in  Germany.  The  way  to  diminish 
the  number  of  such  men  would  have  been  to  show  that 
every  legitimate  German  aspiration  would  not  be  op- 
posed by  other  Powers.  Instead  of  adopting  this 
method,  we  made  it  plain,  by  our  opposition  to  Ger- 
many's colonial  ambitions,  by  our  policy  of  Ententes, 
and  by  our  suspicions  and  reckless  accusations,  that 
Germany's  aims,  even  when  they  were  exactly  sim- 
ilar to  our  own,  could  only  be  secured  by  force  or 

*Thi3  view  is  taken  by  Professor  Murray  in  the  last  section 
but  one  of  his  pamphlet,  called  "The  Peril  in  the  Background." 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO   HAVE  BEEN    209 

by  a  terrifying  threat  of  force.  All  the  evidence  goes 
to  show  that  in  July,  1914,  Germany  supposed  her 
threat  of  force  so  terrifying  that  Austria  would  be 
allowed  to  attack  Serbia  without  interference.  I  do 
not  in  any  way  palliate  the  crime  of  Germany  and 
Austria  in  so  acting  as  to  bring  on  war;  but  it  is 
evident  that  the  policy  of  the  Triple  Entente,  through- 
out the  previous  years,  had  been  such  as  to  encourage 
the  warlike  elements  in  Germany,  by  showing  on  our 
side  a  readiness  for  war,  an  amazing  unscrupulous- 
ness,  and  a  desire  to  thwart  Germany  in  ways  in  which 
no  wise  statesman  would  have  wished  to  thwart  her. 
If  I  had  been  a  German,  I  should  have  done  all  in 
my  power  to  discourage  German  ambitions,  which  I 
consider  foolish  and  brutal;  being  English,  I  should 
have  wished  to  show  that  England's  ambitions  were 
of  a  nobler  kind.  But  the  history  of  the  past  years 
shows  that  our  ambitions  were  of  the  same  kind  as 
those  of  Germany,  and  only  our  methods  were  differ- 
ent. 

How  are  we  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  this  long 
history  of  deceit,  cruelty,  and  preparation  for  war? 
The  English  people  is,  I  believe,  the  most  humane, 
generous,  and  peace-loving  in  the  world  :*  consciously 
and  of  set  purpose,  it  would  never  tolerate  such  a 
policy  as  its  chosen  rulers  have  carried  on  for  the 
last  eleven  years.  But  public  attention  was  en- 
grossed by  the  struggle  in  home  politics:  the  fight 
over  the  Budget,  the  Parliament  Act,  and  Home  Rule 
made  Radicals  in  Parliament  unwilling  to  discredit 
the  Government,  and  unable  to  obtain  a  hearing  for 

•Except,  perhaps,  the  people  in  America. 


210       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

such  criticism  as  they  attempted.  The  first  and  most 
indispensable  requisite,  if  this  nation  and  others  are 
not  again  to  be  led  blindfolded  into  crime  and  disaster, 
is  that  everywhere  men  should  learn  to  be  interested 
in  foreign  affairs,  to  follow  them  closely,  and  to  bring 
the  pressure  of  public  opinion  to  bear  upon  diplomacy. 
The  war,  we  may  hope,  will  have  taught  the  democ- 
racies this  lesson,  that  they  cannot  safely  permit 
themselves  to  ignore  dealings  with  foreign  countries, 
or  blindly  follow  the  lead  of  men  who  say  they  de- 
serve their  trust. 

The  next  thing  to  be  achieved  is  to  destroy  the 
evil  tradition  of  "continuity"  in  foreign  policy.  This 
tradition,  like  much  that  is  worst  in  modern  Liberal- 
ism, is  due  to  Lord  Roseberry,  In  the  days  of  Glad- 
stone and  Disraeli,  Palmerton  and  Lord  Derby,  Fox 
and  Pitt,  Chatham  and  Lord  North,  and  right  back 
to  the  time  of  the  Stuarts,  the  parties  were  hotly 
divided  on  foreign  policy.  The  absence  of  division 
dates  from  Gladstone's  retirement,  when  Lord  Rose- 
bery  dramatically  dropped  the  agitation  against 
Armenian  massacres.  Continuity  represents  no  real 
need  of  national  safety,  but  merely  a  closing  up  of 
the  ranks  among  the  governing  classes  against  their 
common  enemy  the  people.  Ever  since  1832,  the 
upper  classes  of  England  have  been  faced  with  the 
problem  of  retaining  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
substance  of  power  while  abandoning  the  forms  to 
the  clamour  of  democrats.  They  have  gradually  lost 
control  over  legislation,  while  retaining  in  the  maia 
their  hold  of  the  administrative  and  judicial  sides  of 
government.     In   foreign   affairs,   their   ascendancy, 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  BEEN  211 

threatened  by  the  Manchester  school  and  Gladstone, 
was  completely  recovered  twenty  years  ago,  and  sur- 
vived, as  we  have  seen,  even  the  collapse  of  1906. 
Only  by  reintroducing  foreign  affairs  into  the  arena 
of  party  politics  can  this  ascendancy  be  destroyed. 

So  long  as  both  the  great  Parties  pursue  the  same 
foreign  policy,  there  can  be  no  continuous  effective 
critisism.  Effective  criticism,  criticism  which  shall 
be  heard  and  felt  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  land,  is  only  possible,  at  normal  times,  when  it 
is  voiced  by  well-known  politicians  and  echoed  by 
widely-read  newspapers.  The  criticisms  of  back-bench 
Members  can  always  be  disposed  of  by  the  simple 
process  of  not  answering  or  reporting  them.  There 
cannot,  in  the  long  run,  be  any  effective  democratic 
control  of  foreign  affairs  unless  prominent  states- 
men and  newspapers  are  divided  and  are  engaged 
in  mutual  criticism.  But  it  is  possible,  at  times  when 
the  nation  is  strongly  stirred,  for  public  opinion  to 
impose  a  policy  on  a  Party,  as  opposition  to  Chinese 
Labour  was  imposed  on  the  reluctant  Liberals  in 
1905,  or  as  Free  Trade  was  forced  on  Sir  Robert 
Peel  in  1845.  This  must  be  attempted,  in  regard  to 
our  diplomacy,  when  the  present  war  is  at  an  end. 
Perhaps  it  may  prove  a  less  formidable  undertaking 
than  most  people  would  now  suppose. 

The  interests  of  the  British  democracy  do  not  con- 
flict at  any  point  with  the  interests  of  mankind.  The 
interests  of  the  British  governing  classes  conflict  at 
many  points  with  the  interests  of  mankind. 
The  conquest  of  a  new  colony  does  not  raise  the  wages 
of  British  labour,  but  it  affords  posts  for  younger  sons 


212        THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

and  attractive  investments  for  capitalists.  For  this 
reason,  a  policy  of  adventure  and  national  prestige 
appeals  most  forcibly  to  the  rich,  while  the  wage- 
earning  class,  if  it  understood  its  own  interests  and 
were  not  caught  by  the  glamour  of  Jingo  phrases, 
would  insist  upon  a  policy  of  peace  and  international 
conciliation.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that,  when  the  dem- 
ocracy realises,  as  it  now  will,  its  vital  interest  in 
foreign  policy,  it  will  compel  the  Party  representing 
it  to  adopt  such  a  programme  as  all  friends  of  human- 
ity would  desire.  ^ 

If  our  foreign  policy  is  to  become  democratic,  its 
aims  must  become  such  as  to  further  the  welfare  of 
the  democracy  at  home,  and  in  consequence  such  as 
will  not  injure  foreign  nations. 

The  aims  of  our  foreign  policy  must  become  genu- 
inely unaggressive,  and  such  diplomatic  and  financial 
influence  as  we  exert  on  foreign  countries  must  be  in 
furtherance  of  peace  and  freedom. 

The  first  step  should  be  to  announce  that  the  Brit- 
ish Empire  is  large  enough,  and  that  we  firmly  in- 
tend not  to  occupy  any  new  parts  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face.* Alike  in  times  of  war  and  in  times  of  peace, 
the  British  Empire  has  steadily  grown  and  is  still 
growing.  Germany,  which  we  regard  as  far  more 
aggressive  than  ourselves,  would  be  amply  satisfied 

•Professor  Murray  says :  "The  first  principle  of  the  present 
agreed  and  continuous  Foreign  Policy  is  that  we  seek  no  increase 
of  territory."  It  may  be  that  we  do  not  seek  it,  but  Germans 
may  be  pardoned  for  pointing  out  that  we  always  get  it.  In  this 
war,  apart  from  annexing  Cyprus  and  declaring  a  protectorate 
in  Egypt,  we  have  conquered  German  South  West  Africa,  Togo- 
land,  German  New  Guinea,  Samoa,  and  many  places  of  less 
importance.  If  we  are  as  successful  as  we  hope  to  be,  we  shall 
keep  all  these  (except  perhaps  Togoland),  and  probably  also 
Mesopotamia. 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  BEEN   213 

if  its  colonial  possessions  increased  at  half  the  rate 
at  which  ours  have  increased  during  the  last  forty 
years.  The  desire  for  colonies  is  essentially  a  folly, 
based  partly  on  vanity,  partly  on  economic  mistakes. 
Let  us  announce  that  we  regard  it  in  that  light,  and 
that  we  have  no  desire  to  increase  the  immense  ter- 
ritory which  we  now  hold.  Let  us  announce  also 
that  we  will  not  again,  as  in  the  case  of  Morocco, 
promise  military  and  naval  support  to  any  other 
Power  for  purposes  of  colonial  conquest.  We  should 
then  be  left  with  no  cause  for  fighting  except  genuine 
self-defence. 

Self-defence  depends  mainly  upon  the  Navy,  and 
no  defensive  policy  is  possible  for  us  without  a  Navy 
strong  enough  to  defeat  any  probable  aggressor.  But 
the  Navy  is  a  weapon  of  offence  as  well  as  of  defence, 
and  it  is  in  its  offensive  capacity  that  it  is  disliked 
abroad.  Its  powers  of  offence  are  chiefly  two:  it 
enables  us  to  conquer  an  enemy's  colonies,  and  it 
enables  us  to  capture  his  trade.  If  we  genuinely 
ceased  to  desire  new  colonies,  the  first  of  these  of- 
fensive powers  would  become  unimportant.  The  sec- 
ond ought  to  be  definitely  abandoned  by  surrendering 
the  right  of  capture  at  sea.  Before  the  war,  this 
right  was  upheld  by  the  English  and  German  Ad- 
miralties* as  a  means  of  reconciling  their  subject 
populations  to  the  burdens  of  naval  expenditure.  For 
offensive  purposes,  as  we  see  at  the  present  moment, 

♦Before  the  war,  Liberal  opinion  was  against  the  maintenance 
of  this  right.  On  the  recent  attitude  (before  the  war)  of  the 
German  Admiralty,  see  Mr.  J.  H.  Robertson's  Introduction  tn 
Wehberg's  "Right  to  Capture  on  Land  and  at  Sea,"  a  most 
useful  book,  by  a  man  who  is  now  being  persecuted  by  the 
German  Government  on  account  of  his  fair-mindedness. 


214       THE  ENTENTE  POLICY,  1904-1915 

it  is  a  powerful  weapon.  But  for  defensive  purposes 
it  is  a  positive  weakness,  since  it  would  render  fatal 
even  the  briefest  loss  of  our  command  of  the  sea. 
The  Germans  are  now  clamouring  for  its  abolition. 
If  we  abandoned  it,  our  Navy  would  become  obviously 
defensive,  and  would  cease  to  be  a  threat  to  foreign 
commence.  Probably  a  naval  agreement  with  Ger- 
many could  easily  be  embodied  in  the  Peace  in  return 
for  our  abandonment  of  this  barbarous  practise. 

In  our  relations  with  foreign  States,  we  ought  to 
endeavour  to  conclude  arbitration  treaties  such  as  the 
one  we  have  recently  concluded  with  America.  We 
ought  to  make  it  clear  that  we  shall  not  engage  in 
war  except  when  we  are  attacked,*  and  we  ought 
to  avoid  all  such  alliances  and  understandings  as 
might  lead  foreign  Powers  to  expect  armed  support 
from  us  in  the  event  of  their  being  at  war.  Such 
diplomatic  and  financial  pressure  as  we  should  be 
able  to  exert  without  threatening  Avar  ought  not  to 
be  given  to  certain  nations  regarded  as  "friends" 
and  withheld  from  certain  others  regarded  as  at  least 
potential  "enemies."  It  ought  to  be  given  accord- 
ing to  democratic  principles,  for  the  support  of  free- 
dom and  peace,  not  for  the  support  of  this  or  that 
State  regardless  of  its  behaviour.  If  we  had  fol- 
lowed this  course  in  1906,  it  is  probable  that  Russia 
would  now  be  a  Liberal  Power.  If  we  had  followed 
it  in  1911,  Persia  would,  in  all  likelihood,  be  free, 
prosperous,  and  Parliamentary.     If  we  had  followed 

•Unless  an  International  League  of  Great  Powers  could  be 
formed  to  resist  all  aggrression  everywhere,  and  to  insist  upon 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes.  In  that  case,  we  might  be 
willing  to  participate  in  a  war  to  enforce  its  decisions. 


OUR  POLICY  OUGHT  TO  HAVE  BEEN  215 

it  in  regard  to  Morocco,  neither  the  Tangier  crisis 
nor  the  Agadir  crisis  would  have  occurred,  and 
Franco-German  relations  would  have  continued,  as 
before  1904,  to  become  more  friendly  and  less  domin- 
ated by  hopes  of  the  ^'revanche." 

A  rich  creditor  nation,  such  as  England,  has,  with- 
out the  threat  of  war,  enormous  influence  in  inter- 
national affairs  through  its  power  of  granting  or 
withholding  loans.  This  power,  hitherto,  has  become 
subordinated  to  the  diplomatic  game.  But  it  might 
be  used,  as  Palmerston  used  naval  power,  to  further 
liberal  ideas,  to  prevent  oppression,  and  to  promote 
the  growth  of  democracy.  In  this  way,  we  should 
not  only  assist  to  make  the  world  at  large  a  happier 
place,  but  we  should  secure  the  warm  friendship  of 
progressive  parties  and  nations  everywhere,  as  we  se- 
cured the  friendship  of  Italy  and  Greece  by  assist- 
ing them  in  their  struggle  for  liberation.  This  role 
is  worthy  of  a  great  and  free  people:  to  lead  the 
nations  peacefully  along  the  road  to  freedom,  to  be 
not  merely  the  most  astute  politicians  in  the  tragic 
and  futile  game  of  armed  force,  but  effective  pioneers 
in  the  aspiration  towards  international  peace  and  con- 
cord. This  is  the  role  of  true  glory,  of  true  honour, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  the  surest  and  bravest  policy 
for  our  own  prosperity  and  safety.  Generosity  and 
wisdom  alike  urge  this  course;  against  it,  stand  the 
money  market  and  aristocratic  prejudice.  Which  will 
the  nation  follow? 


APPENDIX  A. 

Press  Interpretations  of  Our  Guarantee  to  Belgium 
in  1887. 

On  Feb.  4,  1887,  The  Standard  contained  a  letter 
signed  "Diplomaticus",  and  a  leading  article  which 
"is  generally  believed  to  have  been  semi-official".* 
The  letter  was  as  follows : 

THE  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM. 
To  the  Editor  of  the  Standard, 

Sir: — It  is  with  no  wish  to  add  to  the  fears  that 
prevail  on  all  sides  at  the  present  moment,  but  sim- 
ply from  a  desire,  which  I  think  you  will  hold  to  be 
pardonable,  that  the  English  people  should  reflect, 
in  good  time,  what  may  prove  to  be  the  nature  and 
extent  of  their  difficulties  and  responsibilities  in  the 
event  of  war  between  France  and  Germany,  that  I 
take  up  my  pen  to  urge  you  to  lay  before  them  the 
following  considerations. 

Military  experts  are  of  opinion  that  France  has 
spent  so  much  money,  and  spent  it  so  well,  during 
the  last  sixteen  years  in  providing  herself  with  a  fresh 
military  frontier,  that  a  direct  advance  by  the  Ger- 
man Armies  into  France,  past  the  new  fortresses 
and  forts  that  have  been  erected  and  linked  together, 
would  be,  even  if  a  possible,  a  very  hazardous  under- 
taking. 

But  if  Germany  was,  or  considered  itself  to  be, 
provoked  into   a   struggle   of  life   and   death  with 

•"England's  Guarantee  to  Belgium  and  Luxemburg",  by  C.  P. 
Sanger  and  H.  T.  J.  Norton.     Allen  and  Unwln,  1915,  page  99. 


APPENDIX  A  217 

France,  would  Prince  Bismarck,  with  the  mighty- 
forces  he  can  set  in  motion,  consent  to  be  baffled  by 
the  artificial  obstacles  to  which  I  have  alluded,  so 
long  as  there  existed  a  natural  and  undefended  road 
by  which  he  could  escape  from  his  embarrassment? 

Such  a  road  or  way  out  does  exist.  It  lies  on  Bel- 
gian territory.  But  the  neutrally  of  Belgium  is  pro- 
tected by  European  guarantee,  and  England  is  one  of 
the  Guarantors. 

In  1870  Earl  Granville,  then  at  the  head  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  alive  to  this  danger,  promptly 
and  wisely  bound  England  to  side  with  France  if 
Prussia  violated  Belgian  territory,  and  to  side  with 
Prussia  if  France  did  so. 

Would  Lord  Salisbury  act  prudently  to  take  upon 
himself  a  similar  engagement,  in  the  event  of  a  fresh 
conflict  between  those  two  countries  ?  It  is  for  English 
men  to  answer  the  question.  But  it  seems  to  me,  as 
one  not  indifferent  to  the  interests  and  greatness  of 
England,  that  such  a  course  at  the  present 
moment  would  be  unwise  to  the  last  degree.  However 
much  England  might  regret  the  invasion  of  Belgian 
territory  by  either  party  to  the  struggle,  she  could  not 
take  part  with  France  against  Germany  (even  if  Ger- 
many were  to  seek  to  turn  the  French  flank  by  pouring 
its  Armies  through  the  Belgian  Ardennes),  without 
utterly  vitiating  and  destroying  the  main  purposes  of 
English  policy  all  over  the  world. 

But,  it  will  be  asked,  must  not  England  honour  its 
signature  and  be  faithful  to  its  public  pledges?  I 
reply  that  your  Foreign  Minister  ought  to  be  equal  to 
the  task  of  meeting  this  objection  without  committing 


218  APPENDIX  A 

England  to  war.  The  temporary  use  of  a  right  of  way 
is  something  different  from  a  permanent  and  wrong- 
ful possession  of  territory ;  and  surely  England  would 
easily  be  able  to  obtain  from  Prince  Bismarck  ample 
and  adequate  guarantees  that  at  the  close  of  the  con- 
flict, the  territory  of  Belgium  should  remain  intact  as 
before? 

You  will  see,  Sir,  that  I  raise,  in  a  very  few  words, 
an  exceedingly  important  question.  It  is  for  the 
English  people  to  perpend  and  pronounce.  But  it  is 
high  time  they  reflected  on  it. 

I  am,  Sir, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

Diplomaticus. 

Feb.  2. 

The  article  in  the  ' '  Standard ' '  ran  as  follows : 

"We  are  reminded  this  morning,  by  a  Correspond- 
ent who  speaks  with  high  authority,  that  while  we 
are  all  wondering  how  long  it  will  be  before  a  fresh 
conflict  breaks  out  between  France  and  Germany, 
Englishmen  are  shutting  their  eyes  to  a  question 
closely,  and  perhaps  inevitably,  allied  with  that  con- 
tingent event,  and  affecting  the  interests  of  this  coun- 
try more  vitally  than  they  could  be  affected  even  by 
any  probable  result  from  the  struggle  between  those 
two  powerful  States.  ' '  Diplomaticus ' '  writes  with  un- 
professional terseness ;  but  his  observations  are  to  the 
point,  a,nd  are  expressed  with  significant  lucidity. 
Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  nature  or  as  to 
the  gravity  of  the  question  raised  in  his  communica- 
tion. In  the  event  of  war  between  Germany  and 
France,  and  in  case  either  Germany  or  France  were 


APPENDIX  A  219 

to  disregard  the  neutrality  of  Belgian  territory,  what 
ought  England  to  do?  That  is  the  question,  and  he 
indicates  pretty  plainly  a  reply  with  which,  we  may 
say  at  once,  we  do  not  believe  the  English  people  will 
be  disposed  to  quarrel.  In  order,  however,  to  enable 
them  to  respond  to  the  inquiry  with  full  knowledge 
and  deliberate  judgment,  it  is  necessary  to  lay  before 
them  the  facts  and  contingencies  of  the  situation  some- 
what more  amply  and  more  iti  extenso  than  is  done  by 
"  Diplomaticus. "  On  the  Declaration  of  War  by 
France  against  Prussia,  in  1870,  Earl  Granville,  as 
we  all  know,  with  more  promptness  and  decision  than 
he  usually  displayed,  sought  to  secure  respect  for 
Belgian  territory  by  notif  jang  that,  should  either  com- 
batant ignore  the  neutrality  secured  to  it  by  public 
treaty,  England  would  side  actively  with  the  other 
combatant.  It  may  be  said,  why  cannot  the  same 
course  be  pursued  once  more,  in  the  event  of  a  similar 
condition  of  affairs  coming  into  play  ?  The  answer  is 
that  a  similar  condition  of  affairs  no  longer  exists.  In 
the  first  place,  in  1870  neither  of  the  combatants  had 
any  pressing  temptation  to  resort  to  a  violation  of 
Belgian  territory,  in  the  execution  of  their  military 
designs.  The  territory  of  Germany  was  avowedly 
vulnerable  in  several  places;  and  France  was  so  as- 
sured of  its  military  superiority,  and  so  confident  that 
"A  Berlin!"  not  "Nach  Paris!"  would  prove  the 
successful  war  cry  of  the  struggle,  that  no  precautions 
had  been  taken  against  the  possibility  of  France  be- 
ing invaded.  As  the  event  proved,  even  such  magnifi- 
cent fortresses  as  Metz  and  Strasburg,  with  their  large 
civil  population  and  their  imperfect  stores  of  provis- 


220  APPENDIX  A 

ions,  proved  an  encumbrance  and  a  source  of  danger 
rather  than  one  of  safety;  and,  these  once  invested, 
there  was  nothing  to  stop  the  march  of  the  victors  of 
Sedan  towards  the  French  capital.  Metz  and  Stras- 
burg  are  now  German  fortresses ;  and  no  one  requires 
to  be  told  that  Germany  has  neglected  no  precautions 
or  expedients  to  render  an  invasion  of  the  territory 
of  the  Fatherland  a  difficult  if  not  an  impracticable 
undertaking.  Armed  to  the  head  for  offence,  Ger- 
many is  likewise  armed  to  the  heel  for  defence.  She 
is  more  invulnerable  than  Achilles,  for  there  is  no 
point  uncovered. 

How  stands  it  with  France  as  regards  defence 
against  invasion?  During  the  last  sixteen  years  all 
that  money  profusely  spent,  and  military  skill  judi- 
ciously applied,  could  do  to  provide  her  with  a  strong 
military  frontier  against  Germany,  has  been  quietly, 
but  steadily  and  unremittingly,  carried  forward.  Not 
only  does  France  possess  a  first  line  of  fortresses,  con- 
tiguous to  German  territory,  in  Belfort,  Epinal,  Toul, 
and  Verdun ;  but  all  four  are  linked  with  each  other, 
in  succession,  by  another  line  of  detached  forts.  Not 
to  encumber  ourselves  here  with  military  details,  the 
full  exposition  of  which  would  demand  considerable 
space,  we  may  say  that  "Diplomaticus"  is  guilty  of  no 
exaggeration  when  he  declares  that  military  experts 
are  of  opinion  that  France  has  spent  so  much  money, 
and  spent  it  so  well,  since  the  last  war  in  providing 
herself  with  a  fresh  military  frontier,  that  a  direct 
advance  by  the  German  Armies  into  France  past  the 
new  fortresses  and  forts  that  have  been  erected  and 
linked  together  would  be,  even  if  a  possible,  a  very 


APPENDIX  A  221 

hazardous  undertaking.  There  are,  however,  two 
other  ways  of  entering  Prance  from  Germany.  One  is 
through  Switzerland;  the  other  is  through  Belgium. 
Both  are  what  is  understood  by  "neutral  territory"; 
but  the  mountainous  character  of  Switzerland  renders 
access  to  France  through  its  passes  more  arduous  and 
less  available  than  through  the  territory  of  Belgium. 
In  case  the  German  armies  found  themselves  practi- 
cally prevented  from  engaging  in  offensive  military 
operations  against  France  by  the  admirable  line  of 
defence  with  which  she  has  provided  herself,  would 
Prince  Bismarck,  and  the  great  soldiers  whom  he 
would  inspire,  consent  to  be  thwarted  by  the  inviola- 
bility of  Belgium  as  guaranteed  by  European  Treaty  ? 
"  Diplomatieus "  puts  the  question  with  undiplomatic 
bluntness.  He  forbears  from  answering  it;  and  so 
must  we.  But  it  will  be  obvious  to  everybody  that 
there  is  a  possibility,  a  danger,  of  Germany  not  being 
willing  to  be  debarred  from  invading  France  by  an 
obstacle  that  has  grown  up  since  the  Treaty  guaran- 
teeing the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  signed.  Our 
readers  will  at  once  perceive  that  the  situation  is  ab- 
solutely different  from  the  one  that  existed  in  1870, 
when  Earl  Granville  quickly  and  cheerfully  imposed 
on  England  the  obligation  to  take  part  against  either 
combatants  that  violated  Belgian  soil.  Neither 
combatant  was  much  tempted  to  do  so;  and  thus 
the  engagement  assumed  by  England — a  very  proper 
one  at  the  time — was  not  very  serious  or  onerous,  and 
saved  appearances  rather  than  created  responsibility. 
Now  the  position  is  entirely  changed.  If  England, 
with  a  view  to  securing  respect  for  Belgian  territory, 


222  APPENDIX  A 

were  to  bind  itself,  as  in  1870,  to  throw  its  weight  into 
the  balance  against  either  France  or  Germany,  should 
either  France  or  Germany  violate  Belgian  ground,  we 
might,  and  probably  should,  find  ourselves  involved  in 
a  war  of  giants  on  our  own  account. 

We  think  that    "  Diplomaticus "    understands    the 
English  people  when  he  hints  his  suspicions  that  such 
a  result  would  be  utterly  alien  alike  to  their  wishes 
and  to  their  interests.    For,  over  and  above  the  fact 
that,  as  we  have  seen,  the  temptation  to  violate  Belgian 
territory  by  either  side  is  much  greater  than  it  was  in 
1870,  the  relations  of  England  with  the  European 
Powers  have  necessarily  and  naturally  undergone  con- 
siderable modification  during  that  period.    We  concur 
with  our  correspondent  in  the  opinion  he  expresses 
that  for  England  and  Germany  to  quarrel,  it  matters 
not  upon  what  subject,  would  be  highly  injurious  to 
the  interests  of  both.     Indeed,  he  is  right  when  he 
says  that  the  main  outlines  of  our  policy  would  be 
blurred  and  its  main  purposes  embarrassed,  if  not 
defeated,  were  we  suddenly  to  find  ourselves  in  a  state 
of  hostility  to  Germany,  instead  of  one  of  friendliness 
and  sympathy.     No  doubt,  if  Germany  were  to  out- 
rage the  honour,  or  to  disregard  the  interests,  of  Eng- 
land, we  should  be  ready  enough  to  accept  the  chal- 
lenge thrown  down  to  us.     But  would  the  violation 
of  Belgian  territory,  whether  by  Germany  or  France, 
be  such  an  injury  to  our  interests?     It  might  be  so, 
in  certain  circumstances ;  and  it  would  assuredly  be  so 
if  it  involved  a  permanent  violation  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Belgium.     But,  as  "Diplomaticus"  ingeni- 
ously suggests,  there  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world 


APPENDIX  A  223 

between  the  momentary  use  of  a  'right  of  way,'  even 
if  the  use  of  the  right  of  way  be,  in  a  sense,  wrongful, 
and  the  appropriation  of  the  ground  covered  by  the 
right  of  way.  We  trust  that  both  Germany  and 
France  would  refrain  even  from  this  minor  trespass. 
But  if  they  did  not  ?  If  one  or  the  other  were  to  say 
to  England,  'All  the  military  approaches  to  France 
and  Germany  have  been  closed;  and  only  neutral  ap- 
proaches lie  open  to  us.  This  state  of  things  is  not 
only  detrimental,  but  fatal  to  our  military  success, 
and  it  has  arisen  since  the  Treaty  guaranteed  the 
sacredness  of  the  only  road  of  which  we  can  now 
avail  ourselves.  We  will,  as  a  fact,  respect  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium  and  we  will  give  you  the  most 
solemn  and  binding  guarantees  that,  at  the  end  of  the 
conflict,  Belgium  shall  be  as  free  and  independent  as 
before. '  If  Germany, — and,  of  course,  our  hypothesis 
applies  also  to  France — were  to  use  this  language — 
though  we  trust  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  it — we 
cannot  doubt  what  would  be  the  wise  and  proper 
course  for  England  to  pursue,  and  what  would  be  the 
answer  of  the  English  Government.  England  does  not 
wish  to  shirk  its  true  responsibilities.  But  it  would 
be  madness  for  us  to  incur  or  assume  responsibilities 
unnecessarily,  when  to  do  so  would  manifestly  involve 
our  participation  in  a  tremendous  War." 

On  the  same  day  the  "Pall  Mall  Gazette,"  then 
Liberal,  published  the  following  article  -. 
ENGLAND  AND  BELGIUM. 
Are  We  Bound  to  Intervene? 
There  Is  No  Guarantee. 

"The  'Standard'  this  morning  gives  special  prom- 


224  APPENDIX  A 

inence  to  a  letter  signed  'Diplomaticus,'  on  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  It  also  devotes  its  first  leading 
article  to  the  subject.  The  gist  of  these  utterances 
may  be  summed  up  in  two  propositions:  (1)  Eng- 
land is  under  a  treaty  of  obligation  to  defend  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium;  (2)  But  circumstances  have  al- 
tered since  the  contraction  of  the  said  obligation,  and 
as  against  Germany,  at  any  rate,  England  must  pocket 
its  pledges,  and  allow  France  to  be  invaded  through 
Belgium  without  protesting  or  interfering. 

"Considerable  importance  is  likely  to  be  attached 
to  these  conclusions  abroad  owing  to  its  being  under- 
stood that  the  '  Standard'  is  at  present  the  Governmen- 
tal and  Salisburian  organ.  Each  of  the  propositions 
laid  down  by  our  contemporary  is,  it  will  be  seen, 
likely  to  be  taken  hold  of.  Germany  might  read  the 
second  as  an  invitation  to  invade  France  through  Bel- 
gium ;  France  might  read  the  first  as  an  admission  of 
our  obligation  to  prevent,  or  rather  to  punish,  such  an 
infringement  of  neutral  territory,  if  we  dared. 

"It  becomes  important,  therefore,  to  point  out  that 
the  '  Standard 's '  argument  rests  on  a  false  asumption. 
We  do  not  for  the  present  argue  whether  in  the  con- 
tingencies contemplated  it  would  be  England's  inter- 
est to  intervene  by  declaring  war  against  whichever 
belligerent  might  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium; 
we  confine  ourselves  to  the  preliminary  statement — 
essential  for  clearing  up  the  case — that  it  is  not  Eng- 
land's obligation  to  do  so. 

' '  The  origin  of  the  mistaken  views  prevailing  on  the 
question  is  undoubtedly  a  confusion  between  the  Spe- 
cial Treaty  of  1870  and  the  preceding  General  Treaties 


APPENDIX  A  225 

of  1831  and  1839  which  it  temporarily  superceded.  By 
the  treaty  of  1870  the  obligation  of  England  was,  of 
course,  clear  and  specific.  Here  is  the  pledge  which 
was  given  in  the  identical  treaties  concluded  mutatis 
mutandis  with  both  France  and  Prussia : 

"  'Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  declares  that  if  during 
the  said  hostilities  the  armies  of  France  (or  Prussia) 
should  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  she  ^\'ill  be 
prepared  to  co-operate  with  his  Prussian  Majesty  (or 
the  Emperor  of  the  French)  for  the  defence  of  the 
same  in  such  manner  as  may  be  mutually  agreed  upon, 
employing  for  that  purpose  her  naval  and  military 
forces  to  ensure  its  observance.' 

"There  could  be  no  doubt  about  that  pledge;  but 
then  it  expired  twelve  months  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace.  At  the  expiration  of  that  period,  so  the  treaty 
continued : 

"  'The  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium 
will,  so  far  as  the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  respec- 
tively concerned,  continue  to  rest  as  heretofore  on  the 
first  article  of  the  Quintuple  Treaty  of  the  19th  of 
April,  1839.' 

"Now,  what  some  people  do  is  to  read  this  treaty  of 
1839  by  the  light  of  the  more  specific  treaty  of  1870, 
and  to  deduce  from  the  former  the  same  obligation  on 
the  part  of  England  to  intervene  against  any  infringe- 
ment of  Belgium's  neutrality  as  was  contained  in  the 
1870  treaty. 

"This,  however,  is  a  completely  untenable  proceed- 
ing. The  treaty  of  1839  must  stand  on  its  own  legs, 
and  these,  it  will  be  seen,   are  by  no  means  very 


226  APPENDIX  A 

strong.  The  following  are  the  terms  of  its  second  ar- 
ticle : 

"  'H.  M.  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary 
and  Bohemia,  H.  M.  the  King  of  the  French,  H.  M. 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  H.  M.  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  H.  M.  the 
Emperor  of  ALL  the  Russias,  declare  that  the  articles 
hereby  annexed  to  the  treaty  concluded  this  day  be- 
tween his  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  his 
Majesty  the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  Grand  Duke  of 
Luxemberg,  are  considered  as  having  the  same  force 
and  value  as  if  they  were  textually  inserted  in  the 
present  Act,  and  that  they  were  thus  placed  under  the 
guarantee  of  their  Majesties.' 

' '  Here,  then,  we  are  sent  off  from  the  treaty  between 
the  Great  Powers  to  the  treaty  between  Belgium  and 
the  Netherlands.  The  seventh  article  of  this  treaty 
(which  is  identical  with  the  same  article  of  the  1831 
treaty)   runs: 

' '  *  Belgium  will  form,  within  the  limits  indicated  in 
1,  2,  and  4,  an  independent  and  perpetually  neutral 
State.  She  will  be  bound  to  observe  this  same  neu- 
trality towards  all  other  States.' 

' '  In  this  treaty  it  will  be  seen  there  is  nothing  about 
any  guarantee;  all  that  can  be  elicited  from  it,  and 
from  the  one  cited  as  referring  to  it,  is  this,  that  this 
clause  is  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  'their  said 
Majesties,'  that  is,  England,  Austria,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Russia. 

''But  that  is  not  all.  This  constructive  guarantee 
must  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  party  to  whom 
it  was  given — namely,  to  the  Netherlands.     For  the 


APPENDIX  A  227 

treaty  of  1839  was  one  between  the  five  Powers  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Netherlands  on  the  other ;  and  what 
the  five  Powers  did  M^as  to  guarantee  to  the  Nether- 
lands the  treaty  contracted  between  it  and  Belgium, 
one  clause  of  which  treaty  said  that  Belgium  should 
form  'an  independent  and  perpetually  neutral  State,' 
and  should  'be  bound  to  observe  such  neutrality 
towards  all  other  States.' 

"In  the  treaty  of  1831,  it  is  true,  there  was  a 
further  article  guaranteeing  the  execution  of  all  pre- 
ceding articles  (including,  therefore,  the  one  just 
cited  in  similar  terms  from  the  1839  treaty)  to  the 
King  of  the  Belgians,  but  in  the  1839  treaty,  on  which 
the  independence  of  Belgium  is  now  said  to  rest.  Lord 
Palmerston  omitted  any  such  guarantee. 

"There  is,  therefore,  no  English  guarantee  to  Bel- 
gium. It  is  possible,  perhaps,  to  'construct'  such  a 
guarantee;  hut  the  case  may  he  summed  up  as  follows : 
(1)  England  is  under  no  guarantee  whatever  except 
such  as  is  common  to  Austria,  France,  Russia,  and 
Germany;  (2)  that  guarantee  is  not  specifically  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  at  all;  and  (3)  is  given  not  to 
Belgium  hut  to  the  Netherlands." 

The  "Spectator,"  on  Feb.  5,  said: 
".  .  .  the  general  idea  (is)  that  England  will 
keep  out  of  this  (war).  .  .  That  she  will  try  to  do 
so  we  do  not  doubt,  but  there  is  the  Belgian  difficulty 
ahead.  Our  guarantee  for  her  is  not  a  solitary  one, 
and  would  not  bind  us  to  fight  alone;  but  there  are 
general  interests  to  be  considered.  The  probability 
is  that  we  shall  insist  on  her  not  becoming  a  theatre 


228  APPENDIX  A 

of  war  but  shall  not  bar — as  indeed  we  cannot  bar — 
the  traversing  of  her  soil. ' ' 

The  above  extracts  are  reprinted  in  Sanger  and 
Norton,  {op.  cit.)  and  in  the  ''Labour  Leader"  of 
Feb.  4,  1915.  Messrs.  Sanger  &  Norton  sum  up  their 
discussion  as  follows : 

' '  From  all  the  evidence  it  is  clear  that  in  the  past 
the  British  Government  has  not  considered  that  the 
Treaty  of  1839  imposed  a  binding  obligation  to  go  to 
war  with  any  Power  which  infringed  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium"  (p.  109). 


APPENDIX  B.  " 

What  Support  Did  We  Offer  to  France  in  1905  ? 

The  evidence  as  to  our  attitude  during  1905  con- 
sists partly  of  leading  articles  in  "The  Times",  partly 
of  revelations  in  the  "Figaro"  and  the  "Matin"  in 
October,  1905,  partly  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  con- 
fession that  he  authorised  military  and  naval  con- 
versations with  the  French  in  January,  1906,  during 
the  General  Election  of  that  month. 

"The  Times"  is  universally  believed  on  the  Con- 
tinent to  be  inspired  by  the  Foreign  Office,  and  care- 
ful readers  will  find  that,  until  the  last  few  months, 
it  has  invariably,  in  its  articles  on  foreign  affairs, 
represented  the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office  when- 
ever it  is  known  what  that  policy  was.  It  is  natural 
to  suppose  that  it  has  also  represented  the  Foreign  of- 
fice at  times  when  the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Ofifice  is 
not  otherwise  known.  Now  from  the  moment  of  the 
Kaiser's  first  demand  for  a  Conference,  "The  Times" 
opposed  the  very  idea.  Never  once  did  it  hint  that  Ger- 
many was  "justified  in  asking  for  a  Conference",  as 
Professor  Murray  now  concedes.  Everything  that ' '  The 
Times"  could  do,  it  did,  to  encourage  France  to 
resist  the  German  demands,  and  to  make  France  feel 
that  our  support  would  be  given  whatever  the  conse- 
quences of  resistance  might  be.* 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  his  speech  on  August  3,  1914, 
told  us  that,  in  January,  1906,  just  when  the  Algeciras 

•See  "Times",  April  6,  June  16,  1905. 


230  APPENDIX  B 

Conference  was  assembling,  a  sudden  crisis  arose, 
and  he,  at  the  request  of  the  French,  authorised  the 
discussion  of  plans  for  military  and  naval  co-opera- 
tion in  the  event  of  England  and  France  being  jointly 
involved  in  war  with  Germany.  He  gave  this  au- 
thorisation after  consulting  only  three  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet;  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole,  by  his 
own  confession,  was  not  informed  of  his  action  until 
a  much  later  time.  Now  the  occurrence  of  these  con- 
versations at  this  time  proves  that  we  were  at  any 
rate  not  opposed  in  principle  to  the  military  support 
of  France  in  its  policy  of  Moroccan  conquest,  even 
if  that  policy  should  entail  all  the  horrors  from  which 
Europe  is  now  suffering. 

The  remaining  evidence  is  contained  in  revelations 
made  by  the  ''Matin"  and  the  ''Figaro,"  of  which 
the  substance  may  be  read  in  "The  Times"  of  Oc- 
tober, 1905.  "The  Times"  of  Oct.  9,  1905,  contains 
the  following  note  from  its  Paris  Correspondent  on 
the  Matin  revelations  concerning  the  proceedings 
at  the  Council  of  Ministers  which  ended  in  M.  Del- 
casse's  resignation, 

*'He  (M.  Delcasse)  declared  that  France  could  not 
go  to  the  proposed  international  conference  (i.  e. 
Algeciras  that  was  to  be)  without  belittling  herself 
and  running  the  risk  of  submitting  to  the  discussion 
of  Third  Powers  two  agreements  which  bore  her 
signature  and  which  had  been  ratified  by  her  Parlia- 
ment. He  furnished  documentary  evidence  that  Eng- 
land, Spain,  Italy,  Russian  and  the  United  States 
were  ready  to  refuse  their  adhesion  to  the  Conference 
scheme.     ...     He  further  informed  his  colleagues 


APPENDIX  B  231 

that  Great  Britain  was  ready,  whatever  might  hap- 
pen, to  back  up  France  to  the  very  end,  and  that  in 
the  improbable  eventuality  of  an  unexpected  ag- 
gression Great  Britain  would  side  with  her.  In  a 
footnote  the  Editor  of  the  Matin  states  that  England 
verbally  informed  the  French  government  that,  if 
France  was  attacked,  she  was  ready  to  mobilise  her 
fleet,  to  seize  the  Kiel  canal,  and  to  land  100,000  men 
in  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment was  subsequently  informed  that  if  they  wished 
it  this  offer  would  be  made  in  writing. ' ' 

"The  Times"  leading  article  on  this  says: 

**M.  Delcasse,  it  (the  ''Matin")  affirms,  informed 
his  colleagues  that  England  was  ready  to  support 
France  and  that  in  the  event  of  an  unexpected  act 
of  aggression  directed  against  France,  England  would 
side  with  the  Republic.  With  that  statement  we  have 
no  fault  to  find.  We  do  not  all  doubt  that  in  such  a 
contingency  the  English  Government  would  have  sup- 
ported France  with  the  hearty  approval  of  the  nation. 
But  we  very  much  doubt  the  further  announcement 
which  the  Matin  makes  upon  its  own  responsibility 
that  England  had  verbally  informed  the  French  Gov- 
ernment that  she  was  prepared  to  take  certain  specific 
action  in  that  contingency.  We  believe  on  the  con- 
trary that  the  French  Government  very  wisely  re- 
frained from  asking  for  any  assurances  of  the  kind 
mentioned. ' ' 

On  Oct.  13th,  the  Paris  Correspondent  notes  that 
Jaures  declared  in  a  speech  at  Limoges  that  he  knew 
things  did  really  take  place  as  stated. 

On  Oct.  13th,  the  Paris  Correspondent  says  that 


232  APPENDIX  B 

Jaures  has  written  in  I'Humanite :  I  was  not  aware 
that  it  was  in  Sehleswig-Holstein  that  England  was 
to  land  100,000  men,  but,  with  the  exception  of  this 
precise  statement,  I  heard  at  the  moment  of  the  crisis 
from  a  direct  and  safe  French  source  everything  that 
M.  Delcasse  said  at  the  Council  of  Ministers  as  to  the 
intervention  offered  by  England.  I  heard  at  the 
time  that  she  wanted  to  engage  herself  towards  us, 
even  by  a  written  treaty,  to  support  us  against  Ger- 
many, not  only  by  the  mobilisation  of  the  Fleet,  but 
by  the  landing  of  100,000  men." 

On  Oct.  14th,  the  Paris  Correspondent  writes  that 
the  following  semi-official  note  is  published  by  the 
Havas  Agency : 

''We  are  authorised  to  declare  that  the  accounts 
which  have  appeared  in  the  newspapers  as  to  the  in- 
cidents that  accompanied  the  retirement  of  M.  Del- 
casse and  particularly  the  details  as  to  the  Minister- 
ial Council  which  preceded  this  retirement  are  inac- 
curate. ' ' 

The  correspondent  goes  on  to  say:  "The  Editor 
of  the  'Matin',  M.  Stephane  Lauzanne,  declares  that 
every  line  which  appeared  over  his  signature  and 
which  described  what  took  place  at  the  Council  of 
Ministers  on  June  6  was  strictly  accurate.  M.  Lau- 
zanne refers  to  the  speech  delivered  by  M.  Jaures 
at  Limoges  on  Sunday  and  to  the  article  published 
on  Thursday  in  VHumanite.  ...  He  also  in- 
vokes the  testimony  of  the  "Daily  Mail"  of  yester- 
day and  of  the  '^ Petite  Bepuhlique"  of  the  same  date. 
.  *For  three  days  past',  says  M.  Louzanne — 
'  Prince  Biilow  's  press  has  been  calling  upon  the  Eng- 


APPENDIX  B  233 

lish  and  French  Governments  to  contradict  officially. 
To  this  summons  the  British  government 
replies  by  a  contemptuous  shrug  of  the  shoulders 
but  the  French  Government  bows  before  the  order 
coming  from  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine.  The  note 
communicated  to-day  has  a  new  name.  It  is  not 
called  a  dementi.  It  is  called  ^tme  complaisance/  " 
The  Paris  Correspondent  continues  to  note  that  the 
"Figaro"  gives  facts  of  the  British  offer  during  the 
year  which  elapsed  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement.  "The  British  Government,"  it 
says,  **  approached  our  diplomatists  on  three  occa- 
sions in  order  to  ascertain  whether  France  was  will- 
ing to  conclude  a  definite  treaty  of  alliance.  The 
French  Government,  from  regard  no  doubt  for  Rus- 
sia, who  was  engaged  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain's 
ally,  declined  to  take  this  question  into  consideration. 
But  when  the  Franco-German  conflict  reached  an 
acute  stage,  French  diplomacy  took  up  the  question 
for  itself.  Our  Ambassador  in  London,  M.  Cambon, 
obtained  from  Lord  Lansdowne  the  verbal  assurance 
of  effective  support  from  England  in  the  event  of  a 
conflagration,  and  M.  Cambon  was  able  to  announce 
to  M.  Delcasse  that,  the  casus  foederis  once  given, 
Great  Britain  would  reiterate  this  assurance  in  writ- 
ing. Thus  it  was  that  about  the  15th  of  June,  Lord 
Lansdowne  was  able  to  declare  to  some  friends  that 
in  the  event  of  a  Franco-German  war,  there  would 
not  be  the  least  doubt  about  the  intervention  of  Great 
Britain.  I  was  told  in  Berlin  from  a  highly  official 
source  that  Germany  had  been  informed  of  these 
events  towards  the  middle  of  May  by  Count  Wolff- 


234  APPENDIX  B 

Mettemich,  the  German  Ambassador  in  London. ' '  The 
German  Emperor,  the  Figaro  writer  goes  on  to  say, 
took  immediate  action  by  communicating  the  infor- 
mation through  Italy  to  France,  thus  bringing  about 
the  resignation  of  M.  Delcasse. 

The  same  note  goes  on  to  state  that : 

*  *  Renter 's  Agency  is  enabled  to  state  authoritatively 
with  regard  to  the  recent  sensational  revelations  in 
the  French  Press  that  Germany  has  been  informed 
by  Great  Britain  that  the  question  of  the  latter 's 
offering  assistance  to  France  never  arose,  that  France 
never  asked  for  assistance  and  further  that  Great 
Britain  never  offered  it." 

"On  enquiry  in  British  Government  circles  with 
reference  to  the  above.  Renter's  Agency  is  informed 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  is  not  making  any 
statement  on  the  subject." 

The  "Times"  leading  article  on  the  16th  of  Oct. 
says: 

' '  We  do  not  know,  and  we  do  not  pretend  to  know, 
how  the  French  nation  came  to  understand,  as  they 
did  understand  with  good  reason,  that  in  the  event 
of  an  unprovoked  attack  upon  them  arising  out  of 
the  Anglo-French  Agreement  we  should  support  them. 
But  as  M.  Clemenceau  argues  with  unanswerable 
force  in  the  Aurore,  what  conceivable  grounds  can 
Germany  or  any  other  peaceable  power  have  to 
complain  of  that? 

"Our  support  would  be  given  only  in  the  case  of 
unprovoked  aggression.  Germany  declares  that  she 
never  dreams  of  unprovoked  aggression  against  any- 


APPENDIX  B  235 

body  and  certainly  not  against  France  at  the  present 
time.    Why  then  does  she  cry  out? 

"That  the  French  ever  asked  for  assurances  of  our 
intervention,  or  that  we  ever  gratuitously  offered 
them,  we  do  not  for  a  moment  believe.  That  the  Ger- 
mans should  be  exceedingly  inquisitive  as  to  our  re- 
lations with  France  is  not  surprising.  That  they  will 
discover  anything  more  than  has  already  been  openly 
proclaimed  to  the  world  we  do  not  think  likely." 
On  Oct.  27,  the  Paris  correspondent  says  that: 
"M.  Andre  Mevil  in  Echo  de  Paris  writes: 
'Towards  the  middle  of  June  we  informed  England 
that  the  ill-will  of  Germany  became  daily  more  evi- 
dent and  that  the  crisis,  instead  of  passing  away,  was 
only  being  aggravated.  On  June  20,  M.  Paul  Cam- 
bon,  who  had  spent  48  hours  in  Paris,  returned  to 
London,  with  precise  instructions  from  the  French 
Government.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  21st  he  had  a 
long  conversation  with  Lord  Lansdowne  at  the  For- 
eign Office,  in  the  course  of  which  he  informed  him  of 
the  situation.  When  once  the  British  government 
knew  exactly  what  was  taking  place  they  decided  to 
intervene  energetically.  I  remember  that  on  the  even- 
ing of  June  21  a  rumour  was  current  in  London  that 
next  day,  or  the  day  after  at  the  latest.  Count  Wolff- 
Metternich,  the  German  Ambassador  in  London, 
would  have  a  significant  interview  with  Lord  Lans- 
downe. Being  in  London  at  the  time  I  heard  the 
news.  The  truth  is  that  Lord  Lansdowne  had  officially 
declared  to  Count  Wolff-Metternich  that  if  ever  Ger- 
many attacked  France,  all  the  military  forces  of  the 
British  Empire  would  come  to  the  assistance  of  the 


236  APPENDIX  B 

latter.    Thus  twice  in  less  than  a  month  England  had 
offered  her  support  to  France. '  ' ' 

None  of  this  evidence  is  conclusive  on  either  side, 
and  I  have  not  found  any  way  of  arriving  at  certainty 
as  to  our  promises  in  1905. 


INDEX 

Absurdity  of  war.  31. 

Adversary,  overcome  by  understanding-  your,  56. 

Afghanistan,  British  suzerainty  in  ,171. 

Agadir  crisis,  the,  158,  170. 

Aggression,  German,  74. 

Agreements  in  Morocco,  secret,  145. 

Alarmist  campaign,  an,  206. 

Algeciras,  conference  at,  90,  134,  151;  act  of,  153,  230. 

Alien,  distrust  of  the,  61. 

Alliance  and  democracy,  the,  33. 

Alliance  and  Entente,  the  game  of,  95. 

Alsace,  Lorraine,  83,  96. 

Ambitions  and  methods,  English  and  German,  209. 

America,    community    of    interests    in,    93;    the    champion    of 

mankind,  96;  peace  loving,  209. 
American-Indian  war  of  conquest,  28. 
Ammunition  and  vested  interests,  118. 
Anachronisms,  38. 
Anarchy,  international,  59. 
Ancient  wars,  28. 
Angell,  Norman,  27. 

Anglo-French  Entente  in  1904,  83;  loan  to  Russia,  tlie,  177. 
Anglo-German  enmity,  69;  negotiations  in  1909,  161. 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  172. 
Anglo-Russian  Entente,  171. 

Animal  mechanism  and  freedom  of  thought,  11. 
Archangel,  and  the  myth  of  the  Russian  army,  5. 
Aristocracy  and  money  grubbing,   91;  foreign  policy   of  the, 

98;  problem  of  the  English,  210. 
Articles  concerning  Egypt,  secret,  139. 
Artificial  obstacles,  217. 
Asquith,  Mr.,  127. 
Atavistic  moral  notions,  3. 
Athenian  civilization,  106. 
Atlantic,  German  naval  base  in  the,  159. 

Atrocities  in  all  the  armies.  111;  German,  6;  in  Persia,  198. 
Atrocity  myths,  4,  7. 
Attila,  106. 

Attrition,  effects  of  a  war  of,  109. 
Austria-Hungary,  174. 
Bagdad  railway,  the,  73,  133,  204. 
"Balance  of  power,"  98. 
Balfour,  Mr.,  172. 


238  INDEX 

Balkan  wars,  the,  30,  36,  133. 
Bayonets  and  artillery,  63. 

Belgium,  the  Russian  army  in,  5;  the  grey  book,  9;  sufferings 
of,  25;  claims  of,  121;  Germany's  invasion  of,  126;  the 
occasion  for  violence  and  of  hypocrisy,  129;  not  the  occa- 
sion of  interventions,  129;  the  secret  treaty,  131;  and 
Morocco,  147-148;  and  Persia,  180,  193;  neutrality  of,  216; 
the  temporary  use  of  right  of  way,  218. 

Berlin,  the  German  cruiser,  158. 

Bessemer  process  in  1879,  the,  76. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  10. 

Bismarck,  Prince,   76.   217. 

Blame  not  all  one  one  side,  the,  125. 

Blessings  of  war,  28. 

Boers,  the,  45,  131. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  84. 

Boxers  in  China,  145. 

Brailsford,  Mr.,  125-126. 

British  democracy,  interests  of  the,  211. 

British  foreign  policy,  123. 

Browne,  Professor  Edward;  and  Germany  and  Persia,  ISO. 

Brute  within  us,  the,  88. 

Bureaucracy,  and  radicals,  173. 

Burglar  agreements  in  Morocco,  145. 

Bushire,  191. 

Byzantine  attitude,  the,  116. 

Cabinet  of  nations,  England's  place  in  the,  167. 

Caliber  of  the  next  generation,  the  mental,  115. 

Cameroons,  the,  133. 

Casablanca,  57. 

Case  for  the  Entente,  133;  for  the  Germans,  134-135. 

Cavaliers,  32. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  131. 

Charles  II  and  Dutch  wars,  32. 

Christ,  Jesus,  34. 

Civilization,  modern,  68. 

Clemenceau,  M.,  176. 

Compensation  in  Morocco,  German  demands,  156-7. 

Condorcet,  53. 

Conference  on  Morocco,  Kaiser's  just  demand  for  an  interna- 
tional, 148. 

Continent,  a  necessity  of  friends  on  the,  131. 

Conversations  with  the  French,  naval,  129. 

Co-operation  and  competition,  prehistoric,  87. 

Council  of  the  powers,  a,  41. 

Coventry  ordnance  works,  208. 

Creditor  nation,  England  a  rich,  215. 

Credulity  in  war  time,  5. 

Criticism,  effective,  211. 


INDEX  239 


Crushing  Germany,  121. 

Cubans,  American  interference  and  the,  45. 

Economic  injury  in  war,  25;  organization,  88;  exhaustion,  117. 

"Egging  on"  to  war  by  England  and  Germany,  150. 

Egypt,  agreement  concerning  the  political  status  of,  139. 

Encirclement  of  Germany  by  the  Entente,  the,  133. 

Enemy,  internal  and  external,  the,  55;  of  the  common  people, 
210. 

England's  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  9;  and  the  Triple 
Alliance  in  1887,  readiness  to  provoke  war  in  1911,  142. 

Enjoyment  of  war,  60. 

Epoch?  are  we  at  the  end  of  a  great,  121. 

European  rule  over  uncivilized  nations,  50. 

Evidence  for  false  beliefs  in  war  and  in  religion,  5;  contra- 
dictory, 150. 

Evils  produced  by  war,  12,  24. 

False  stories,  an  accident  of  war,  8. 

Fashoda  incident,  the,  132,  142. 

Feeling  as  an  ethical  factor,  20. 

Ferocity  developed  in  war,  16. 

Financiers,  the  yoke  of,  202. 

Finland,  14,  171,  177. 

Food  supplies,  threatening  a  nation's,  50. 

Foreign  office,  the  immaculate  sinlessness  of  the,  126;  criti- 
cism of  the,  130;  The  Times,  162;  and  the  common  people, 
210. 

France,  not  Belgium,  the  decisive  factor,  127. 

Freedom  of  the  sea,  79. 

French  yellow  book,  170. 

Friends  of  peace,  97. 

German  navy,  the,  141;  colonial  expansion,  204;  defenses,  220. 

Governing  classes  the  enemy  of  the  common  people,  210. 

Government  impossible  without  the  consent  of  the  governed, 
49. 

Granville,  Earl,  217. 

Grey,  Sir  E.,  123;  and  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  127,  141;  his 
cardinal  principles,  149;  mention  of,  159,  167,  183,  184,  192, 
201;  and  Persia,  180;  and  the  secret  treaty  with  France, 
227  et  seq. 

Grievances  against  Mr.  Shuster,  196. 

Hatred  of  the  enemy,  6;  a  biological  instinct,  11;  interna- 
tional, 26;  of  England,  67;  called  a  noble  indignation,  71; 
menace  to  civilization,  112;  hymns  of,  122. 

Hegemony  of  the  Balkans,  the,  36. 

Highwayman  ethics,  50. 

Homer  and  the  Old  Testament,  imagination  dominated  by  31. 

Homicide,  instinct  to,  58. 

Homo  sapiens,  15. 


240  INDEX 

Horse  dealer  diplomacy,  91. 

Hymns  of  hate,  122. 

Ideals  supported  by  force,  33. 

Idle  rich,  the,  51,  120. 

Incentives  to  war.  62. 

India,  English  tribute  from,  52;  and  British  aggression,  45. 

Industrial  progress,  German,  76. 

International  consciousness,  13;  law,  21. 

Intrigue,  the  game  of,  90-91,  153. 

Investigation  of  atrocity  stories,  7. 

Isvolsky,  M.,  184. 

Jameson  Raid,  the,  154. 

Japan,  alliance  with,  132,  172,  182. 

Jingo  phrases,  and  the  wage-earning  class,  212. 

Judgment  by  formula,  21. 

Kaiser,  the,  125,  168,  189,  190. 

Knout  in  Persia,  the  Russian,  200. 

Knowledge  with  elevation  of  mind,  18. 

Kostyleff,  N.,  2. 

Labour  Leader,  the,  7. 

Land  Blue  Books  and  old  newspapers  a  source  of  information 

on  secret  acts  of  the  foreign  ofTice,  158. 
Landowners  of  England,  the,  26,  51. 
Landsdowne,  Lord,  123,  150. 
Latin-Slav  league  in  Paris,  173. 
Leibniz,  on  war,  1. 
Le  Matin,  144. 
Liakhoff,  Colonel,  187. 

Liberals,  and  English  Russian  loan,  178. 
"Lies,"  8. 

Lloyd-George,  148. 
London  papers,  126. 
Love,  falling  in,  15. 
Loving  our  enemies,  27. 
Luxemburg,  the  Duchy  of,  35. 
Motives  for  war,  114. 
MuUiner,  Mr.,  207. 
Murray,  Prof.  Gilbert,  124,  145. 
Mushiru  '1-Mulk,  the,  183. 
Myths,  national,  70. 
Napoleonic  wars,  the,  26. 
Nation,  as  an  entity,  the,  63. 
National  humiliation,  a  cause  of  war,  170. 
Navy,  the  German,  71-72,  77,  132,  205. 
Naval  estimates  based  on  false  facts,  English,  206. 
Nervous  endurance  will  decide  this  war,  16. 
Neutrality  of  Belgium,  9;  neutral  territory,  221. 
Newspapers,  174. 


INDEX  241 


Nicholson,  Sir  Arthur,  188. 

Non-combatants,  24. 

Non-resistance,  the  principle  of,  35,  42-43;  its  possible  opera- 
tion, 47-48. 

Open  Door  and  Germany's  colonization  plans,  the,  134,  140, 
160. 

Pacifism,  difficulties  of,  65,  86. 

Pack,  the  human,  57. 

Panic,  measures  dictated  by,   141. 

Paper  guarantees,  79. 

Parable  of  the  Agadir  crisis,  165-6. 

Pareto,  V.,  2. 

Parties  and  foreign  policy,  211. 

Passive  resistance,  44,  47-8. 

Patriotism,  14,  62,  66;  in  its  degraded  form,  93. 

Panther,  the  German  gunboat,  158. 

Peace,    11;    universal,    42;    conditions    for   a   lasting,    94;    the 

Kaiser  on  the  side  of,  168. 
Peloponnesian  war,  the,  13. 
Pericles,  117. 
Persia,  14,  22,  85;  partition  of,  132,  185;  peaceful  penetration 

of,  179;  and  Belgium,  180;  Russian  intervention  in,  187-8; 

highly  civilized,  190;  ultimatum  to,  195;  Sir  E.  Grey  and, 

203,  214. 
Phrases,  influence  of,  31. 
Plato  on  non-resistance,  43. 
"Playing  Off,"  the  game  of,  174. 
Poland,  reconquering,  171,  178. 
Policies  of  the  Great  Powers,  the,  203. 
Policing  Morocco.  151-152. 
Potsdam  agreement,  the,  135,  189. 
Prestige  and  war,  36,  57,  163,  165. 
Pretexts  for  war,  22. 
Pride  as  a  virtue,  53;  stronger  than  self  interest,  80;  national. 

92;  motive  for  continuing  war,  122. 
Primitive  poetry  and  war,  16. 
Principle  in  this  war,  no  great,  13,  32. 
Professorial  parasites,  17. 

Professors,  German  and  English,  views  of,  68-69. 
Pro-Germans,  English,  124. 
Promises  to  France  in  1905,  England's,  236. 
Protestant  and  Catholic  wars,  31. 
Prussian,  the,  53. 

Public  opinion  and  diplomacy,  210. 
Punic  wars,  the,  68. 
(Quakers  and  non-resistance,  40. 
Questions  of  right  and  wrong,  20. 
Radical  and  labour  elements,  and  the  foreign  policy,  162. 


242  INDEX 

Rectitude  of  Germany's  claims  in  Morocco,  legal,  163. 

Renaissance,  the,  120. 

Revanche,  policy  of  the,  142. 

Revolution,  the  Russian,  174. 

Right  of  way,  temporary  use  of  the,  218. 

Rights  under  the  Algeciras  Act,  German,  155-156. 

Rivalry  of  states,  83. 

Romain,  Rolland,  2. 

Roman  civilization,  106. 

Roseberry,  Lord,  and  "continuity"  in  foreign  policy,  210. 

Roundheads,  32. 

Rum  and  colonization,  50. 

Russian  loans  and  the  Duma,  175-6. 

Sacred  fires,  guardians  of  the,  18. 

Salonika,  139. 

Sarajevo  murders,  the,  36. 

Savage,  the  noble,  29. 

Scie7itia,  The,  1,  67,  138. 

"Scraps  of  paper,"  90,  189. 

Secret  diplomacy,  38,  84,  144. 

Self  deception,  10. 

Servia,  34. 

Shah  and  Anglo-Russian  loans,  the,  182. 

Shaw,  Bernard,  2. 

Shereef  and  the  Moorish  government,  the,  146. 

Shibboleths,  political,  98. 

Shuja-ud-Dowleh,  201. 

Shuster,  Morgan,  191,  195-6. 

Signatory  powers  in  Morocco,  151-153. 

Sikat-ul-Islam,  the,  199. 

Slavdom,  34. 

"Smashing"  a  nation,  30. 

Socialism  and  political  sanity,  27,  98. 

Socialists  and  the  intellectuals,  10. 

Social  justice,  26. 

Spiritual  freedom,  53. 

Starvation,  defeat  by,  76. 

Strike,  defense  by  general,  49. 

Submarines  and  naval  power,  78. 

Subtle  untruths,  1. 

Supporting  a  state,  effects  of,  214. 

Supremacy,  naval,  72. 

Swiss  International  Revieiv,  1  (note). 

Tangier,  the  German  Emperor  and,  146. 

Teheran,  171. 

Thirty  years'  war,  the,  106. 

Three  years'  service  law,  the,  169. 

Times,  The,  160,  169. 

Tolstoy,  34,  41. 


INDEX  243 

Transvaal  and  British  aggression,  the,  45. 

Treaties  have  not  the  binding  force  of  private  contracts,  22; 
of  neutrality,  224;  secret,  143. 

Trevelyan,  George,  32. 

Triple  Entente  policy  in  1911,  133;  no  justice  for  Germany, 
157. 

Tripoli  war,  the,  133. 

Truth  neutral  in  its  essence,  2;  ideals  of,  18. 

Turner,  G.  D.,  197,  (note). 

Unrequited  hatred,  54. 

"Victory  and  the  fundamental  irrational  belief,  11. 

Wage  earners  and  the  war  loss,  120. 

Wallace,  Graham,  60. 

War,  justifiable?  20;  four  kinds  of,  28;  evils  and  blessings  of, 
27;  condemned  by  Christ  and  Tolstoy,  34;  a  disaster  to 
neutrals,  80;  physical  and  moral  effects  of  the  present, 
109;  steps  toward,  168;  the  price  of  the  diplomatic  game, 
170;  causes  national  humiliation,  170. 

Washington,  the  neutral  atmosphere  of,  96. 

Wells,  H.  G.,  60. 

Whitewashing,  political,  139. 

William  the  Conqueror,  50. 

Witte,  M.,  173,  174. 

Wolff-Metternich,  Count,  233. 

Yoke  of  cabinets  and  financiers,  the,  202. 


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